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ABSTRACT 
ABSTRACT 
The Arab region comprises a group of developing countries which sought 
further socio-economic development through institutionalizing their 
cooperation. Within this context intensified efforts have been made 
toward their economic integration. The oil boom of the 1970s and the 
subsequent enormous wealth accruing to the region increased the 
pressures on the Arab States to institutionalize their financial 
cooperation and to integrate their financial markets. 
The main objectives of this study are to examine the problems and 
prospects of the integrated Arab Financial Markets. We hold the 
view that the development of the national financial markets is the 
first step toward creating integrated Arab Financial Markets. And 
we assume that the primary objective of the Arabs in integrating their 
financial markets is to finance economic development and to achieve 
financial equilibrium for the region as a whole. 
Accordingly, this study investigates three main areas of interest which 
are (a) the structure and performance of the region's emerging 
financial markets, (b) their role in economic development and the flow 
of funds from the high savings countries to low savings ones, (c) 
desirable policies and procedural changes to improve efficiency and 
create or strengthen the links between the national financial 
institutions in order to enlarge their contribution to national and 
regional development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the Arab countries have shown some interest in 
the integration of their financial markets as one of the major 
instruments for developing the Arab region.(1) This interest has been 
consolidated by the growing interdependence of the Arab countries' 
economies. This is evident both in the significant movement of people 
and of capital within the region on an unprecedented scale; in the 
growth of regional investment and trade; in the desire to establish a 
real industrial base in the region; and in the unnecessarily large 
proportion of the region's savings held abroad.(2) 
The backwardness of the region's financial systems in the early 1970s 
prevented it from playing any significant role in recycling the capital 
surplus of the oil-exporting countries and passed this opportunity to 
the international banks which recycled most of this surplus outside the 
region.(3) The development of the Arab financial markets was seen as a 
precondition for correcting those conditions and channelling more funds 
for domestic development.(4} The integration of the Arab markets was 
seen by some writers in the region as the appropriate channel to 
transfer funds from the high saving Arab countries to the low saving 
countries.(5) The popular appeal of the integrated Arab financial 
markets induced the twenty Governors of the Arab Central Banks to 
examine this issue in 1978 and to agree to make greater efforts towards 
its realization.(6} Consequently new financial institutions were set 
up: new commercial banks, development banks Islamic banks, investment 
companies, securities markets and other types of financial institution 
and arrangements required to fulfil specific functions relating to the 
transfer of funds within and outside the region.(7). As a result the 
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financial scene of the region began to change rapidly. 
In spite of its importance, this development has not been investigated 
thoroughly on the regional level before. It would appear that the Arab 
states have emphasized the integration of Arab capital markets as an 
instrument for economic growth, without giving much consideration to 
the existing socio-economic factors which would hinder its realization 
and without recognizing the expected inefficiencies and dangers 
associated with them. 
In this study we shall examine the problems and prospects of 
integrating Arab capital markets through an examination of the 
financial institutions and markets of the region. We will assume that 
the development of the national Arab capital markets is the first step 
towards their integration, and that the primary objective of the Arab 
countries in developing and integrating their markets is to facilitate 
the financing of economic development. In order to meet these 
objectives this study is presented in eight chapters:-
Chapter one will review the financial and economic literature available 
for dealing with questions related to financial growth, the size and 
nature of the markets, the emergence and development of various types 
of financial intermediaries and markets, economic and financial 
integration, and the impact of the markets on economic development. 
This review will serve as a theoretical background to an analysis of 
the nature and development of the financial institutions and markets 
in the region, and will enable us to pass judgement as to the degree 
of their efficiency, their impact on the process of economic 
development and the way in which improvement in their operation may 
be made. 
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The second chapter is concerned with the analysis of the socio-economic 
characteristics of the countries in the Arab region. It will focus on 
the distribution of the human and natural resources, the level of 
socio-economic development achieved, the availability and methods of 
financial utilization, and the eXisting economic co-operation within 
the region. This chapter is designed to serve as a necessary 
background to the proper understanding of the problems and prospects of 
integrating Arab capital markets, as the recent focus on Arab capital 
markets has been encouraged by the structural differences in the region. 
We shall argue here that the resources available in the region are 
poorly utilized due to their uneven distribution, and that the 
integration of the Arab financial market can particularly facilitate 
the achievement of a regional financial equilibrium. But overall 
economic integration is the road to comprehensive economic and social 
development on the regional level. 
Chapters three to six will examine the evolution and operation of the 
main constituents of the financial markets in the region: namely the 
banking system, the development banks, the Islamic banks and the stock 
markets. This analysis will show their organizational characteristics, 
the legal framework within which they operate, and their impact on 
the economic development of the national and regional level. 
This examination will enable us to judge their effectiveness with 
reference to the theoretical discussion in chapter one and within the 
framework of the regional economy presented in chapter two, and will 
enable us to identify any structural and operational faults in their 
function. We will then suggest measures which may be undertaken to 
improve their efficiency. Each chapter will be concluded with a short 
- 3 -
remark regarding the position of each type of institution within the 
region's financial structure and its importance in the provision of 
capital for productive investment. 
Chapter three is devoted to the analysis of the banking systems. Here 
we shall provide a detailed and extended analysis of the structure and 
function of the banking systems and emphasise more essential criteria 
of economic development and performance in relation to the Arab economy 
as a whole. This chapter can roughly be divided into five separate yet 
inter-related sections each section focuses upon distinct features of 
the banking system. 
The Introduction provides an introductory overview of the nature of 
the banking system. Here we shall indicate how the banking system has 
a dual function the first of which provides an adequate supply of an 
"acceptable money", the second function transfers capital between 
lenders and borrowers. The effective performance of this dual function 
played by the banking system is fundamental in the overall development 
of the economy. 
The first section deals with the structural and organizational nature 
of the banking system. Here it will become evident that the systems 
performance capacity is dependant on these organizational and 
structural factors. In order to have an adequate grasp of the 
structural nature of the banking systems within the region as a whole, 
we need to examine the structural change according to the historical 
events which influence growth of the system. During the colonial 
period the Europeans introduced the conventional banks for the first 
time, mainly as a means of facilitating trade with the centres and 
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to serve the colonial administrations. At this period of time 
indigenous banks were few and far between. After each Arab countries 
independence greater concern was placed on the establishment of 
national banks For the first time the banks were subjected to new 
regulations and the free era came to an end. Central banks or 
equivalent institutions were introduced to improve and overcome the 
previously existing deficient monetary systems. A second major role of 
these newly established central banks was to encourage and promote 
economic development. At this stage the more socialist oriented Arab 
countries for example Egypt, Syria and Algeria r~-organised their 
banking system and brought it firmly under state control, while at the 
same time standardizing their financial systems. 
In third period pertinent to structural change in the banking system 
which coincided with the oil boom in the early 1970s. The increase in 
oil prices created enormous liquid wealth which attracted the 
establishment of new banks both national and foreign. Additionally 
the new found wealth allowed Arab financial institutions and other 
wealthy people to establish banks abroad in such places as London, 
Paris and New York. Obviously, this led to an increase in the number of 
banks in the region and a further increase in the number of branches 
and their financial assets 
In the second section we shall examine the banking systems role in 
economic development. The introduction of the central banks improved 
the monetary system and helped create a more effective set of 
organizational principles, for example the central system played a 
prominent role in the supervision of the financial sector and aimed 
to promote its growth Equally the central system in many Arab 
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countries undertook the duties of managing government national debt. 
This section will also examine the commercial banks and their role 
in monetizing the economy, mobilising saving and extending credit to 
trade and other productive sector. The findings of this examination 
of the commercial banks reveals a poor performance in all of the three 
above functions. Most of the Arab countries depict a low monetizing 
ratio, low saving ratio and the sectoral distribution of finance showed 
bias toward short-term finance mainly for financing trade and 
construction. The productive sector which needs long-term credit was 
neglected. 
The third section provides a more critical analysis and draws out a 
number of possibilities which might improve the banking system. The 
growth of the Arab banking system expanded without any co-ordination 
between the various Arab countries which meant that organizational 
structure was heterogenous rather than homogenous. An example of this 
multifarious nature can be seen in the contrast beween the United Arab 
Emirates who have a population of less than one million people but over 
52 banks and Iraq with 13 million people and only one commercial bank. 
The national financial legislation and particularly banking regulations 
placed some barriers on the expansion of banks between countries, and 
like-wise, the imposition of ceiling limits on the interest rate 
structure placed constraints on the effective operations of the banks 
Another critical factor which hindered the effectiveness of the banks 
was their concentration on urban areas at the expense of rural areas. 
The banks were reluctant to spread to rural areas because they were 
cost ineffective. 
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In conclusion, in this chapter we will find that the overall 
development of the banks leaves much to be desired, there are a very 
few large banks with a regional base, the majority of the banks are 
small concentrating their operation to the urban centres in the 
countries of their origin. The expansion of some banks abroad diverted 
part of their efforts to serve their national countries. That is, they 
diverted part of their efforts elsewhere at the expense of economic 
development in Arab countries. Furthermore, unless the banks up-grade 
their resources, expand in the region and abandon their conservative 
lending policy they will continue to be fragmented and of little value 
for economic development in the region. 
Many economists would argue that the development banks are not an 
integral part of the capital market. These economists suggest that 
development banks have a distinct function which essentially aims to 
channel the public sector funds to special economic activity, as 
opposed to other financial institutions which explicitly work in 
channelling funds according to the market forces. However, I would 
argue that this is not the true state of affairs in the Arab region. 
Indeed, the development banks are the second most important sector in 
the Arab financial system and they perform a crucial role in the flow 
of capital at the regional level. What must be remembered is that the 
development banks have a special position in the developing countries, 
and in the first part of this chapter we shall examine this crucial 
rule and the rationality which underlines their establishment in the 
developing countries. Here will be presented the three main 
theoretical interpretations for the creation of such banks. Due to the 
weak forces in the developing countries it is unlikely for the 
financial institution to specialise in providing risky long-term 
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finance. The next interpretation highlights the problems and 
deficiencies inbuilt within the banking model which is based on the 
British banking system. The final interpretation stresses the 
importance of technical assistance preformed by development banks. 
In the second section we shall examine the evolution of development 
banks in the Arab region. There are two separate kinds of development 
banks, national banks and regional banks. The former is responsible to 
the country of origin and the latter concerns itself with the regional 
and sometimes international banking activities. Here we shall present 
an overview of the banks' development in terms of their number their 
spread, areas of activities and growth in their financial assets. 
Section three concentrates on the manner in which the banking charters 
define the operational rules and particularly how these regulation 
obligate the national development banks to the followng criteria they 
are limited in their operations to specific economic activites within 
the countries of origin; they are expected to extend long-term finance 
on concessionary terms and they are not allowed to solicit savings and 
if a certain few are allowed it is under limited conditions. With 
regard to the regional banks, in total there are nine of them, each of 
these banks have a separate and distinct set of responsibilites. The 
two of special interest in this section are the Arab Fund for Social 
and Economic Development and the Arab Monetary Funds which are 
respectively modelled on the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, although the Arab Banking institutions have a more widespread set 
of objectives. These objectives are primarily to promote economic and 
financial integration of Arab countries. 
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Section four provides a critical exposition of the development banks 
both regional and national with regard to the national institutions we 
shall examine their performance efficiency through their effectiveness 
in utilizing the capital on their disposal. To explore the adequacy of 
their capital we shall focus on a comparison of the finance extended by 
them to the total investment made by the Arab countries in each 
economic activity. With regard to the regional institution we shall 
also examine the way in which they utilize their available resources 
and the recipient countries and the economic activities pursued by 
these recipients. 
Section five provides a number of concluding comments: here we shall 
argue that both national and regional development banks are of a 
central importance to the development of the Arab region as a whole, 
and development would be less had not these banks extended the 10ng-
term finance and technical assistance to the productive sectors. 
However, there are number of drawbacks and problems in their ability to 
step-up such development. For instance, the majority of the national 
banks, particularly in the poor Arab countries have inadequate 
financial resources. They are dependent for their capital on their 
particular governments which lack any wealth. Obviously the solution 
here is to free them from the constraints imposed upon their operation, 
and allow them to solicit savings and raise the lending charge rate. 
With regard to the regional banks, they have been one of the main 
channels in which the savings of the Arab capital surplus countries 
transfered to other Arab countries. However, the main discrepancies 
arise from their inability to accurately indentify feasible projects 
over a wide area. With regard to the two Pan-Arab institutions they 
have achieved a limited success, the success is undermined by the 
bureaucratic 
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restrictions and their lack of economic power. Increasing the regional 
economic power and reducing the shackles of bureaucracy could pave the 
way toward a more effective operation and Arab economic integration. 
In chapter five I shall focus on the distinct role played by the 
Islamic bank. This role is important both in terms of cultural and 
economic principles, although the Islamic Bank operates by a co-
ordination of these latter two principles, whilst the more modern 
financial institutions and commercial banking systems often neglect 
the intimate interplay between cultural and economic factors. That is, 
the Islamic bank according to Islamic tradition reinforces the 
disapproval of the lusury systeml whilst the more conventional systems 
impose a set of economic practices upon the Islamic people which are 
foreign and disagreab1e to their way of life. Chapter five can be 
appropriately divided into six sections which dealing with a specific 
set of pertinent factors related to the Islamic Bank. In the first 
section I shall provide a detailed account of the economic principles 
of Islam. The 'spirit' of Islam it seems, places greater emphasis on 
the collective needs of the community, and while allowing the 
individual to prosper economically the individual must always pay heed 
to the principle of shared benefit. An example of this ethos is the 
prohibiting of paying fixed interest rates on money loans. Therefore 
the economic contract between two participating parties is based on a 
shared profit and loss making criteria. All these principles are 
derived from a number of passages in the Holy Koran. 
Section two will trace the historical evolution of the Islamic banks. 
There will be a focus on the circumstances of their emergence, the 
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manner in which they have gradually embedded themselves within both the 
local region and abroad. Here I shall illustrate how the simple 
economic life style had no need for a banking institution. However the 
arrival of colonialism meant an imposition of the conventional bank 
upon the Islamic nations. Of course, after independance it was 
difficult to uproot these now established banking systems. A set of 
superficial principles of objections to such colonial systems 
manifested itself in the introduction of nationalised banks and the 
imposition of ceilings on the interest rate structure. These latter 
two developments did not fully embody the symbol of Islam and were 
partial solutions. However, the new found wealth of the early 1970's 
meant that people could institutionalise their own banking systems 
which corresponded more closely with the principles of Islam, hence the 
emergence of the Islamic bank. Many countries went on to establish one 
or two banks, a few countries attempted to introduce radical changes 
and implement a banking system in total accordance with the ideas of 
Islam. 
Section three, attempts to explain the way in which the Islamic 
financial institutions generate their funds and how the financial 
instruments developed were in compliance with the principles of Islam. 
A focus is placed on how they built their financial liabilities and how 
they deployed their financial assets. Section four a comprehensive 
case study is made of the experience of the Jordanian Islamic Banks. 
Section five looks at the impact of the Islamic institutions in the 
Arab region as a whole. The new instruments based on Islamic 
principles allowed the devout people to be able to utilise the banking 
systems whereas, previously they refrained from using such systems. 
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The second major impact was that because the Islamic Banks participated 
in the shared risk notion of profit and loss with the entrepeneur this 
allowed for an extension of long-term finance and the development of 
the economy. Finally, the operation of the Islamic bank is the concept 
of profit-loss sharing avoided the artificial ceiling of interest rates 
imposed in the region and allowed people to deposit money at home. 
In conclusion, section six illustrates how the Islamic Banks, even 
though they are of recent origin, are essential for development and 
enrich the diversity of the financial system. One discrepancy is 
however, their lack of growth at present and their operations have yet 
to become finalised. That is, perhaps they need to incorporate at some 
future time, a more flexible and all encompasing set of financial 
instruments. 
Stock markets are often regarded as a feature of the more developed 
countries as they provide long term finance and confidence in holding 
long-term security. That is to say, the development of the British 
Banks specialise in one type of business, namely in providing short-
term finance for stock goods, while the security markets and other 
financial institutions provide long-term finance for housing, plant 
equipment and so on. Many Arab countries in the late 1970's began to 
improve their financial system and the financial security shares and 
government bonds began to be more frequently circulated in the market. 
These markets were created to organise trade in these securites. 
Chapter six provides a thorough examination of the Arab security 
markets, their development and structural operation. This chapter can 
be appropriately divided into six sections. 
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In section one there will be a detailed account of the structure and 
function of the stock market, followed by an analysis of its 
significance and value in economic development. Here I shall introduce 
the concept of primary and secondary markets as well as organised and 
unorganised markets, 
Their significance will be examined through their function in the 
saving investment process. For instance, the primary market is the 
site where the funds are raised initially by governments or the 
corporations, the secondary market is the site where the investors can 
sell the outstanding securities in their possession and restore 
liquidity. 
Section two focuses on the historical grounds for the emergence of the 
stock market. In the earlier period of this century the French 
introduced the practice of stock marketing to such countries as 
Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia. In the absence of any national security 
and due to the low per capita income at this time the markets were 
thoroughly a foreign enclave. Even though the operation of such 
markets was terminated when the French departed, these earlier 
institutions provided the framework for contemporary stock market 
institutions. In the 1970's some Arab countries, such as Jordan and 
Kuwait, established such markets for the first time, whereas, the 
countries which had previously been exposed to a colonial stock market 
system, revived these financial institutions in the hope of increasing 
long-term finance for economic development. 
The contemporary structure of the Arab stock markets reveals a decisive 
and common factor, that is, all of them are public institutions 
governed by committees heavily represented by the public sector. The 
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characteristics of the dealers, however, differ substantially. In 
Kuwait and Jordan the process is similar to that of London, whereas in 
Morocco and Saudi Arabia the banks playa major role in these markets, 
similar to that of the German stock market system. The discussion then 
moves on to examine the development of the two main active markets, 
separately, namely Jordan and Kuwait. I shall then go onto discuss in 
a general fashion the securities markets in other countries and 
conclude that the markets in both Jordan and Kuwait attracted the 
listing of share-holding companies, as they regarded the market as a 
means to facilitate escalation and expansion of capital. With regard 
to operation, the Amman Financial market has grown in trade shares but 
has failed to expand in government securities. The Kuwait stock 
exchange has become large, but speculative activities hindered and 
interrupted trade on many occasions. In Morocco and Tunisia the 
markets have had no substantial growth, as very few companies are 
officially listed and there is little trade there. 
In section three, I shall examine the relationship between stock 
markets and their importance in economic development. Here I compare 
the trading activities of these markets with the banks outstanding 
lending activities. Their role in attracting foreign capital is 
discussed as well as their role in creating confidence in the financial 
securities and their influence on the rate of savings. 
Section four analyses factors adversely affecting the growth of Arab 
stock exchanges, these include; the relatively cheap borrowing from 
development banks and commercial banks, (this has prevented the company 
from resorting to market activity); the narrow base of the economy 
hinders the establishment and growth of corporations, i.e. share 
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holding companies; family enterprises continue to dominate the economic 
arean, again, at the exclusion of corporations; additionally the 
enormous wealth of a many governments precluded them from any 
borrowing. 
These factors among others limited the supply of security. On the 
demand side I shall examine those factors limiting this demand for 
securities such as, the rigidity of the traditional bureaucratic 
institutions and the information published about share-holding 
companies not being sufficient enough. The low per capita income in 
some countries and the skewed wealth in others altogether reduces the 
demand. 
Section five, will suggest ways in which Arab countries can move 
toward development and integration of the current stock exchanges. 
Although the circumstances in each country differ, the problems faced 
by these markets are common, it is suggested that a number of measures 
be introduced to increase the supply and demand for securities. These 
measures include, some incentive through direct allowances, such as 
tax concessions for the companies and the share-holders. It would be 
preferable if the central bank performed the role of creating these 
more favourable conditions, by attempting to curb inflation and to 
liberalise the interest rate structure. 
In conclusion, in section six, a recapitulation of the overall 
development will be presented. It can be observed that the present 
stock exchanges are few and small, and indeed, of minor importance for 
economic development, and for the purpose of integration of the Arab 
capital market a regional stock exchange is essential. 
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Chapter seven examines the effect of the Offshore Banking business 
on the Arab economy and market. If the Arab countries are to achieve 
any effective integration of any kind they have to adopt a common 
economic strategy with the outside world. The introduction of an 
offshore banking system works directly against such integration by 
systematically increasing the connections with the outside world , 
whilst neglecting and reducing the inter-relations between Arab 
countries. Again this chapter can be divided into seven separate 
sections. In section one, I shall discuss exactly what the offshore 
banking business entails. The restricted financial environments of 
many countries induced the financial institutions and other enterprises 
to tax haven territories, in order to operate freely in what could be 
described as a relatively 'free financial zone', that is, a zone not 
subject to the type of regulations imposed on domestic banks. This 
allows the offshore banking business to compete effectively for 
business from the surrounding countries. 
In section two, the introduction of these banks to the region is traced 
and drawn out and then their emergence and growth is discussed. These 
banks were primarily established in Bahrain. The United Arab Emirates, 
Egypt and Tunisia, also have such banking facilities but only on a 
limited scale. The offshore banking institutions in Bahrain grew 
rapidly and led to Bahrain establishing itself as a financial centre, 
additionally enabling it to host other kinds of financial institutions, 
for example the Exempt Companies, which allowed the establishment of 
many Arab companies, especially Kuwait companies, as shown earlier. 
In section three I shall examine both the impact and the advantages 
for the international banks in establishing themselves in Bahrain. 
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Initially the international banks used Beirut as the main banking 
headquarters in the region, the civil war in Lebanon and the rapid 
increase of wealth in the Gulf area were the two main factors which 
caused the international banks to shift their headquarters to Bahrain. 
I shall examine in detail the decline of Beirut as a financial centre. 
There are two other main advantages for the international bank in 
establishing themselves in Bahrain, and both derive fr~n the 
geographical location of Bahrain. First, it is located on the door-
step of the most wealthy countries in the Gulf region. This allowed 
the international banks to mobilise in a very short time an enormous 
amount of capital. Secondly, the geographical position of Bahrain is 
mid-way between the Far East and Europe, which allows for a global 
money market which could operate continuously. 
Section four focuses on the impact of offshore banking business in the 
Arab region. Their progressive and constructive impacts were the 
development of the money market and the narrowing of the rate of 
currency exchange. However, the speculative activities of the offshore 
banking business in the currency of the neighbouring countries and the 
mobilising of saving and lending dramatically harmed the countries 
involved. These surrounding countries were adverse to international-
ising their currency, the offshore banking business also mobilised more 
savings out of the region than was ultimately reinvested within the 
region. Next, they impeded the development of the local banks, due to 
their operations under the liberal system, whilst the local banks were 
constrained by strict regulations, particularly with regard to interest 
rates. 
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Section five examines the impact of the offshore banking business on 
the host country (i.e. Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia). The aims of establish-
ing the offshore banking business in Egypt and Tunisia was to increase 
the finance of economic development, whilst in Bahrain the main 
intentions were to diversify their economy by the promotion of the 
service sectors. The offshore banking business, equally, has an 
adverse effect on the socio-economic nature of these countries. In 
Egypt, they attracted the most competent and qualified bank staff from 
the local banks, in Bahrain, the incorporations of this system and its 
lucrative financial rewards created an atmosphere of both superficial 
needs and high cost of living. 
In Section six, I shall explore the prospects of the offshore banking 
system, I shall argue that their growth and development enabled them to 
compete and to resist other competition because of their established 
nature, and effectivity. 
The previous discussion, the analytical insights and the issues raised 
from this examination of the evolution and operations of the Arab 
financial institutions and markets will provide a foundation to 
extrapolate in chapter eight on a number of concluding remarks as to 
the existing financial structure and function in the Arab world. At 
the same time, it will enable us to constructively recommend the 
adoption of certain policies as a means of integrating the Arab capital 
market, this would undoubtedly have the effect of creating financial 
equilibrium at the regional level. In general, however, the conclusion 
of this chapter would seem to imply that the various problems of 
integration are sufficiently great to make the implementation of such a 
development extremely unlikely in the near future. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF THE FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THEIR 
ROLE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
The Development and Integration of the Financial Markets and their 
Role in Economic Development. A Theoretical Discussion 
Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to provide the theoretical setting on 
questions related to market development, market integration and their 
significance in the saving - investment process as a basis for 
discussion in the subsequent chapters. 
The chapter is presented in three main sections. In the first section 
we will examine the nature, evolution and expansion of financial 
markets. Section two will present the concept of economic integration 
and review the best known forms of economic and financial integration. 
Section three will examine the importance of capital accumulation in 
the technologically backward economies, the sources of investment 
finance, then review the generalizations reached by certain economists 
concerning the role of the financial markets in development and finally 
examine the contribution of integrated financial markets to the 
countries intending to integrate their markets. 
1.1. The nature, evolution and expansion of financial markets 
1.1.1 Definition of a financial market 
Financial markets like other markets grew to provide a focus for the 
activities of sellers and buyers of a particular commodity, in this 
case money. The importance of money in economic life has necessitated 
the creation of a variety of financial instruments which can be 
exchanged for money. This in turn has resulted in the complexity of the 
present financial markets. 
The financial literature provides no standard definition of the term 
financial market; on the contrary one encounters notable variations 
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between writers. For instance Silber defines financial markets as a 
transmission mechanism and describes them as follows: 
"Financial markets are basically the same as other kinds of 
mark~ts. Pe~ple ~uy and sell, bargain and hassle, win and lose 
... ln the flnanclal markets. They buy and sell securities or 
I.O.U's."(l} 
This shows that the market is easy to describe but more difficult to 
define. Smith's definition of the market is similar to the first. He 
says that, 
lithe market in financial tenns, is a place to borrow 
and lend money in the broadest sense, all borrowing 
and lending is part of one big financial market."(2} 
Mason is more specific in her definition of the market. She describes 
the market as a market in particular instruments, consisting of all 
those who are involved with that instrument either as a holder or as 
specialist agents or consultants.(3} 
From the above discussion we have to accept with Revell that the word 
'market ' is used somewhat loosely in discussing the financial 
system.(4} Smith suggests that the definition of a market usually 
depends upon the purpose of the discussion. Once the definition is 
extended beyond identical securities issued by a single institution or 
corporation, the concept necessarily includes instruments that are not 
perfect substitutes.(5} 
In the financial literature financial markets are usually classified 
according to the financial instruments maturities, to the status of the 
market (organised or unorganised) and to the type of financial 
securities (primary or secondary). 
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With regard to the financial instruments' maturities, the financial 
markets are divided into money markets and capital markets. 
The money market may be defined as a network of borrowers and lenders 
for short-term securities. But what constitutes short term securities 
varies from one country to another, although most participants in the 
financial markets define the short-term as up to one year maturity.(6) 
Within this definition, the treasury bills, commercial papers, bankers' 
acceptance and bank accounts of less than one year maturity are the 
main financial instruments issued and traded on such markets. The main 
participants in the money markets are commercial banks, discount houses 
(in Britain) and the monetary authorities. 
The capital market is a term used to mean all the financial markets 
dealing in medium and long-term securities.(7) The best known 
financial instruments issued and traded in such markets are shares, 
bonds, mortgages and long-term loans. The participants of capital 
markets are among others, unit trusts, investment trusts, insurance 
companies, issuing houses, saving banks. 
The money markets and the capital markets are not necessarily formal 
organisations where buyers and sellers meet regularly in a particular 
place to conduct business. The majority are merely a collection of 
institutions dealing in financial instruments with similar features, 
and, within each market there is a high degree of specialisation. In 
special cases a capital market may have a specific location such as a 
stock exchange. 
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The classification of financial markets by economists is usually based 
on the financial role of these markets in the economic process. Since 
economists are more concerned with the link between financial 
activities and the real sector of the economy. 
They have divided financial markets into primary and secondary 
markets.(8) The first market includes all financial instruments 
regardless of their maturities issued for the first time. The second 
market includes all markets in the outstanding financial instruments 
regardless of their maturities. So it is possible to find money 
markets and capital markets in both the primary and secondary 
securities. 
The classification of the financial markets into organised and un-
organised markets depends on the status of the markets. The majority 
of financial markets have no location and no restriction on their 
participants others have some regulations and rules which determine the 
financial instruments traded on the market and the participants of the 
market. The organised stock exchange is the best example of an 
organised market. 
1.1.2 The process of financial development 
In parallel with Rostow's stages of economic development(9) Revell 
distinguishes four main stages of development of a financial system. 
These stages are associated with some devices introduced to overcome 
the constraints on economic development. According to Revell the 
introduction of commodity money was the first device in the process of 
financial development. It ended the practice of barter and separated 
the acts of sale and purchase. Consequently the store of purchasing 
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power was introduced for the first time. However, at this stage the 
rudimentary financial system did not allow a deficit unit's expenditure 
to exceed its share of income accruing to it. There was no deficit 
finance and the only development was the emergence of the partnership 
form of business which allows a few people to pool their savings but 
this device was not sufficient to overcome constraints on development. 
The second stage of financial development came through the development 
of borrowing. At first the deficit units which were prepared to run 
business risks for profit issued interest-bearing financial claims 
direct to the surplus units in the form of bonds and loans. This 
allowed the deficit units to expand their business and to control 
physical assets greater than their net worth. Concomitantly it allowed 
the surplus units to earn some income on their savings if they were 
held in such instruments without sharing in the risk of the business. 
Then with the appearance of joint-stock companies, surplus units had a 
further opportunity. They were able to obtain a title to a share of 
profits of the business with their liability limited to the amount of 
money which they had subscribed. With the introduction of borrowing 
techniques, the financial markets emerged to facilitate transactions in 
these securities. 
During the course of development direct finance became inefficient as 
the savers and borrowers grew larger in number, so the third stage of 
financial development began with the introduction of a new mechanism of 
indirect finance via the financial institutions.(lO) The commercial 
banks were the first to emerge within the financial institutions 
because people in the early stage of development showed a preference 
for holding their savings in money and bank deposits. But when the 
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economy became complex the performance of savers and borrowers also 
changed. The former showed a greater preference for holding their 
savings in financial instruments earning more income or giving more 
security, while the latter showed more interest in borrowing long to 
start a more risky business. 
These demands were satisfied by the emergence of the non-bank 
institutions. The new institutions usually specialise in financing 
particular economic activities and secure their funds by issuing their 
own financial instruments with certain features to suit savers and 
borrowers alike. 
The effective standing of the financial institutions between savers and 
borrowers in their different capacities (ll) left very little chance of 
direct contact between them. Hence the direct channelling of funds from 
savers to borrowers declined and indirect finance via the financial 
institutions grew. (12) 
The fourth stage of development came with the operation of the financial 
institutions; they began to depend on switching their liabilities and 
assets for relatively small differentials in the expectation of profits. 
This switching is very important to the smooth running of a complex 
financial system at the present time. (13) 
The growth and sophistication of the financial markets in different 
countries depends on the requirement of the governments, the corporations 
and others. In countries where the government borrows on a large scale 
through the issue of treasury bills and debentures and where corporations 
are numerous and obtain most of their capital needs through the issue of 
equity shares. 
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bonds or borrowing from the financial institutions, the markets become 
more complex and richer in financial instruments. In other countries 
where the government borrows little and the corporation sector is very 
weak with most of its finance being achieved by ploughing back profits, 
the market would be very small with a narrow range of financial 
instruments.(14) Thus the advanced countries with a market economy 
system, where the government and corporations are large borrowers, have 
developed more sophisticated financial markets than the socialist or 
the less developed countries. 
1.1.3 Measurement of financial development and the difference between 
markets 
The size of a financial market can be measured by the amount of 
financial instruments outstanding at any given time, or the increase in 
their total over a period of time.(15) The pervasiveness of financing 
activities in the economic life of any country may be indicated by 
relating the above measurement of market size to real variables. 
Economists have developed several ratios. The best known are the 
ratios which measure the current flows of funds against gross domestic 
product and gross capital formation as well as the ratios which measure 
the outstanding financial instruments against national wealth at any 
given time. 
Economists have observed that during economic development countries 
usually experience more rapid growth in financial assets than in 
national wealth. This phenomenon was examined by many economists for a 
group of countries over a long period of time. They found the ratio of 
the total outstanding financial assets to national wealth was about 
0.36 and 0.1 in 1880 for Britain and Japan respectively but it rose to 
- 27 -
1.04 and 0.4 in 1913 then rose again to 1.7 and 1.5 in the early 
1960's. 
This indicates that financial assets have grown faster than gross 
domestic product in these countries. In the socialist countries and 
the developing countries, the ratio was also on the rise but at a very 
slow rate. For instance this ratio was found to be around 10 per cent 
in 1928 in the Soviet Union rising to about 0.35 in the 1960's. 
Likewise in the developing countries, the ratio was low and until now 
perhaps less than 0.5 in such countries.(16) 
In a study of the financial structures of 35 developed as well as 
developing countries over a long period time(17). Goldsmith introduced 
the above ratio as the principal indicator of financial development and 
he termed it Financial Interrelation Ratio (FIR). 
From the difference in financial structure among countries he found 
that as a country progresses up the scale of wealth and income, its 
financial structure usually becomes increasingly rich in financial 
assets and institutions. This common path of financial progress is 
marked by a uniform behaviour of the FIR, which implies the existence 
of stages and cycles of financial development and is reflected in the 
size of their financial structure, and caused by the fact that the 
financial structure of western Europe countries served as a prototype 
for the modern financial system. And from this study he observed a 
striking regularity in financial development over a long time and 
around the world. Some of these observations are:-
1. The financial assets of a country increases faster than its 
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national wealth (and than national product) in the course of 
development, then they level off at a value of about 1~ times the 
national wealth. 
2. The share of the financial institutions in the ownership of 
financial assets increases with a country's economic growth. 
3. The value of the FIR reflects the degree of specialisation in 
production and finance of each country. 
4. The financial institutions are the predominant holders of 
financial assets bearing a fixed rate of interest while the individuals 
are the predominant holders of equities. 
5. The banking system is the first to emerge followed by the non-
banking institution so the share of banking in the ownership or 
financial assets declines. 
6. Foreign financial links are helpful at some stage as they provide 
the necessary finance or provide an outlet for surplus to be invested 
abroad. 
7. The financial innovations of the advanced countries are 
transferred to other countries. 
8. The cost of finance is cheaper in countries with a developed 
financial growth. (18) 
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From these observations he identified the existence of three types 
of financial structure in the course of financial development. 
The first type prevails at the early stage of financial development and 
its main characteristic is the limited number and variety of financial 
instruments with a FIR of less than one half. The commercial banks 
constitute the most important financial institutions among other types 
of financial institutions. He cited the financial structure of the 
European countries from the early eighteenth to the middle of the 
nineteenth century as an example of this type. 
The second type of financial structure is similar to the first type 
except for the greater role of the governments financial institutions 
in this type. He cited the financial structure in the present 
developing countries as an example of this type. 
The third type of financial structure is characterised by increased 
diversification among financial institutions and a FIR ratio of over 
one. The diversification of institutions in this type led to decline 
in the importance of the banking system and a corresponding increase in 
the importance of the non-bank financial institutions.(19) 
Despite the importance of the above findings about the process of 
financial development, the financial structure does not lend itself to 
measurement in a way helpful in deciding on the optimal size of a 
- 30 -
single financial market for any country. To quote Goldsmith: 
"we have not succeeded in developing reliable methods 
to me~sure th: extent and the result of facilitating 
funct~on o~ flnance to determine the optimal size of 
the flnanclal super structure in relation to the real 
infrastructure of the economy and to distinguish 
effectively the contribution of different forms of 
financial structure to economic growth."(20) 
1.2. Economic and Financial Integration 
Capital market integration is a part of overall economic integration 
and can only be achieved within economic integration. We begin this 
section by examining the concept of economic integration before 
presenting a brief review of the forms of co-operation in economic and 
financial field in general. 
1.2.1 The concept of economic integration 
A survey of the conceptual approach to economic integration reveals 
that the term has a very broad meaning in its aggregative sense and 
rather diversified emphasis. The economic literature on integration 
emphasises three approaches, namely, the classical, the institutional 
and empirical approaches.(21) 
The classical or the functional approach is an extention of the 
classical economic doctrine of free international trade. This approach 
to economic integration stresses the removal of artifical trade 
barriers and in finance it perhaps stresses the removal of exchange 
controls on capital. The institutional approach for economic 
integration stresses the socio-economic factors and envisages economic 
integration as the realization of equality of opportunity. This 
approach rejects the classical concept of achieving integration through 
equalisation of commodity - factor prices through trade regardless 
of social factors. Its alternative to the free flow of goods and 
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factors is an exclusive standard of equality of opportunity, social 
as well as economic.(22) 
The empirical approach is a mixture of the two previous approaches. It 
seeks the removal of artificial barriers and attempts to bridge the 
social and economic disparities between countries to be integrated. 
Within this context Balassa defines economic integration as "a process 
and state of affairs. Regarded as a process, it encompasses measures 
designed to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging to 
different national states. As a state of affairs it can be represented 
by the absence of various forms of discrimination between national 
economies".(23) 
Thus economic integration in any form is a two-pronged process of 
abolishing discriminatory barriers among participating states and the 
deliberate introduction of co-ordination with the objective of 
establishing a level of economic co-operation whereby optimal 
development may be achieved for equal partners. The experience of many 
regions which have embarked on a policy of economic integration shows 
the difficulties in implementing immediately all measures for full 
economic integration. This has led to the emergence of several forms 
of partial integration, namely the free trade area, the customs union, 
and the Common Market. 
In the first two forms of co-operation quantitative restrictions and 
tariffs on trade between member states are abolished. In the third 
form of co-operation a further step is taken to allow for more 
integration through the abolition of discriminating and restrictive 
measures against factor mobility. In the final stage of total 
- 32 -
economic integration a regional decision making authority is usually 
established to supervise and unify monetary, fiscal and other policies 
within the integrated area as one entity.(24) 
1.2.2. Capital Market Integration 
Capital Market Integration on the other hand is concerned with the 
financial aspects of economic integration. The removal of all kinds of 
restriction on the movement of capital within the integrated area is 
essential for financial integration.(25) 
To achieve full freedom for capital movement within the integrated area 
the most effective measures in this direction are: 
1. The creation of a single currency to end all the uncertainty 
inherent in the exchange of many different currencies. This would 
facilitate the movement of capital and bring the national economic 
and monetary policies of the users of the same currency in line.(26) 
2. Development of the financial systems of the member countries the 
establishment of a unified network of financial services in the banking 
stock exchange and other finance fields.(27) The permission of 
securities and borrowing by the residents of other member countries 
is essential to encourage individuals and institutions to put their 
savings and raise money across boundaries. 
3. The establishment of the same type of strategy towards the 
outside world. This would create equal protection to the member 
countries from the rest of the world and open the member countries on 
each other for the movement of capital.(28) 
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In cases of less than full integration there have been a wide range of 
arrangements used for financial co-operation. These forms depend on 
the stage of economic development of the member states and what they 
intend to accomplish through their co-operation. Serious efforts in 
this direction usually start with monetary co-operation. The co-
operating countries may create among themselves one of the following 
forms: payments unions, reserve pooling, exchange rate co-ordination 
monetary co-ordination and parallel currency. Each of these is a 
partial form of monetary integration, as their names imply, and each 
serves a specific purpose. The first two forms provide the 
participating countries with a direct source of reserve saving and 
promote trade. The first form is usually a clearing system agreed upon 
by a group of countries to settle current account payments which arise 
from trade among their countries. The best known of such arrangements 
is the European payments union which operated from 1950-1958.(29) This 
form is recommended for countries with unconvertible national 
currencies. Through the payment's union they can agree to settle 
credit and debit arising from trade among their countries with their 
national currencies. This will reduce the need for hard currency and 
create smooth trading relations between them. 
In the second form the participants pool part of their central monetary 
authority reserves to be used for the settlement of payments for any 
country in difficulty. These reserves are usually used in financing 
the overall balance of payments deficit's by providing short and 
medium-term loans. The loans may be automatic loans or subject to some 
condition specified in the agreement. This type of arrangement was 
first introduced by Triffin to help countries, particulaly the weak 
ones, to benefit from the pool.(30) 
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The remaining forms are more advanced and meant to create stability in 
the currency exchange rates of the participating countries through 
exchange rate co-ordination. Progress towards the creation of the 
European Monetary System (EMS) started in this form. In the 
community·s drive for further integration of it called for co-
ordination of member states domestic monetary policies in particular 
the development of bank liquidity, the terms for allocating credit and 
the level of interest rates. 
The last form of parallel currency is the creation of new currency to 
be used within the integrated area in parallel to the national 
currencies. The parallel currency usually start as a unit of account 
within the integrated area, then gradually it is promoted as means 0 of 
exchange and reserves and then eventually will be granted the status of 
a currency.(31) 
1.3 Theoretical Considerations concering the relevance of the 
financial markets in economic development 
The role of the financial markets in the process of economic 
develepment has been a controversial subject among economists. 
To understand the impact of the financial markets on economic develop-
ment we have to enlarge the area of our investigation to include 
capital accumulation and development then review the theoretical, 
empirical and historical studies about the role of the financial 
markets and finally present what the integrated financial markets may 
contribute to the participating countries. 
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1.3.1 Capital accumulation and development 
There is one central problem, that of capital accumulation, which is 
common to the vast majority of the developing countries. The essence 
of economic development is the building up of capital equipment in 
industry, mining, agriculture, schools and laboratories. In the 
present backward developing economies, Johnson views capital 
accumulation in its widest sense as the distinguishing characteristic 
of development and the structural transformation of economies as a 
generalized process of capital accumulation: 
liThe condition of being "developed" consists of having 
accumulated and having established, efficient social and 
economic mechanisms for maintaining and increasing stocks 
of capital per head in the various forms. Similarly the 
condition of being "underdeveloped" is characterised by 
the possession of relatively small stocks of the various 
kinds of capital.(32) 
The notion of capital accumulation as a source of growth has its roots 
in economic history.(33) The writings of the contemporary development 
economists emphasise the need for capital accumulation, whether they 
approach the subject historically to explain how the industrial 
revolution took off two centuries ago or so in Britain and other 
advanced countries or analytically through introducing various models 
in which precise ratios of investment to national income are calculated 
so as to achieve a particular rate of growth.(34) Contemporary writing 
on capital theory ascribes the productivity of capital to the existence 
of a wide range of production techniques. The accumulation of capital 
enables producers to introduce the best technology and permit more 
innovative production methods, in order to increase productivity.(35) 
It is generally accepted that technological change itself depends on 
accretion to investment-capital formation.(36) 
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However, production function studies mainly in the advanced countries, 
cast some doubt on the importance of capital accumulation for 
development. Solow's investigation into the role of capital in the 
economies of the advanced countries had shown that capital was of minor 
importance in the growth of the non-farm sector of the U.S. economy 
for the period 1919-57.(37) This is so because these countries 
attained long ago a very high scientific and technological level, and 
these findings did not account for the embodied technological changes 
caused by capital investment. 
Nevertheless Solow's evidence is concerned with advanced economies. 
Thus conclusions may not be drawn on development strategy for countries 
- developing countries - with different economic and social structures. 
The present developing countries need capital far more than it is 
needed in the developed countries. Developing countries need 
investment in capital goods if fundamental changes in the structure 
of their economies are to be achieved. Developing countries need to 
build their industrial bease and increase the importance of industrial 
as opposed to agricultural activity. This structural change is 
recommended to lessen their heavy dependence on imports of all sorts 
of goods and to lessen their heavy reliance on agricultural and mineral 
products as main exports. They need further investment in social 
capital such as housing, transport facilities, electricity etc., which 
are a precondition for the smooth operation of the productive sectors. 
As capital stock of a country increases through the process of net 
investment, we therefore now turn to the question of sources of 
investment and the way to mobilize them. 
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1.3.2 The Sources of Investment 
A country may obtain resources needed for investment by saving part of 
its national income. But in various studies made by the Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations, the ratio of gross 
domestic savings to the gross domestic product of the developing 
countries has been found to be less than 15 percent in the period 1955-
68.(38) This ratio may not adequately achieve the desired rate of 
growth in such countries. Thus a country with an open economy and an 
ambitious target of economic growth usually augments its domestic 
resources by an inflow of foreign resources. Such inflows may come in 
widely varied ways be it outright grants, technical and economic 
assistance or in the form of loans and direct foriegn investment. 
The experience of recent years has shown that the inflow of foreign aid 
merely amounted to a very small proportion of the needed investment in 
the developing countries and more importantly investment in countries 
which received foreign capital was not the sum of domestic and foreign 
savings as previously thought.(39) 
Many economists have investigated the effect of foreign capital inflow 
on domestic savings and found it to have a highly significant effect. 
Haavelmo suggested that domestic savings is not a function of local 
income alone, but it is also related, inversely, to the inflow of 
foreign capital.(40) Haavelmo's hypothesis was tested and supported by 
Rahman in the late 1960's using cross country data for thirty one 
developing countries/(41) These pioneer studies were followed by other 
studies made by many economists all of which support the hypothesis 
that foreign capital had been substituted for domestic saving.(42) 
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The other impact of private foreign investment on local enterprises was 
investigated by Bos, Sanders and Secchi.(43) They found that finance 
obtained from the financial institutions of the host countries to 
finance the expansion required by foreign enterprises reduces the 
amount available for the rest of the economy.(44) 
In addition Oacy had drawn attention to two important consequences of 
dependence on foreign resources to accelerate the attainment of self-
sustaining growth. The first consequence observed is that countries 
which have been fed with foreign resources find it difficult to make 
the necessary economic adjustment when the aid dries up. The second 
consequence of dispensing with foreign finance is the emergence of 
trade contraints, as a result of the combination of three factors 
namely:-
1. Structural change in the economy. 
2. Remission of the profit of foreign investment. 
3. Amortization of the existing debt.(45) 
The above discussion suggests that developing countries should 
be very selective in allowing direct foreign investment to operate 
in their economies and should pay more atention to maximizing their 
domestic savings. But for them to do so they have to identify who 
the savers are and why they save. Newlyn suggests that the ultimate 
source of all saving are the individuals, but saving can be accumulated 
in three ways: 
1. Individuals may save part of their income to the extent they 
consume and pay taxes less than their income. 
2. The government may save when its taxes revenues are less than 
its expenditure on consumption. 
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3. The producers save when the total sales receipts is greater than 
the sum of production costs plus direct taxation plus dividends. 
On the question of what determines the level of saving, the saving 
function differs between these sectors. For instance, the government 
to an extent can raise its saving by collecting more taxes and other 
revenues and cutting its expenditure. However, its ability to do so is 
restricted by the tax effort and tax capacity. Meanwhile corporate 
saving is the function of business activities, government tax policy 
and the form of ownership. Business activities are positively related 
to the rate of growth of national income.(46) And the tax policy and 
ownership greatly influence the distribution of profit between dividend 
and retained earnings. Finally the function of personal savings is 
complex and dependant on many variables. A considerable amount of 
research has been directed to the assessment of various incentives for 
personal saving. 
Economists have introduced many theories with regard to personal 
saving. These theories have been classified as relating to: 
1. The ability to save. 
2. The willingness to save. 
3. The opportunity to save.(47) 
The first is a necessary condition relating to income. Within this 
group of theories came the absolute income hypothesis of Keynes and 
others (48) the permanent income hypothesis of Friedman, (49) and the 
relative income hypothesis which was developed by many economists but 
gained wide attention through Duesenbery's writings.(50) The first 
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theory implies that a higher rate of savings is expected at a higher 
level of income. The second theory is an expansion of the Keynesian 
assumption that saving is a function of income. The modification of 
Friedman on the previous hypothesis of the Keynesians is that saving 
is a function of income in the long run - while the relative income 
theory introduced some social and cultural values as determinants on 
saving. The empirical studies of individual household behaviour have 
supported the hypothesis that income is an important determinant of 
saving; as it is now an accepted fact that the largest proportion of 
saving is done by upper income fami1ies.(51). 
Within the theories of willingness to save, perhaps comes the claim by 
classical economists that interest rates have a significant influence 
on the volume of saving. They claim that an increase in interest rate 
increases the volume of saving and vice versa. But as regards the 
willingness to save, given that the ability to save depends on the 
balance between present and future consumption, modern economist have 
come to question the effect of interest rates on aggregate saving. 
They introduced the notions of substitution, income and wealth effects 
and argue that the influence of these variables on saving is not in the 
same direction. For instance when the interest rate falls, the 
substitution effect would influence the rational individual to consume 
more and save less, because his utility of saving is less than his 
utility of consumption. In this sense, the substitution effect implies 
a direct relation between saving and interest rates. The income effect 
would curb present consumption and increase saving, because a rational 
individual would keep his level of income through saving more at the 
time of a fall in interest rates. Thus, the income effect implies an 
inverse relation, while the wealth effect has different tendancies 
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depending on the wealth status of the individual. A fall in interest 
rate would make an individual feel more wealthy if he has more 
financial assets than liabilities and in this case he has less need for 
more saving. But if he has more financial liabilities than financial 
assets he feels less wealthy and expects to save more. Thus the wealth 
effect works in either direction depending on the status of an 
individual.(52) For these off setting effects, economists are unsure 
as to the net effect of interest rates on saving.(53) Empirical 
investigations show that saving of the household sector is mainly a 
function of income and wealth, but the connection between savings and 
interest rates in not unequivocally proven.(54) 
Within the opportunity to save comes the theory relating to the 
development of the financial market, because the opportunity to save 
depends on the availability of approapriate assets in which savings can 
be held, which in turn depends on the efficiency of the financial 
system and within this context come the recent economists writings on 
the development of the financial markets as instruments to mobilize 
savings. 
1.3.3 The role of financial market in development 
The role of financial market in the process of economic development 
has been a contraversial subject among economist. This controversy 
emanated partly from the institutional differences between the 
developing countries and advanced countries. On the positive side 
there is a reputable body of opinion to the effect that financial 
markets are crucial for development and it cannot be denied that they 
have been the link between savers and lenders in the market oriented 
economies. 
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In contrast to the positive view expressed by many economists, there 
is a negative view expressed by other economists. This group states 
their scepticism about the usefulness of the policy of developing 
financial markets in the developing countries. Gurley's scepticism 
about such a policy emanated from his doubts about the universal 
desirability of financial techniques for mobilizing and allocating 
resources in developing countries.(55) He argues that other possible 
alternative techniques for finance could be better for the developing 
countries, as the financial markets there are undeveloped and the habit 
of holding financial assets is not established or not widely 
accepted. (56) Furthermore, he argues that the development of financial 
markets is not necessary and would be inhibited by certain factors such 
as: 
a. Inflation which would reduce real demand for financial assets in 
such countries. 
b. The narrow economic base would be reflected in the narrow range 
of financial instruments on such markets particularly the primary 
securities. 
c. The high average cost of the operation of the financial markets. 
d. The criteria of the markets would not work in favour of equality 
in income distribution which is a very important objective in these 
countries.(57) 
The weakness of such a view stems from the fact that it does not 
question the efficiency of the development of financial markets per se 
but it introduces the alternative techniques which only proves more 
feasible in countries with a comprehensive aggregate planning approach. 
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The more important challenge to financial markets came from Minsky 
who questions the indirect finance through the financial institutions 
and the concomitant growth of financial superstructures is questioned 
on practical grounds. He argues that financial institutions 
amplify cycles in expectations, retarding real economic development. He 
wrote lithe potential for seriously disruptive domino effects is 
implicit in the hierarchical pattern which has developed. The 
introduction of additional layering in finance, together with the 
invention of new instruments designed to create credit by tapping pools 
of liquidity is evidence, beyond that revealed by the data on financial 
stocks and flows, of increasing fragility of the financial system. In a 
fragile financial structure, feedbacks from the rising interest rates 
of a boom lead to financial crunches and crashes".(58) This arguments 
shows that too much development in the financial markets with a 
tendancy toward speculative finance can be a destabilizing force. 
The economists who hold a positive view on financial development are 
many. Some have investigated the relationship between financial 
development and economic development, and developed a number of 
argument relating to the broad inter-relationships between them. 
Gerschenkron, Cameron and Tilly (59) examined the historical experience 
of banking institutions in financing early European industrialization. 
The former explored the positive role of the Credit Mobilier in 
stimulating industrial expansion in France in the eighteenth century, 
and in the second work he examined the industrial capital needs and 
their source of finance in England, Germany and Russia. From these 
investigations, he found banking functions were different from one 
country to another. 
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The German banks were the most helpful to industrial finance and 
management. They were in essence the prime source of capital and 
entepreneurship for industry there. He wrote 
"Gennan banks, as the saying went, accompanied 
the industrial enterprise from cradle to grave, 
from establishment to liquidation throughout all 
the vicissitude of its eXistence ll .(60) 
The British banks and the Russian banks were found passive in their 
relations with industry. The finance of industry in both countries was 
mainly achieved from sources outside the banking system. So he 
attributed to the German banks a greater influence on industrialization 
than the British and the Russian banks had. 
He concluded that the difference in the function of these banks was 
mainly shaped by the pattern of industrialization and the economic 
environment in each country. In the German case, the relatively 
backward Gennan economy influenced banks to take the lead in financing 
the country's industrialization, while the more advanced British 
economy was able to generate internal saving for its own finance and 
expansion, so the banks were passive. In contrast, the extremely 
backward economy of Russia in those days made the Russian banks 
themselves weak. He wrote, 
liThe scarcity of capital in Russia was such that no banking 
system could conceivably succeed in attracting sufficient 
funds to finance a large scale industrialization ... 
no bank could have successfully engaged in long tenn credit 
policies in an economy".(61) 
In such an environment it was natural for the state to take over the 
responsibility of financing industry in Russia and from these 
experiences he concluded that the banking system can be growth inducing 
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in moderately backward economies as the German banks' experience has 
shown.(62) 
This work was followed up and developed by Tilly, Cameron and others. 
The former examined the financial institutions and industrialization in 
the Rhineland. His study shows that the financial institutions have 
been successfully used for development purposes in Britain and 
Germany. (63) He argued that the economic conditions in each country 
influenced the structure and operation of the banks. The relative 
absence of joint stock-companies and the emphasis on railway investment 
in Germany encouraged banks to extend short-term and long-term finance, 
as well as advice to industry. 
In Germany there was scarcity of jOint-stock companies, founded in the 
Rhineland between 1830-1870, that did not have one or more bankers in 
a key managerial position - either on the direction which handled day-
to-day decisions or on the administrative council, which handled less 
frequent and more important decisions such as the awarding of large 
contracts. (64) 
Likewise the development of the financial system in England reflected 
the characteristic of early English industrialization with its emphasis 
on the textile industry.(65) The long-term requirements of such 
industries were comparatively small relative to working capital needs 
and more over were adequately met from the accumulated profit of that 
industry. This left the working capital to be provided by the banks. 
The arguments presented by Tilly in his interpretation of the 
operations of banks in Germany and Britain point to the existence of a 
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variety of successful types of banks (i.e. those designed specifically 
to serve the particular context in which they operate). Along this 
line of thought Cameron in his comparative study of the evolutions of 
the banking system in eight developed countries pointed to the absence 
of a single model of the banking system appropriate for all 
economies. (66) 
But on the bank contribution to economic development (from the case 
studies which he edited), he concluded from the experience of the 
banking system particularly in Austria, Italy and Spain that banking 
mayor may not make a positive contribution to economic development. 
Much depends on the structural characteristics of the system, laws, 
regulations and customs more than on the personal quality of 
bankers.(67) Consequently he concluded that the structure of the 
financial system and the way the system reacts and responds to the 
special needs of its economy may well hasten or retard the process of 
economic development.(68) Likewise, after reviewing the historical 
evidence assembled by Cameron etal., Gurley concludes that 
II recent experi enc'e strongly suggests that banking 
systems as intermediaries are not highly essential 
to the growth process."(69) 
The analytical works of Shaw, McKinnon, Patrick and others and the 
empirical studies of Goldsmith and Wallich(70) give further insights 
into the role of financial markets on development. 
Through their analytical work these economists appeal for financial 
development as a means of creating growth - inducing instruments. The 
theoretical postulates of their approach rests on the following 
assumptions. 
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1. A preponderant objective of economic policy in the developing 
countries is to raise the domestic saving rate in order to finance 
the investment expenditure needed to sustain a per capita income.(71) 
2. The firms and the households in the developing countries are 
isolated from each other under the prevailing fragmented economic 
conditions, so they face different effective prices for land, labour 
and capital.(72) 
Within this context these economists view money and other financial 
instruments as playing an important role in improving the quantity 
and increasing the quality of capital formation. Along this line 
Patrick advocated a policy strategy for financial development in the 
developing countries based on his view that financial development will 
promote real growth. 
He believes that much of real wealth in developing countries held by 
individuals in unproductive assets. The financial development would 
lead to the introduction of a wide variety of financial claims to serve 
as assets for them. As for the financial claims offered to investors 
differentiated by liquidity, yield, maturity, divisibility, risk of 
default or change in value and other services they are suitable to 
capture the unproductive assets in gold, jewelery and such like and 
turn them into productive assets thus helping economic growth.(73) 
Patrick goes further to suggest deliberate creation of the supply of 
financial services by governments when the private entrepreneurial 
response in the financial sector may not be adequate or possibilities 
of external economies may exist as a way to promote real growth in the 
developing countries.(74) 
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Similarly, Mckinnon and Shaw contend that the financial institutions 
are invariably growth-inducing and only when they are repressed, which 
in their view is often the case, would they fail to make positive 
contribution. Both of them call for the development of the financial 
markets through finance deepening and liberalization. Shaw equates 
'deep' with liberalized finance which opens the way for increased 
savings and superior allocation of capital. According to Shaw by 
deepening the finance 
lithe market for savings is extended ... local capital 
markets can be integrated into a common market and new 
opportunities for pooling savings and specializing 
investments are created."(75) 
Similarly, Mcknnon advocates financial liberalization and condemns what 
he terms 'financial repression ' . He calls for raising the rate of 
interest on the financial claims to match the range of that on real 
assets and calls for freeing the financial markets of all types of 
control. In his view this will make the market efficient and would 
lead to economic growth. The high interest rate will make people 
restructure their portfolio wealth in favour of financial assets. 
External finance would help the entrepreneur to go beyond the confines 
of his own savings and undertake those large scale investments that 
embody technological improvement and give rise to increased 
productivity.(76) 
In a cross-section analysis of many developed and developing countries 
financial assets and gross national product, Wallich found the degree 
of financial intermediation was significantly and positively related to 
real economic growth.(77) Similarly, Goldsmith found the financial 
structure of the countries he studied is closely related to their real 
infrastructure. (78) 
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Both of these studies are of special importance because they provide 
quantitative supporting evidence for the relationship between financial 
growth and real economic growth. But these findings can only indicate 
that an increase in financial intermediation, as denoted by the ratio 
of financial assets to gross national product (GNP), accompanies 
growth. 
Goldsmith points out that the development of financial 
institutions 
lIaccelerates economic growth and improves economic 
performance to the extent that it facilitates the 
migration of funds to the best users .... to the place 
in the economic system where the funds will find the 
highest social return.(79) This indicates that 
financial development does actively promote real 
growth. II 
But Goldsmith later qualified this judgement and took a neutral stand 
on financial development, (80) because he saw the determinant factors 
as the effects of the legal and economic environment, rather than those 
of the financial structure a10ne.(81) 
1.3.4 Casual relat;onsh;p between f;nanc;al development and econom;c 
growth 
The previous investigation into financial development points to the 
fact that there is an interconnection between the financial structure, 
capital accumulation and the growth of the economy. But the direction 
of causation in the relationship between financial development and the 
real rate of economic growth is not at all clear. It seems from the 
development has proceeded as if it previous discussion that financial 
was the result of demands upon it. These demands arose from the 
deficit units' needs for finance from the surplus units within this 
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context, real economic development causes financial development. But 
also we may conclude that financial development can allow greater or 
lesser rates of increase in income depending on the form it takes. To 
identify causation, it is the introduction of money and financial 
institutions and their combined effect which count in favour of 
financial development. Monetization and financial institutions, led to 
specialization in production and finance. It is in this way that the 
financial system may influence real development. 
It is a known fact in today·s economies that not all savers are 
willing to invest the full amount of their savings directly nor are 
they efficient investors. Under these circumstances financial 
development augments the savings. According to Porter it allows 
savings to occur without the need for a concomtant act of investment. 
(82) Similarly Goldsmith agreed to the possibilities of promoting 
higher saving as a direct effect of institutional development. (83) And 
finally financial development increases savings as it deters the flight 
of capital.(84) In addition, financial development increases the 
productivity of investments as the financial intermediaries provide the 
mechanism for the transfer of claims on real resources from savers to 
the most efficient investors. They also allow investors to make large 
scale lump investments in technological improvement which gives rise to 
increased productivity. Thus financial development is growth promoting 
to the extent that it encourages saving and improves the allocation of 
resources. 
This explanation is further delineated in Patrick·s analysis. 
Historical evidence of financial development reveals the existence of 
two distinct patterns of financial institution. The first type of 
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institution has played a leading role in the economic development of 
their respective countries. The second type of institution has merely 
responded to the demand made for their services. Patrick calls 
institutions of the first type, 'supply leading' institutions and those 
of the second type 'demand following ' institutions.(85) 
Economists quote the German and Japanese financial institutions, 
particularly banks, as paradigms of the first type. These institutions 
had provided long-term loans to their countries ' industries in the 
early stages of industialization. By so dOing, they led and influenced 
economic development. 
However, the financial institutions in Britain and the United States 
(mainly banks) are merely a I demand - following' phenomenon. As the 
economies grow they generate additional and new demand for their 
services. Thus their role in inducing economic growth was passive and 
permissive, although some writers have suggested that circumstances 
could have compelled them to do so at that time. 
However, the classification into supply leading or demand following 
institutions does not conclusively explain the direction of the 
causality. 
1.4 The importance of integrating financial markets for development 
The advantage of an integrated capital market can be understood from 
the function expected from such market. A strong large market is 
capable of providing a better service to savers and borrowers alike, 
through the economies of scale and wider diversification of risk it 
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permits. The success of the international markets is mainly attributed 
inter alia because they operate on a world scale. A well integrated 
capital market which permits and promotes the flow of capital among the 
member countries is bound to contribute to their economic development 
in two ways. 
1. A well-integrated capital market equilibrates capital flow and 
cancels the balance-of-payments difficulties among the member 
countries. This is clear from the experience of the States within 
the United States of America, which have no balance of payment problems 
amongst themselves. 
2. A well integrated capital market allows capital to be allocated 
among member countries on a commercial basis, consequently eliminating 
regional differences in prospective yields which means a better 
allocation of capital in the integrated area. 
However, the second advantage mentioned above concerning the integrated 
capital market is not accepted by every commentator as integration 
is in favour of the strong members. It has been argued that if capital 
were free to move in quest of higher profit, it might not reflect the 
interest of the community as a whole. Along this line of thought Lomax 
wrote: 
liThe ultimate free-market doctrine might go as far as 
to assert that all economic problems should be left to 
the market economy, and they would be resolved satisfactorily. 
This view however, seems completely false in modern condition~. There is no reason to believe that life in a 
society in which everything was left to market. forces 
would be satisfactory or even tolerable. The lll-balance 
of power between particular producer~ or sectors would 
almost certainly lead to the weak gOlng to the wal~,.and 
for many people life would be intolerable .. In ~dd1tlon 
patterns of expenditure would be far from ldeal .(86) 
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This argument does not represent an isolated view, and one need not 
conclude from it that the pricing system ought to be thrown out as a 
guide to the allocation of investment funds. The fact that the pricing 
system may pull in the wrong direction is probably due to the unequal 
availability of educational opportunities, transportation facilities 
and public facilities among regions.(87) So the integrated countries 
may carry out public investment projects in such areas in order to 
bring about a degree of equilibrium in terms of profitability in 
different regions which would correct the operation of the profit 
motive in the private sector and force private investment into socially 
desirable directions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ARAB REGION ECONOMIES 
Analysis of Structural Characteristics of the Arab Region Economies 
Introduction 
The Arab region during its history passed through periods of 
advancement and prosperity, rendering it the most advanced region of 
its time. The prosperity of the Arab region was based among other 
things on the region's integrity. 
The region has maintained its hegemony, first under the Arab rule then 
under the Ottoman dominance for many centuries, but it began to 
disintegrate in the nineteenth century. During that century Egypt and 
the Ottoman Empire began borrowing from the European banks to finance 
development and to build up their arsenal. The need of these countries 
for more capital allowed the European states and banks to put pressure 
on them to grant some concessions which they did. Then the competing 
European Imperialism took advantage of the bankruptcy of both regimes' 
at the end of that century(l) and began direct political control over 
Egypt and other territories in the region. 
This trend of disintegration culminated in the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire in the First World War, when Imperialism took control over the 
remaining part of the Arab region. Consequently the region was divided 
in compromise between the rival European powers.(2) 
The rivalry between the new occupiers and the new arbitrarily drawn 
boundaries, isolated the Arab countries from one another, and haul ted 
the free movement of goods and people between the Arab countries, 
while such movement between the Arab countries and the metropolitan 
centres was permitted and encouraged. It follows that no branch of 
economic production was able to complete with the goods of the advanced 
- 63 -
countries. This made the Arab countries' dependency absolute on the 
metropolitan countries. In the middle of this centry, the colonizer 
left the region in a piecemeal fashion. In so dOing they conceded 
political independence to those who were under their tutalage and 
domination. As a result they left behind twenty two sovereign states 
many of them are the creation of this century.(3) The result of the 
whole process was the creation of fragile economies dependent on the 
production of primary product, and the introduction of a large array of 
systems of government and political control ranging from revolutionary 
republics to patriarchal monarches. 
In the post-independence period, the Arab countries began working 
toward integration. The few independent countries in 1945 set up the 
Arab league as a central body to coordinate their efforts in all fields 
in the common interest of the Arab.(4) The Arab league established 
many committees each responsible for specific activities. In the field 
of economy the Economic Council of the Arab leage has advanced several 
agreements covering uniform policies in many areas to include trade, 
petroleum, transportation, capital movements and others. The most 
important agreement among these is the Arab Economic Unity Agreement 
which was introduced in 1964. The Agreement envisages total economic 
integration to be achieved in stages. The agreement calls for the 
establishment of a permanent Board known as the "Arab Economic Unity 
Council" to execute this Agreement and to assist in the drive toward 
economic integration of the region. Consequently the Arab Common 
Market was established by five Arab states namely, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, 
Egypt and Kuwait. This was followed by several measures and 
arragements for coordination of the Arab policies in various 
fields.(5) 
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However, the Arab countries have taken many measures aiming at pooling 
their resources and coordinating their policies, implementation of many 
measures to reach these objectives has lagged behind. Coherent common 
policies among the Arab countries were thwarted by the interest of some 
groups in maintaining national sovereignty. As a result of Arab 
achievements in this direction have been very modest. 
As the essential function of the Arab capital market is to increase and 
channel the flow of long-term funds for development between the Arab 
countries, it is necessary to examine the socio-economic 
characteristics of the Arab region in order to provide background 
information on the present twenty two sovereign states in the region, 
and know who the savers are, why they save, how their savings are used 
and why the development of the Arab capital markets in necessary. To 
answer these questions this chapter is presented in five sections. 
Section one will examine the natural and human resources of individual 
Arab countries. This will show the competence and the deficiencies of 
human resources and their economic activities. Section two examines 
the economic growth and structural changes in the individual Arab 
countries to show the stage of economic development and structure. 
Section three assesses the level of the region's industrial activities 
to show how far it has developed its productive sectors and where 
capital is needed. Section four examines the mobilisation and uses of 
the region's resources to show how the Arab countries finance their 
socio-economic development. Section five examines the emergence of the 
concept of an Arab capital market. This will show why some countries 
have encouraged the establishment to new financial institutions, and 
show the collective financial measures undertaken to increase the flow 
of capital within the region. Finally in the concluding remarks, we 
shall relate all these issues to our main theme of the integrated Arab 
capital market. 
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2.1 NATURAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES 
2.1.1 Population and labour force and their characteristics 
The importance of human resources is not limited to the fact that their 
activity determines economic development in any country, but more 
important is the fact that there can be no development without people 
and development itself is created for them. Thus a brief summary of 
the major characteristics of the Arab population is provided to 
acquaint the reader with the participants of the Arab financial market 
and to indicate the potential that the region possesses for economic 
development. 
The Arab region had a dynamic population of about 163 million 
inhabitants in 1980 (see Table 2.1). With an average rate of growth 
exceeding 3 percent, the region's population could double in less than 
25 years. The population structure is similar to that in other 
developing countries. A large part of the population is under the age 
of 15. Thus the proportion of population in the economically 
productive age group (16-64) is relatively lower than that of their 
counterparts in advanced countries. This phenomenon is clearly 
demonstrated in the region, where the economically active population 
was estimated at 86 million persons. This figure is slightly over 50 
per cent of the total Arab population and very low compared to its 
counterparts in the middle income countries or industrial market 
economies which averaged 55 per cent for the former group and 66 
percent for the latter group of countries in 1979. (6) 
At the national level the Arab region displays a wide difference in the 
size of population and the rate of growth. The distribution of people 
among the Arab countries is very skewed. In 1980 the population of 
Egypt alone accounted for about one quarter of the Arab population. 
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TABLE 2.1 Arab Countries: Some Indicators of Population 
----- I --.----- I 
--
J 
Country Population t Average J Labour Pt:rcentage I Percentage of J Average annual I 
in Urban annual J force in of population I Labour force in I growth of I 
millions 1980 growth . I thousands of working I economic sectors I Labour Force J 
1930 rate for I 1980 age 1979 I I J J c:, 1970-8U J 
1975-80 I I Agri lInd I Serv I I 
I I I J I 
I I I I I 
Algeria 18.67 44 3.3 4.397 49 I 32 1 24 J 44 I 3.4 J 
Iraq 13.07 72 3.3 3.232 51 I 43 I 26 I 31 I 2.4 
U.A.E. 0.73 48 2.8 .313 I I Qatar 0.24 88 8.9 .096 1 
Kuwait 1.37 88 6.1 .378 52 2 I 34 I 64 I 4.5 
Saudi Arabia 8.96 67. 2.9 2.691 52 62 1 14 I 24 I 4.5 
Libya 2.97 52 4.3 .662 51 20 I 27 I 53 I 3.7 
Jordan 3.24 56 3.2 .765 51 21 I 19 1 60 I 3.1 
Bahrain 0.31 80 5.4 .085 I 
Tunisia 6.37 52 2.3 1.574 55 35 I 32 33 3.0 
Syria 8.98 50 3.3 2.183 48 32 I 31 37 3.3 
Oman 0.89 5 3.5 .268 I 
Lebanon 2.66 76 2.0 .872 55 12 I 2G I 62 1.3 
Egypt 42.20 45 3.0 11.865 57 50 I 29 I 21 2.0 I 
Morocco 20.05 41 3.0 5.378 50 53 I 21 I L6 3.0 I 
Sudan 18.68 25 2.5 6.641 53 78 I 10 I 12 2.4 I 
Somalia 4.64 30 2.6 1.402 54 84 I 8 I 8 2.2 I 
Mauritania 1.63 23 2.2 .436 52 85 I 5 I 10 2.4 ,-
Yemen A.R. 5.81 10 1.8 2.140 51 76 I 11 I 13 0.7 , 
Yemen P.D.R. 1.97 37 3.1 .497 51 47 I 15 I 38 1.0 , 
OJ ibouti 0.31 65 2.5 , I , 
I I I 
I I I 
TOTAL 163.75 40 3.1 45.866 I I I 
I 
-----
- - ----
I I 
SOURCE: 
-
-- --- between Arab Countries, Jordan 1981. 
Morocco, Sudan, Algeria and Iraq are other countries with a sizeable 
population. With the exception of Yemen Arab Republic and probably 
Saudi Arabia, the population of the Gulf States - Kuwait, Qatar, 
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Oman reached about 3.5 million 
persons or about 2 per cent of the Arab population. 
Fortunately. the sparsely populated Arab countries have experienced 
a higher rate of growth in their population than the populous ones. For 
instance. the average annual growth rate of population of Qatar and 
Kuwait was about 8.9 per cent and 6.1 per cent respectively in the 
period 1975-1980. On the other hand, the average annual growth rate of 
the population of Mauritania and Yemen Arab Republic was about 2 per 
cent. 
The second characteristic of the region is the large proportion of 
its people who live in rural areas. The urban population of the region 
accounted for about 40 per cent of the total population in 1980. 
However, there has been a considerable difference among Arab countries 
in the proportion of urbanised population to the total population. For 
• instance, the population of Kuwait and Qatar are totally urbanised with 
88 per cent of their population living in urban areas. This ratio 
falls to just 5 per cent in Oman, 10 per cent in the Yemen Arab 
Republic. 25 in Sudan and less than 5U per cent in the majority of the 
remaining countries. 
The third characteristic of the Arab population is the high rate of 
illiteracy. An average of 42.2 per cent of the total Arab population 
was classified as illiterate in 1980. (7) But there is a difference in 
the extent of illiteracy between males and females. where the former 
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had a much lower illiteracy rate, averaging about 27.7 per cent while 
the latter had an average of 51.5 per cent in 1960. (~) At the country 
level, the Arab countries diplay a wide difference in illiteracy rates . 
• For instance 1n 1978, Jordan displayed the lowest rate of 25 per cent. 
while Yemen Arab Republic displayed the highest rate of about 77 per 
cent. The other Arab countries displayed a ratio between these two 
extreme poles. A decade earlier these ratios were higher for every 
Arab country, and again Jordan had the lowest ratio of about 45 per 
cent and Yemen had the highest ratio of about 92 per cent. (see 
Appendix 2.1) This is an indication of considerable progress. 
Although there has been a great drive forwards in the expansion of 
public health and education facilities in the Arab region, the 
persistence of illiteracy among the population indicates that these 
facilities have not been sufficient for a rapidly growing population. 
Moreover, the distribution of these facilities is concentrated in large 
urban areas. That is to say the rural population are totally excluded 
from these services and to some extent poor urban residents are 
deprived of these services. 
However, there is a distinct difference between the countries in the 
region. The rich oil-producing countries have provided these services 
for larger proportions of their population and invest heavily in the 
welfare of their people while in other non-oil Arab countries, the 
level of these services is extremely low. For example, Saudi Arabia, 
one of the first group, allocated £28,818 million investment in health 
and education in the 1970's. This is in contrast with Yemen Arab 
Republic with almost the same size of population which devoted about 
$427 m for the same purpose and during the same period. (9 ) 
- 68 -
Lack of medical care and facilities in poor Arab countries in 
particular is responsible for a high mortality rate in the region. The 
fact that 1.2 million Arab children die each year without reaching 
adulthood points to the fact that health facilities are not tailored 
to the region's needs.(JD) 
The lack of access to health care and education for the majority of the 
people in the region has far reaching implications for economic 
development. On the one hand a high rate of illiteracy has tended to 
reduce the potential economic use of the existing manpower available to 
the region. On the other hand poor health tend to affect the 
productivity of employed workers manifested in long-leave for hospital-
ization and absenteeism. It is worth mentioning that a large part of 
education in the region is directed towards the social services and the 
humanities which bear very little relation to the actual needs of the 
region. The essential training and vocational, technical and 
scientific studies comprises a small part of overall education in the 
regi on. 
Consequently, the region as a whole suffers from a shortage of skilled 
labour particularly professional, technical administrative and 
managerial. The demand on these categories of labour from both the 
private and public sectors has been high and surpasses over supply in 
the majority of the Arab countries. This shortage of skilled labour 
has impeded the pace of development in the region. According to 
Show·who has recently studied this problem, the quality of the labour 
force is going to be one of the most serious bottlenecks for growth in 
the region. (.11) 
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The region's labour force was estimated at 46 million, slightly 
over half of the economically productive age group. This is so, 
because the participation of women in paid employment is limited. 
In addition there are large numbers of the Arab population of 
working age who are continuing their education at schools, colleges, 
universities, vocational training centres and other educational 
institutions. 
The distribution of the labour force in the economic sectors shows , 
that the traditional sector provided employment for one half of the 
Arab labour force. The service sector is the second in terms of 
providing jobs for workers. The industrial sector provided jobs for 
about 9 million persons (see Appendix 2.2). This accounted for less 
than 20 per cent of the Arab labour force. On the individual country 
level the situation considerably differs from one country to another. 
The labour force in the traditional sectors of Saudi Arabia, 
Morocco, Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania and the Yemen Arab Republic was in 
the range of 60-85 per cent of the total labour force in these 
countries. The second sector of special importance in offering jobs is 
the service sector. This sector provided jobs for over 50 per cent of 
the labour force in Kuwait, Libya, Lebanon and Jordan. The industrial 
sector's share in employment was modest in all Arab countries. 
Accounting for approximately one third of active labour force in 
Kuwait, about one quarter in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Tunisia and less 
than one quarter in the remaining Arab countries. 
This will explain later why the per capita income of many Arab 
countries is very low. 
- 70 -
The variation in the pace of economic development as will be shown 
later in this chapter, the uneven distribution of population. and the 
very low level of skill and indigenous technology in the region caused 
a great movement of labourers from Arab countries with relatively large 
labour forces such as Egypt, Yemen A.R., Jordan, Lebanon, TuniSia, 
Morocco Algeria to scarely populated countries such as the Gulf States 
• 
Saudi Arabia and Libya. 
Ttle Arab migration to America began in the early years of the century 
particularly from Syria, Palestine and Lebanon. In the 1960s many 
Arabs of North African countries, namely TuniSia. Morocco and Algeria 
migrated to Europe and in particular to France. Today several millions 
Arabs are living in Europe and America. The Arab migrant workers within 
the region were estimated at 6 million persons in 1982. (12) The 
foreign migrant workers perhaps exceeded the Arab migrant. The influx 
of foreign labour on a large scale makes the national citizens in the 
Gulf States a minority in their own countries. This has created some 
social problems, particularly in the lower Gulf States where the 
foreign expatriates from outside the region outnumbered the Arab 
expatriate and local citizens. (13) Kuwait has no such problem because 
it has long given preferential treatment to other Arabs to come and 
work there. However, the lower Gulf States from the time of British 
domination have imported much of their labour needs from outside the 
region. Today, foreign workers make up over 90 per cent of the labour 
force in the United Arab Emirates, while the migrant work forces of 
Saudi Arabia and Libya are 30 to 40 per cent of the host countries 
total population. (14) 
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TABLE 2.2 
and Irri ated Cultivated Land and their Potential in 
n ml 10ns 0 ectares an water in billion cu ic metres) 
I 
Country I 1975 Future Potentf al 
I I 
Water used Cultivated· Cropped Irrigation Cultivated Cropped 
for area area water area area 
Irrigation 
Egypt 55 2.9 5.1 65 4.4 8.7 
Sudan 16 1.5 1.2 35 4.2 4.7 
Iraq 25 3.7 1.6 55 4.4 7.3 
Syria 6 0.6 0.4 14 1.3 1.9 
Morocco 10 0.8 1.0 13 1.1 1.7 
TOTAL 112 9.5 9.3 182 15.4 24.3 
Other Arab 13 1.3 1.2 18 1.5 2.4 
Countries 
All Arab 125 10.8 10.5 200 16.9 26.7 
Countries 
Percentage of 90 88.00 89.00 91 91.00 91.00 
the five 
Countries to 
the rest of 
the Arab World 
SOURCE: Source and Problems of Arab Development, p.78-9 
(Kuwait: 1980) 
2.1.2 Land and Water 
The Arab region covers a wide area of over 13 million square 
kilometers of Western Asia and North Africa. From the geographical 
perspective, it occupies a strategic position at the meeting pOint of 
the three continents. Climatically it mostly lies in the arid zone 
with a rainfall of less than five inches a year. Rainfall is 
sufficient and climate is moderate in a narrow area close to the 
Mediterranean Sea. Other parts like North Yemen and South Sudan also 
receive sufficient rainfall. 
In the global context the Arab region represents about 10 per cent of 
the world1s total land, but the regions arable land is less than 4 per 
cent. The pasture and forest land covers about 28 per cent and the 
irrigated land less than one per cent (see Appendix 2.3). 
This leaves over two thirds of Arab land of little use as compared with 
world level of 35.1 per cent. (15) This points to the scarcity of 
arable land. 
However, the region has a great potential to expand its irrigated land 
area particularly in Egypt, Sudan, Syria and Iraq where two of the 
world1s greatest rivers (the Nile and the Euphrates) run through their 
land. These countries can exploit their water resources more 
effectively instead of allowing part of this resource to reach the 
sea unused. Table 2.2 shows the region has utilized water for 
irrigation at about 125 billion m3/year while its surface water 
is estimated at 200 billions m3/year. Rationalising the use of 
water for irrigation from the present level of 12000 m3 per hectare 
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to 7500 m3 per hectare could, according to experts, increase the 
Arab irrigated area to about 21 million crop hectacres. (16) 
On the country level the cultivated land of potential expansion is 
mainly located in five Arab countries namely, Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, 
Syria and Morocco. Sudan and Iraq have a great potential for 
doubling their cultivated land. It is worth noticing here that the 
distribution of land and water correlates with the distribution of 
the population. 
2.1.3 Mineral Resources 
The scarcity of arable land in the sparce1y populated Arab countries 
seems to be compensated by the considerable subsoil minerals 
particularly petroleum. The region as a whole had over 51 per cent of 
the world's proven oil reserves and about 14 per cent of proven gas 
reserves as seen in Table 2.3. However, the region may be rich in 
oil and phosphate but poor in other minerals such as coal, uranium and 
copper which are very important for economic growth and modern-
ization. This indicates the heavy dependence of the region on the 
oil industry. The minerals are concentrated in a few countries, 
for instance the distribution of oil reserves among the Arab 
countries shows that Saudi Arabia accounted for about 47 per cent, 
with about 19 per cent for Kuwait, 10 per cent for United Arab 
Emirates, 12 per cent for Iraq, 6 per cent for Libya with the 
remaining Arab countries such as Algeria, Bahrain, Tunisia, Syria, 
Egypt and Oman sharing the remaining six per cent of which Algeria 
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TABLE 2.3 
Gas and Oil Reserves, Production and Depletion Period 
Country Gas Producti on 
Reserve Reserve billion barrels 
in billion per day 
barrels 1979 1982 
U.A.E. 810 32.4 1,829 1,229 
Bahrain 223 0.2 51 45 
Tunisia 122 1.9 115 106 
Algeria 3,152 9.4 1,217 670 
Saudi Arabia 3,433 165.3 9,533 6,697 
Syria 36 1.5 166 175 
Iraq 816 41.0 3,700 987 
Qatar 1,756 3.4 508 330 
Kuwait 966 67.1 2,496 833 
Libya 609 21.5 2,029 1,017 
Egypt 203 3.3 497 667 
Oman 76 2.7 295 322 
1. TOTAL 12,202 349.7 22,499 13,078 
2. Th. World 85,652 670.2 63,185 54,572 
World 14.2% 51.2% 35.6% 24% 
SOURCE: O.P.E.C. Annual Statistical Bulletin, 1981 
Petroleum Economist, January 1983 
Oil and Gas Journal Various Issues 
Oil 
Depletion Period of 
Oil according to 
Production 
1978 1982 
72 
12 
49 
38 
68 
23 
114 
28 
221 
58 
14 
23 
accounted for one half. The distribution of gas among Arab countries 
is almost always associated with the distribution of oil, but Algeria 
has a considerable gas reserve greater than its share in oil. 
The region's production of oil has varied over the years. It was 
estimated at about 18 million barrels a day in 1973, (17) steadily 
climbed to about 22 billion in 1979, then dropped in recent years to 
about 13 million barrels a day. This occurred partly because new 
countries have entered the oil market such, as the U.K. and Mexico 
which have increased their oil sales and partly because oil demand was 
down in the early 1980's from a peak in the early 1970's as can be seen 
from Table 2.3. 
The importance of the region's oil industry emanates from its large 
proven reserves and from the fact that almost all its production goes 
to export. Its heavy dependence on the international demand for energy 
explains the considerable variation in its production. 
Phosphate is the second mineral with considerable proven reserves in 
the region. It had an estimated 51 per cent of the proven world 
reserve in 1975 as seen in Table 2.4. The distribution of phosphate 
among the Arab countries shows that Morocco had over 35 per cent and 
the remaining 15 per cent was shared by Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, 
Tunisia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia. The regions production was about 
one-quarter of the wor1d's production of which Morocco accounted for 
about two-thirds in 1979. Jordan and Tunisia were the other Arab 
countries with a relatively large production. 
Iron ore is the third mineral with large reserves in the region. The 
estimated proven reserve was about 4 billion tons and the possible 
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TABLE 2.4 
Phosphate Reserve and Production and Iron Ore Reserve in the Region 
Country 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Morocco 
Saudi Arabia 
Syria 
Tunisia 
Mauritania 
Libya 
Others 
1. TOTAL 
2. Worl d 
1/2 
Phosphate 
Proven Reserve 
1975 
Ton 
642 
4,325 
1,760 
1,062 
57,000 
912 
860 
885 
64,446 
130,000 
51'}', 
Production 
1979 
m. Ton 
1.10 
.65 
n.a. 
2.83 
20.32 
n.a. 
1.17 
4.04 
30.2 
126.79 
23.8'}', 
I ron Ore 
Proven Reserves 
Ton 
1102. 
338. 
55. 
56. 
80. 
12. 
515. 
1815. 
4024. 
SOURCE: A.M.F. Joint Arab Economic Report 1982, 1981 
The British Sulphur Corporation Ltd. 
Statistical Supplement July/August, 1981. 
reserves may be three times as much as the proven ones. Here Algeria, 
Libya and Mauritania accounted for the most proven and possible reserve 
(18). In addition to these three important minerals, the region has 
abundant quantities of glass sand, copper ore, bromine, potash and the 
potential gains from a geological mapping programme are very large. 
2.2. Economic growth and structural changes in the post 
independence period 
Economists differ in their explanation of the process of economic 
development as well as to the criteria they employ in their analysis of 
development. (19) However, economic development has been defined as 
the process of whereby a country's real per capita income increases 
over a substained period of time through continuing increases in per 
capita productivity. (20) 
Accepting this criteria as a measure of growth, the region in general 
and the major oil exporting countries in particular have achieved 
significant growth since independence. But the regions great expansion 
took place between 1973-81. In this period the price of oil increased 
significantly, and the oil revenues had been very large. Consequently, 
the growth which had been achieved in the major oil exporting countries 
was significantly greater than the growth achieved in the other Arab 
countries. 
2.2.1 Economic Growth 
In analysing the growth in per capita income and the gross domestic 
product of the Arab countries for the period 1971-82 we observe the 
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striking difference between the non-oil Arab countries and the 
major oil exporting Arab countries (The major oil exporting countries 
concerned in this analysis are Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Libya and the United Arab Emirates). At the beginning 
of the period under consideration the major oil-exporting countries 
had a per capita gross domestic product (GOP) of $707 and the 
remaining Arab countries $229. In 1982 these had grown to about 
$6179 and $819, respectively as seen in Table 2.5. 
Similarly, the gross domestic product of the major oil exporting 
countries in absolute terms in 1971 was about $24 billion and of the 
other group $21 billion. By 1982, these figures had increased to 
approximately $312 billion and just $100 billion respectively. That 
means the first group achieved a growth rate of about 30 per cent in 
their GOP at current prices, while the latter had achieved just 16 per 
cent as seen in Table 2.6. 
The difference is great and striking in the growth of the GOP and per 
capita income between these groups. However, the great difference is 
not only between oil and non-oil producing countries, but it also 
evident within each group. Data on the GOP and per capital income for 
individual countries Qatar and the United Arab Emirates had some of the 
highest per capita incomes in the world - over $35000 in the early 
1980's. These were followed by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with GOP per 
capita of approximately $17000 in 1981 almost one half of the GDP 
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TABLE 2.5 
Gross Domestic Product Per Capita at Current Prices and its Percentage Year to Year 
Growth Rates for Arab Countries Divided into Oil and Non-Oil Producers 
1 
-------- -- T--- ---- I --- --1- ~-I 1 1 
1971 I 1972 I 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1 1980 1 1981 1 1982 I Average I 
1 
I 
Non-Oil Countries 1 I 
G.D.P. per cap $ I 229 258 I 298 372 431 483 
Growth Rates I 12.6 I 15.5 24.8 15.8 12.1 
1 
I 
Oil Countri es $ 1 707 839 l 1129 2337 2675 3084 
Growth Rates I 18.6 I 34.5 107.0 14.5 15.5 
1 
I 
All Countries 1 1 
G.D.P. per cap $ I 360 420 I 530 930 1070 1230 
Growth Rate I 16.6 I 26.2 75.5 15.0 14.9 
I 
I 
Source: Calculated From Data in Arab Monetary Fund. 
National Account Country Tables for the Years 1971-1982 
(Abu Dhabi, 1983) 
565 
16.9 
3559 
15.4 
1430 
16.2 
I I I I 
1 I I I 
1 I I I 
660 642 763 I 797 I 819 
16.8 -2.7 18.8 I 4.4 I 2.7 I 12.5 
I I 
I I 
3887 4799 6381 I 6727 1 6179 
9.2 23.5 32.9 1 5.4 1 -8.4 I 24.3 
I 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1590 1850 2400 I 2530 I 2390 
17.2 16.3 29.7 I 5.4 I -5.4 20.1 
I I 
I I 
TABLE 2.6 
Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices of Arab Countries Divided into Oil and Non Oil Producers and its Percentage 
Year to Year Growth Rates 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 I 1978 1 1979 1 1980 1 1981 1 1982 1 Average I 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Non-Oil Countries 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
G.D.P. in mil1ion$1 208951 240791 285451 365621 434621 497671 599931 719201 71897\ 882431 946441 997831 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
" 1 15.2 1 18.5 I 28.1 1 18.8 1 14.5 I 20.3 1 19.9 1 0 1 22.7 1 7.2 1 5.4 1 15.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Oil Countri es I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
G.D.P. in million$1 246041 302951 422331 8998411070271127675115303311725911220757 303107132962313126931 
1 1 1 1 
" 1 23.1 1 39.4 1113.0 I 18.9 I 19.3 I 19.8 I 12.8 1 27.9 37.3 1 8.7 1 -5.1 1 28.6 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 I 
1 1 1 1 
All Countries I I I I I I I I I 1 1 1 
G.D.P. in mi1lion$1 455021 543741 70778112654611504891177442121302712445111292654 391350142426714124761 
1 1 1 1 
" I 
1 19.5 1 30.1 I 78.8 I 18.9 I 17.9 1 20.0 I 14.8 1 19.7 33.7 1 8.4 I -3.0 1 23.3 
1 1 1 I 
1 1 1 1 
NOTE: Oil Countries include the O.A.E., Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Libya. 
Non Oil Countries include Jordan, Bahrain, Tunisia, The Sudan, Syria, Somalia, The Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, 
Mauritania, Yemen, Arab Republic, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. 
per capita income in the other two countries. The third sub-group 
includes Libya and Oman which had a GOP per capita income in the range 
of $7000 - 10000 in the same period. Finally Iraq and Algeria with a 
GOP per capita income of about $2000. 
Similarly the non-oil Arab countries had different growth rates. The 
GOP per capita income of this group in 1980 ranged from $390 in the 
lowest to $1740 in the highest. The lowest sub-group includes the 
Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania, Yemen, Arab Republic an People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen with a per capita income of less than $480. The 
second sub-group comprises Egypt and Morocco with a per capita income 
of less than $720. And finally the highest among the non-oil countries 
are Jordan, Syria and Lebanon with a per capita income of over $1400. 
The difference in per captia income within the major oil exporting 
countries can be attributed to the magnitude of oil revenues received 
by each country and the size of its population. But the difference in 
GOP per capita income within Arab non-oil countries can be partially 
explained by the difference in their stage of development and 
partical1y by population density. 
2.2.2. Structural Change 
In the above discussion it was made clear that the oil revenues were 
the main cause of per capita income increases, particularly in the oil 
producing countries. Thus the most important change in the 1970's was 
the decline in the pre-eminence of the agricultural sector as a main 
contributor to the region's economy leaving the hydrocarbon 
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sector in the lead as can be seen in Table 2.7. In that period, the 
agricultural sector's contribution to the region's GOP declined from 15 
per cent in 1971 to less than 7 per cent in 1980. Likewise the 
manufacturing sector's contribution dropped from about 10 per cent in 
1971 to slightly over 7 per cent in 1980. But the transport sector 
almost maintained its position of about 5 per cent of the region's GOP. 
In contrast, the mining sector's contribution rose from about 27 per 
cent in 1971 to almost 50 per cent in 1980. 
The overwhelming dominance of the mining sector dwarfed the contrib-
ution of other sectors. This points to the weakness of the region's 
economy and to the little progress achieved outside the mining 
activities. On examining the sectoral contribution on the country 
level as given in Appendices 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 & 2.8 the data show great 
differences between individual countries, but it is possible to put 
them into four groups. The first group include Iraq and Algeria. They 
are both from the major oil exporting countries but differ from other 
Arab oil exporting countries in having more balanced economies. The 
mining sector contributed about 22 per cent of their GOP in 1971 and 
increased to about 47 per cent in 1980. The second group includes the 
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Libya and Oman. This 
group is heavily dependent on oil revenues. The mining activities 
contributed almost 60 per cent of their GOP in 1971 and increased to 
about 64 per cent in 1980. The third group includes, Jordan, Bahrain, 
Tunisia, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Morocco. This group has produced 
oil but on a smaller scale and its economies are more balanced than the 
economies of other groups. The fourth group includes the least 
developed countries in the region namely, the Sudan, Mauritania, 
Somalia and both Yemens. Here the traditional sector has continued to 
dominate the economic scene. 
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TABLE 2.7 
1971 1972 1979 1980 
Agr. , Fishing & Forest 
Millions of 0.5.$ 6680 7908 20355 24983 
Percentage Ratio to G.D.P. 15.1 15.3 7.2 6.6 
Mining, Quarr. & Fuel 
Millions of 0.5.$ 11926 14298 122734 185845 
Percentage Ratio to G.D.P. 27.0 27.6 43.3 48.9 
Manufacturing Industry 
Millions of U.S.$ 4695 5317 22244 27310 
Percentage Ratio to G.D.P. 10.6 10.2 7.8 7.2 
Elect., Water & Gas 
Millions of U.S.$ 647 833 2258 2712 
Percentage Ratio to G.D.P. 1.5 1.6 0.8 0.7 
Contructi on 
Millions of U.S.$ 2363 3394 26695 31621 
Percentage Ratio to G.D.P. 5.3 6.5 9.4 B.3 
Commerce, Rest. & Hotel 
Millions of U.S.$ 5175 6149 28271 34075 
Percentage Raion to G.D.P. 11.5 11.8 10.0 8.9 
Tran., Comm. & Storage 
Millions of U.S.$ 2531 2843 13884 16449 
Percentage Ratio to G.D.P. 5.8 5.4 5.0 4.3 
Finance, Insurance & Bank 7406 Millions of O.S.$ 835 782 6042 
Percentage Ration to G.D.P. 1.8 1.5 2.1 1.9 
Service Sector 
Millions of U.S.$ 9347 10447 40681 49757 
Percentage Ratio to G.D.P. 21.2 20.1 14.4 13.2 
G.D.P. at Factor Cost 
Millions of U.S.$ 44199 51971 283164 38015B 
SOURCE: Computed from Appendix 5 to 8 
2.3 The Industrial Activities 
2.3.1 The industrial level 
The early efforts for industrialization began in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon 
and other Arab countries in the North. These efforts led to the 
establishment of some small plant industry mainly directed to the 
domestic market. In the 1970's the oil boom allowed the region to 
pursue vigorously its industrialisation through increasing imports of 
capital goods and expertise. The region's total merchandise imports in 
1971 amounted to about $9 billion rising to $138 billion in 1981 a 
large part of which was for the establishment or operations of 
industries. As the oil exporting countries had very little industry 
before the oil boom, they embarked on a strategy of import substitution 
industrialisation. This includes building materials and equipment 
industries, ship repair, metal engineering and electrical industries, 
food industries and others. Then it was natural for them to start 
hydrocarbon related export industries. 
They increased their petroleum refineries and established petro-
chemical industries, liquid petroleum gas and liquid natural gas 
plants, and aluminum smelting and steel making industries.( 21) 
In the early 1980's, the region's industrial base has become more 
diversified, but development has fallen short of the Arab desire to 
building a real industrial base. The regions production of 
manufactured goods in 1980 accounted for only 0.5 per cent of the world 
industrial capacity.(22) 
Industrial progress has been of a very limited nature. The Arab 
efforts in industrialisation to improve sectoral balance and 
diversification have been confronted with various obstacles, such as 
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the small market size in individual Arab countries, the shortage of 
skilled labour across all Arab countries, and the shortage of other 
types of labour in the oil exporting countries and of capital 
expenditure in the more densely populated Arab countries. As a result, 
Arab industry today is composed mainly of small plants. The large 
industrial projects are inadequate in both number and capital and both 
types of industries have continued dependence for their operation on 
imported raw materials, foreign technology, expertise and markets. 
These deficiencies have been a matter of concern for the Arab planners 
and decision makers. They have realized that without Arab co-operation 
none of them is able alone to create a viable industrial base. 
Indust~ still has considerable room for expansion on a regional scale. 
Arab industry's production of manufacturing goods comes to only a 
small proportion of the imported manufactured goods. These facts were 
examined in several conferences and all called for joint Arab 
action.(23) 
The joint industrial projects may prove the key to the region's 
industrialisation. Likewise in the petro-chemical industry with its 
countless product the region has ample opportunity for specialisation. 
Metwally suggests that the long-tenm solution to the economic 
development problem of most, if not all the Arab countries lies in 
industrialisation through some form of economic integration between 
themselves.(24) Ghantus, among others, calls for a common 
industrialisation strategy because modern industry and in particular 
the engineering industry can only operate.on a large scale and notes 
that many of the individual Arab markets are too small for scale 
economies in production to be realized.(2S) 
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2.3.2. The performance of agricultural sector 
The Arab agricultural performance has been less successful than in 
industry. The Arabs have paid less attention to the development of 
their traditional sectors and more to industrialisation. Too much 
emphasis on industrialisation in fact changed some of them from food 
exporters into food importers with little gain. In addition to this 
preferential policy the lack of arable land and water in the capital 
surplus countries, with the exception of Iraq and the shortage of 
capital in countries with arable land have been further constraints 
on agricultural development. 
Only Saudi Arabia can claim that significant development has been 
achieved in this sector. Indeed it has made vigorous efforts to 
develop its traditional sector, despite the physical limitation on 
significant progress in this direction. It has made great efforts to 
improve the standard of living of its rural population and to curb 
their flow to the urban centres. The government applied all manner of 
subsidiaries to encourage farmers to grow plants and raise livestock. 
It bought their out-put at a very high price and extended to them all 
the credit needed. This policy resulted in a dramatic rise in 
agricultural product. The country was approaching self-sufficiency in 
many food stuffs such as milk, eggs and cereals. Indeed wheat 
production rose from just 3000 tones in the early 1970's to over 1.3 
million tons in the early 1980's as impressive achievements (26). 
However, the experience of Saudi Arabia is the exception and not the 
rule and more importantly such policies are not entirely conclusive to 
the creation of a self-sustaining agricultural sector. 
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The Arabs have failed to increase their production enough to feed their 
growing population. The average annual growth rate in the production 
of wheat, grain and animal products for the period 1970-81 was 1.ij per 
cent, 4.0 per cent and 0.7 per cent respectively see Table 2.8. This 
has sharply reduced the per capita rate of domestic food production 
because the population grew at an average annual rate of 3 per cent. 
Also the increase in the region per capita income has increased its per 
capita consumption. As a result, the region's self-sufficiency in food 
has deteriorated further. Its self-sufficiency in grain dropped from 
84 per cent in 1970 to about 60 in the 1980s. For sugar the rate 
dropped from 40 per cent to 30 per cent during the same period. The 
region can claim it had self-sufficiency in fruit and cotton while 
other foodstuffs have to be imported (see Table 2.9), a rapidly rising 
costs. For instance, the cost of such imports in 1971 was about $100 
million, but it soared to $21 billion in 1981.(27) 
The food problem continues to haunt the Arabs. The vulnerability of 
the region is great if it cannot produce its own food. To quote 
Caplan, 
liAs the west fears its energy dependence on the Middle East, 
so too, the Middle East countries are worried by their 
dependence on Western food supplies. And if, as the recent 
Rome Conference concluded, the world is heading for serious 
food shortages in the 1980's, the Arabs may become really 
alarmed. This reasoning has promoted the Kuwait based Arab 
Fund for Economic and Social Development to draw up an 
imaginative plan, spread over a 25 year time scale, to turn 
Sudan into an Arab food granary" (28) . 
The prominent position of agriculture in the economic life of the 
region has been undisputable for many centuries and agriculture will 
continue to be the base of the region's economy for the forseeable 
future. It provides a living and employment for more than one-half of 
the region's population, and more importantly there can be no 
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TABLE 2.8 
Economic Indicator of the Arab Agricultural Performance for the Period 
1970-1981 
The Production Labour Average Average 
Yield to the Productfvi ty Annual Annual 
per World to the Growth Growth 
hectar Production World Levels Rates in Rates in 
to the Land Labour 
World Yield Productivity 
Levels 
cz, cz, cz, cz, cz, 
Wheat 56.7 2.3 86.2 1.8 0.5 
Grain 55.1 1.7 94.8 4.0 -0.6 
Animal Product 31.7 1.7 64.1 -0.7 0.6 
SOURCE: Compiled from:-
A. W. H. Rashid, "Aggravation of the Agricultural Food Deficit in the 
Arab Region", 
Oil and Arab Co-operation, Vo1.l0, No.2, 1984, pp.68-8l. 
TABLE 2.9 
The Regions Self-Sufficiency at the Beyinning and at the End of Last 
Decade in Selected Agricu tural Products 
~ 
Major Catagories Self-Sufficiency 
1970 1980 
Grain 84 
Sugar 40 
Fruits & Vegetables 114 
Animal Products 81 
Coffee, Tea, Tobacco 16 
Cotton 240 
SOURCE: The Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development 
(A.F.E.S.D.) Joint Arab Economic Report 1981. 
(Sharjah Dar al-Khalij, 1982), p.39 
60 
30 
101 
65 
11 
190 
successful industrialisation without a flourishing agriculture. It 
provides material for processing and it saves the Arabs paying for 
foreign food stuffs. The solution to the agricultural problem may be 
achieved through more efficiency. Labour productivity in the 197U's 
was behind the world level respectively. Table 2.8 shows that the 
labour productivity for the three products wheat, grain and animal 
product was about 86 per cent, 94 per cent and 64 per cent of the world 
level. The average annual growth of labour productivity was very low 
or negative. 
2.4 Mobilization and Uses of Resources 
2.4.1 Mobilization of domestic resources 
The great disparities in the distribution of natural and human 
resources among the Arab countries has resulted in their improper use. 
The resources available to satisfy the enormous individual and 
collective needs of the Arab countries are relatively small and 
unevenly distributed. Table 2.10 shows the total economic resources 
and their use for the two major groups namely the oil exporting 
countries and the non-oil countries. In 1971 the total economic 
resources for both groups were close in volume, but since the oil 
prices rose in 1973 the total economic resources put at the disposal of 
the oil exporting countries has risen faster than those resources 
available to non-oil countries. This has resulted into two distinct 
patterns of economic growth. 
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TABLE 2.10 
Total Economic Resources and their use 
Arab Countries 
in group 
The Oil-Exporting 
Countries Resources 
1971 
% 
I 
I 
I 1974 
1 
I 
1 % 
1 
1 
1 
1 1 
1 
1979 1 1981 
1 
1 
% 1 % 
1 
I 
1 
1 1 1 GOP 24604 180.0189984 180.1 2220757 72.91329623173.01 
Imports of goods and 
services 
Total Resources 
Uses 
Consumption 
Investment 
Exports of goods and 
services 
The Other Arab Countries 
Resources 
GOP 
Imports of goods and 
services 
Total Resources 
Uses 
Consumption 
Investment 
Exports of goods and 
services 
6059 120.0 22324 119.9 81748 27.1 121340127.0 
I I I 
1 1 1 
30663 1 112308 302505 450963 
1 
1 
13124 42.0 28738 25.5 103111 34.0 152963 33.9 
4724 15.4 17246 15.31 65695 21.7 97042 21.5 
12813 41.7 66328 59.01 133700 44.0 200957 44.5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
1 
20898 80.3 36562 72.01 71897 69.9 94644 68.9 
5111 19.7 13890 28.0 30872 30.1 42620 31.9 
26009 50452 102769 137264 
18994 73.0 32037 63.0 64106 62.3 86739 63.1 
3184 12.2 7435 14.5 19678 19.1 23493 17.1 
3831 14.8 10935 21.5 8983 18.6 27031 19.8 
SOURCE: Complied from N.M.F.: Arab countries National Accounts 1971-19H2 
( U • A. E .: A. M. F ., 1983). 
The economic growth in the non-oil Arab countries has depended on the 
increase in average income per inhabitant which was extremely low. To 
increase per capita income these countries tried to increase the 
productivity of their workers through adoption of modern techniques and 
the diversion of persons from less productive activities to more 
productive ones. They did this by squeezing the consumption of their 
masses - which generally speaking was very low - and increasing the 
ratio of economic resources to total resources devoted to the 
investment. This is evident in the rise of the ratio of resources 
allocated for investment and the fall in resources devoted to 
consumption. The former ratio had risen from about 12 per cent of the 
total economic resources in 1971 to slightly over 19 per cent in 1979 
but dropped to 17 per cent in 1981. In contrast private and public 
consumption declined from 73 per cent in 1971 to about 63 per cent of 
the total economic resources in 1981. 
In contrast, economic growth in the oil-exporting countries depended on 
the influx of oil revenues. The unique experience of the major oi1-
exporting countries of receiving enormous liquid wealth in a very short 
time fostered types of consumption peculiar to countries of high 
productivity and made planners base their targets on the volume of 
investment expenditure rather than on production.(29) The total 
consumption of the oil exporting countries rose more than twelve times 
in a decade, from about $13 billion in 1971 to about $153 billion in 
1981. The sudden increase in consumption and the importing of a 
variety of luxury goods has been strongly criticised.(30) Sudden 
riches seem to deter the building of a vigorous society and provide 
ample opportunities for extravagant expenditure. 
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However, concurrent with the increase in consumption in the oil 
exporting countries, investment also increased at a great pace. It had 
risen about twenty times during that decade from about $5 billion in 
1971 to approximately $97 billion in 1981. Thus the oil exporting 
countries have invested heavily in various economic sectors. The 
distribution of planned investment in the 1970's among the Arab 
countries as given in Appendix 2.9, shows that the emphasis in these 
plans is on the productive sectors. This is clear from the allocation 
of 55.5 per cent of the total planned investment to these sectors. 
While the service sectors and the distribution sectors were allocated 
one-quarter and one fifth of the total planned investment respectively. 
However, the emphasis on the productive sectors was more pronounced in 
the development plans of the non-oil countries which allocated two-
thirds of their planned investment to these sectors. 
The emphasis on other sectors in some oil exporting countries such as 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates was necessary for two 
reasons. 
(a) The physical and social infrastructure of both countries was 
relatively undeveloped compared to their counterparts in Kuwait and 
Iraq.Ol",) Thus Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates devoted a 
large proportion of their total investment plans in the early 1970s to 
building up their physical and social infrastructure, especially 
housing, roads, ports, electricity and water. 
(b) The building of the physical infrastructure is necessary to 
prepare the ground for the smooth take-off of the development of other 
sectors. 
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The uneven distribution of liquid wealth among the Arab countries 
resulted in large disparities among Arab countries in per capita 
consumptIon and capital formation. The figures for 1981 (Table 2.10) 
show the consumption of the oil exporting countries was twice that of 
the non-oil countries despite the fact that the majority of the Arab 
population live in the latter countries. Likewise the investment in 
the oil exporting countries was four times that in the non-oil 
producing countries although the investment opportunities are larger in 
the latter countries. In this context it can safely be assumed that, 
there has been much room for improving opportunities and reducing 
wastage in the region had a collective plan been made for deploying the 
regions surplus among the Arab countries. 
The oil exporting countries have pushed the investment ratio in the 
non-oil economy (over 60 per cent) beyond all historical records (33) 
through the Governments budget regardless of the productivity of these 
investments. In contrast some productive investment opportunities were 
left in the non-oil producing countries due to lack of capital. It is 
worth noticing here that investment in some of the non-oil countries 
such as Jordan and North Yemen was only possible through the help 
received from the oil exporting countries. In solidarity with other 
Arab countries, the oil exporting countries extended in official aid 
about $20 billion to the former countries during the 1970s (Appendix 
2.10) Concomitant with this, the non-oil producing countries received 
about $26 billion in remittances from their citizen working in the oil 
exporting countries (see Appendix 2.11). These payments undoubtedly 
alleviated the hardship of the non-oil countries and made economic 
growth possible, but not to such a sufficient extent to finance all the 
investment opportunities available in these countries. 
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The great discrepancy between the oil revenues and the planned 
investment in the major oil exporting countries is striking. Table 2.11 
shows tlla t the Uni ted Arab Emi rates' oil revenues were a1 most ten 
times its' planned investment. This in Kuwait corresponds to a 400% 
ratio and more than 300% in Saudi Arabia. A similar discrepancy can be 
observed in Qatar and Libya. The other Arab countries like Iraq and 
Algeria with considerable oil production have invested a larger 
proportion of their oil revenues (and the latter country has even 
borrowed to satisfy its development needs). In the former countries 
with a high discrepancy between oil revenues and planned investment, 
development was severely constrained by the lack of other complementary 
factors of production such as labour and poor infrastructure facilities 
which severely reduced the capital absorptive capacity of these 
countries. These problems were aptly described by Everett. He wrote, 
IIEvery economi st wou1 d agree that in any country there 
is some limit to the rate of capital formation that can 
be carried out at any given time with resulting increase 
in productivity. There are technical and other limitations. 
Among the technical ones are the size of the construction 
industry, the availability of materials for capital 
construction and of workers for construction and subsequent 
operation, the capacity of the ports and transportation 
system to carry capital goods, of the communication system 
to carry messages, of the country's housing to house 
expatriate or migrant builders and workers, and of the 
existing productive complex into which or onto which the new 
enterprises must be fitted and on which they must depend in 
part for their productivity. Other limitations would include 
the number of individuals in the society with adequate 
managerial and technical capabilities, including in the 
extreme case the capability of making contracts with 
foreigners to do the capital formation, and the values and 
motivations of many groups in the society of workers, which 
affect their availability for new enterprises of government 
officials, which will determine the degree of waste, corruption 
and misdirection of investment."(33} 
2.4.2 The Financial Assets Accumulation 
The major oil exporting countries have converted their depleted 
national wealth in excess of their development needs in the short run, 
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TABLE 2.11 
Arab countries planned investment and value of petroleum exports 
Planned Value of 
investment oil exports 
( 1 ) (2 ) 
Jordan 2,853 
Bahrain 377 7,897 
Tunisia 13,553 2,354 
The Sudan 10,068 
Syria 16,028 5,290 
Somalia 757 
Lebanon 2,361 
Egypt 33,790 8,016 
Morocco 13,947 
Mauritania 999 
Yemen A.R. 4,498 
Yemen P.D.R. 323 
U.A.E. 8,020 74,254 
Algeria 31,982 45,133 
Saudi Arabia 97,501 3,47,724 
Iraq 42,528 95,344 
Oman 5,231 12,015 
Qatar 20,257 
Kuwait 19,262 86,717 
Libya 33,752 87,693 
TOTAL 3 38.130 7 92.703 
SOURCE: Joint Arab Economic Report, 1981. 
Table 10/6, p.236. 
Table 2/12, p.295. 
(u.s. $ million) 
(1) & (2) 
4.7 
575.0 
302.0 
421.0 
10.8 
70.8 
28.1 
44.6 
43.5 
22.2 
38.5 
42.6 
as a result a great proportion of their oil revenues have been kept in 
liquid assets abroad. This leads us to investigate where the rest of 
oil revenues have gone and more importantly how these funds have been 
deployed. In answering these questions we encounter a scarcity of data 
and different estimates for Arab capital surpluses. However, the most 
quoted data are tabulated in Table 2.12. According to figures in the 
Table the accumulated capital surpluses of the six Arab countries 
totalled about $275 billion at the end of the first quarter of 1982. 
Others estimated it at 400 billion at the end of 1982.(~) The wide 
discrepancy in these estimates is due to the absence of publications 
about them. The distribution of these financial assets between the 
holder shows the drastic concentration of the financial assets in the 
hands of two countries namely Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The formers 
foreign assets stood at about $160 billion and the latter's foreign 
assets at $75 billion. The other two countries which were still holding 
foreign assets at the end of the period under consideration were the 
United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) and Qatar, each of them was possessing a 
relatively modest amount compared to the holding of the first two 
countries. While the last two countries on the list, Libya and Iraq, 
have found their surpluses drastically cut and even becoming negative. 
This happened for different reasons. Iraq has lost its foreign assets 
and borrowed what is estimated by some sources at about $35 bi1lion(36) 
mostly from the Arab rich countries, as a result of the war with Iran 
which started in September 1980, whilst the reduction in petroleum 
production in Libya has dried up its foreign assets. 
The surpluses of the major oil exporting countries were matched by 
smaller deficits accumulated by other Arab countries. The latter 
countries have been unable to generate domestic income sufficient to 
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TABLE 2.12 
Arab Foreign Assets 
(U.S. $ billion) 
Country 1972 1977 1978 1979 1980 1982 (1) (2 ) (3) (4) ( 5 ) (6) 
Saudi Arabia 2.3 64 61 78 125 160 
Kuwait 2.4 21 27 49 65 75 
United Arab Emirates .3 9.3 12.7 30 
Qatar .4 2.9 4.2 10 
Iraq .7 8.6 17.5 
Libya 2.7 4.1 6.3 
TOTAL 8.8 112.8 167.7 275 
SOURCE: For Calculations I, 2, 3, 4 and 5 for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
quoted by Financial Times Survey, Monday September 28th, 1981 
Arab Banking and Finance, p.II. 
For Calculations 1, 3 and 4 for U.A.E., Qatar, Iraq and Libya 
quoted by Zuhayr Mikdashi, Payments Imbalances, O.P.E.C. and 
Financial Markets in Oil and Arab Co-operation, Vo1.l, No.3, 
1981, Table 2, p.ll. 
Calculation 6 for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and U.A.E. from Odeh 
Aburdene, U.S. Economic relations with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 
and U.A.E. by A. Abourdeineh in Arab Business Magazine, No.40, 
(August, September, 1982), p.40-43 in Arabic. 
their consumption and investment. So in contrast to the first group, 
they borrowed about $72 billion or about one quarter of the surplus 
accumulated by the first group. As seen in Table 2.13, the figures 
show Algeria as the largest borrower among the Arabs with an 
outstanding debt of approximately $21 billion in 19B1. During the 
1970s Algeria had raised large sums of money in order to finance its 
ambitious industrialisation programme. Egypt is the second country in 
terms of outstanding debt accumulated in 1981, approximately $17 
billion. Then comes Morocco with a figure of loans amounting to $10 
billion. The other Arab countries borrowed less than the first three 
did. 
On the question of surplus deployment, detailed statistics are not 
available. However, it is known that the vast bulk of such funds are 
placed in Euro dollar markets in short term instruments with a much 
smaller amount finding its way into the Arab region and to other 
developing countries. This is clear in the portfolio investment of 
Saudi Arabia, the largest holder of such funds and in the Arab 
portfolio investment in the United States of America which is the 
largest recipient of Arab capital surpluses. In the case of Saudi 
Arabia's surplus, two thirds of it is invested in U.S. dollars 
primarily U.S. Government treasury bills and notes and the other 20 per 
cent in O-Mark and Yen denominated securities.(36) In 1982 the Arab 
investment in the United States was estimated to be nearly $80 billion. 
The bulk of these investments were in the form of U.S. Government 
securities (about $46 billion), corporate bonds and stocks($15 billion) 
and direct investments were just about $4 billion, (see Table 2.14). 
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TABLE 2.13 
Arab countries: Debt indicators 1972-1981 
Country Total Debt 
'" UUI.:'I.QIIUIII~ 
1972 1981 
Somalia 251 1,316 
Sudan 702 6,004 
Algeria 2,697 21,686 
Egypt 2,680 17,334 
Iraq 733 -
Jordan 339 2,277 
Lebanon 63 385 
Morocco 1,216 10,678 
Oman (2) 343 842 
Syria 523 3,978 
Tunisia 1,083 4,599 
Yemen A.R. (5) 380 1,747 
Yemen P.D.R. 149 1,271 
TOTAL 11,159 72,117 
--
NOTES: \1\ Exports of G & S 1980 2 Debt of 1974 
~ ~~gg~~_gf_~ t ~ 1§~8 
~ . 
U I SUU r-:,t::u 
1972 1981 
100 877 
396 4,595 
1,488 14,392 
1,982 13,887 
415 -
171 1,419 
62 246 
919 7,879 
166 556 
337 2,336 
694 3,182 
230 1,094 
20 640 
6,980 51,103 
(in million US dollars) 
Total Debt Disbursed Debt Service Service to GNP to Exports 
1972 1981 1972 1981 1972 1981 
2 16 24 71 - 6 
51 111 17 68 14 24 
189 3,880 21 36 12 26 (I) 
349 2,065 25 47 31 23 
45 - 10 - 3 -
10 182 28 39 7 6 
9 54 3 - - -
104 1,233 18 51 10 30 
10 95 14 10 1 2 
42 411 14 15 8 15 (3) 
95 517 31 39 15 15 (4) 
10 59 30 34 5 5 
- 37 - 66 - 7 (6) 
916 8,660 
I 
TABLE 2.14 
United States Investments of the Major Arab Oil Exporters 
(end of 1982) 
U.S. Government Securities 
Treasury Bill s 
Treasury Bonds 
Federal Agency Issues 
Corporate Bonds 
Corporate Stocks 
Commercial Bank Liabilities 
Demand Deposits 
Time Deposits 
Other (mainly CDS) 
TOTAL 
Non Bank Liabilities 
U.S. Government Liabilities 
Direct Investment 
TOTAL Investment in U.S. 
$ Millions 
46280 
7005 
33006 
6269 
5892 
9570 
8164 
1340 
1434 
5391 
69906 
1019 
4884 
3926 
79735 
% 
58.0 
8.8 
41.4 
7.9 
7.4 
12.0 
10.2 
1.7 
1.B 
6.8 
87.7 
1.3 
6.1 
4.9 
100.1 
NOTE: Statistics cover Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia & U.A.E. 
SOURCE: United States Treasury Commerce Department, Publication of 
Office of Intenationa1 Banking and Portfolio Investment, 
1st March 1983, cited in The Arab World, Rodney Wilson 
An International Directory, (U.K. Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., 1984) 
Table 22. 
The deployment of the region's surplus in short-term financial 
instruments abroad has not been rewarding. In the period 1974-78 the 
interest earned in real terms from such investment in the Western 
countries was low and perhaps even negative.(~) Thus the way the 
Arabs' money has been deployed has not been compatible with their 
announced aim of accumulating these funds as a·pension fund' for the 
future generation when the oil era comes to an end. 
The Arab holders of these surpluses have not been interested in this 
short term investment. But they encountered two major problems. 
First, the oil exporting countries were obliged to accomodate the 
expanding world demand for energy by selling more oil, thus producing 
more revenue than they could absorb. As a result oil revenues began 
accumulating in the international banks. Undoubtedly these countries 
have benefitted from the adjustment in oil prices in parallel with othe 
sources of energy prices but objectively, they could have managed with 
a lower production level. In fact, despite the increase in oil prices, 
many people in the region advocated the policy of leaving the oil in 
the ground instead of converting it into financial assets which may be 
eroded by inflation. Within this context an Arab financier said it 
.wou1d be wise for the oil exporting countries to tailor oil production 
levels to their own needs.(Ja) 
The second problem faced by the Arab countries with large holding of 
surpluses is that of portfolio selection. In selecting their portfolio 
investment the Arab were faced with two problems. The first of these 
problems was the concentration of the revenues in the hand of 
governments. The latter trusted this task to their Ministry of Finance 
or Central Bank. The lack of material and human resources in such 
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institutions made it impossible for them to effectively invest huge 
amount of surpluses in a short time.(39) 
The second problem with regard to portfolio selection is the reluctance 
of all countries to open the door to foreign direct investment on large 
scale.( 4Q) SO the Arabs were left with very little choice apart from 
accumulating their funds with well known international banks. 
2.5 The Emerging concept of Arab Capital Markets 
2.5.1 On the national level 
In view of these limitations the Arab countries began questioning their 
investment strategy. They found that long term rewarding investment, 
particularly equity investments are not open enough in foreign 
countries on the scale required. Consequently the call for Arab 
investment to confine itself to the region was intensified.(4l ) 
This policy was reflected in the paper given by Alhamed. He said, 
"we do not regard ourselves in the Arab capital surplus 
countries as merely providers of funds, mere money 
lenders or ventures. Our role cannot possibly be 
confined to such limits as our fundamental aim is 
the most appropriate coupling of Arab financial 
resources to the development needs of Arab lands".(~) 
This development coincided with the need of the other Arab countries 
for funds and great opportu~ities opened up for Arab capital when many 
Arab countries welcomed the Arab surplus. 
Within this context, Kuwait the first Arab capital surplus country has 
gradually diversified some of its portfolio across a wider spectrum of 
assets. The Kuwaitis established their own investment companies very 
early and have been by far the leading institutions in this respect. 
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In the 1970s in an effort to have more control and direction over their 
capital surpluses, many Arab countries resorted to the establishment of 
their own financial institutions. The leading countries in this 
direction were Kuwait, Libya and U.A.E. These countries have developed 
their own financial institutions to have direct control over their 
capital surpluses. Since then such institutions have been instrumental 
in channelling part of their funds. Other Arab countries, Jordan, 
Bahrain and Egypt among others also embarked on policies of developing 
their own financial institutions. In addition, the latter two 
countries invited foreign banks to operate as offshore enterprises in 
their territories with the intention of helping to finance projects in 
the case of Egypt and building a regional service centre in the case of 
Bahrain. The proliferation of the new financial institutions in many 
Arab countries was accompanied by the emergence of securities markets 
and the introduction of new financial legislation and regulations. So 
the scene of the Arab financial markets began to change rapidly, and 
some regional financial centres began to emerge. These developments 
will be the subject of the remainjng cpapters. 
2.5.2 On the regional level 
Long before the appearance of Arab capital surpluses, Arab countries 
were active participants in several agreements. The vast increase in 
the surplus available for investment increased the Arab efforts tpward 
economic integration. The Arab countries collectively established the 
Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development (A F S E 0) in 1972 and 
the Arab Monetary Fund, AMF in 1977. Since then these institutions 
have been performing for the region what the international institutions 
perform for the world, but the Arab institutions have broader aims than 
the international ones. Both institutions have been active in 
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promoting Arab economic integration by various means. In addition the 
oil rich countries have established their own development institutions 
to serve the region in particular and the developing countries in 
general through the extention of soft loans. 
The new wealth also encouraged the establishment of many joint 
ventures. A survey shows that there are now 750 jOint Arab projects 
with a total capital of about $35 billion.(43) The joint projects 
allowed the region to benefit from economies of scale, relieved the 
deficit Arab countries hosting such projects from the burden of 
borrowing, and provided an opportunity for the capital surplus 
countries to diversify their investment and to be partners rather 
lenders of money. 
Further co-operation envisaged in the multilateral agreements initiated 
by the Arab Economic Unity Council namely: 
1. Agreement on avoidence of double taxation and elimination of tax 
evasion. 
2. Agreement on co-operation in collection of taxes. 
3. Agreement on capital investment and mobility. 
4. Agreement on settlement of investment disputes between Arab host 
countries and citizen of other countries.(44) 
Some of these agreements have been approved. 
A further co-operation envisaged in the three agreements was approved 
by the Arab headsof state in 1980. These agreements are the strategy 
for joint Arab Economic Action. The joint agreement for Investing Arab 
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capital in Arab countries and the plan for joint Arab development 
during the 1980s, proclaimed as the decade of Arab economic co-
operation. 
The main aim of these efforts is to speed up economic development by 
pooling resources. This would alleviate the present constraint on the 
region's development, and open the way for creating a viable modern 
economy for the region as a whole. The importance of these efforts 
emanates from the fact that they were initiated at the offical level 
and with the approval of those in power. As a result further progress 
is expected because it is in compliance with the desires of the 
region's people.(45) It may proceed slowly but the probability of 
reversal ~ remote. Progress in this direction would have been greater 
had not these efforts received a serious setback with the suspension of 
Egypt - the founder of and the most populous country in Arab League -
form membership of the Arab League in 1979. 
Conclusions 
The Arab countries have great diversity in population, in economic 
wealth and in the level of economic development, but their economies 
still have the feature of developing economies. The high per capita 
income ~nd the favourable balance of payments in the oil exporting 
countries are symptoms of a developed economy, but the great reliance 
of the economics on single products, an inadequate indigenous supply of 
technical skills and labour and an over dependence on imports of all 
sorts of goods from abroad put their economics among the under 
developed economies. 
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The extensive mining of Arab minerals has undoubtedly facilitated 
economic growth in the region, but has had implications for the sources 
and structure of the Arab economies. The oil boom helped the 
establishment of the urgent social and physical infrastructure 
especially in the oil exporting countries, but in modernizing the 
regions traditional sectors and in building a real industrial base its 
contribution was modest. The non oil Arab countries financed the bulk 
of their domestic capital needs from domestic saving, and foreign funds 
most of which come from official sources and workers', remittances. 
Some of them borrowed on the international markets, but the ones that 
had restricted access to market financing were forced to slow down 
their economic growth. 
The oil exporting countries had abundant funds and the allocation of 
resources to domestic investment was dictated by economic and social 
needs. The lack of the complementary factors of production reduced the 
capital absorptive capacity of these countries and so some of them were 
left with enonmous liquid funds. Economic development of the sparsely 
populated countries may require a further large influx of population. 
Similarly, the other Arab countries are needed for capital. 
The Arab countries collectively have the adequate human and natural 
resources to support a major development programme for the region as 
a whole. The efforts of the individual Arab countries for development 
have been constrained by the shortage of either labour or capita1.(47) 
Therefore, the great challenge for Arab planners will continue to be 
how to rationalize the scarce Arab resources and how to bring about 
their free movement within the region. The existence of high saving 
countries and low saving countries - with the former having few if any 
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options to diversify their economies or reduce their almost total 
dependence on oil and the latter having limited access to the 
international capital markets provides the basic rationale for enhanced 
efforts toward the development of Arab capital market. In addition the 
emphasis on the establishment of viable industries on a large scale one 
has much in commonwith the emphasis on creating a dynamic and efficient 
Arab capital market. The type of funds needed, their nature and size 
requires a new arrangement to allow the operation of Arab financial 
institutions across boundaries with a minimum of restriction. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATION OF THE BANKING SYSTEM 
Analysis of the development and operation of the banking system 
Introduction 
The banking systems are the most important financial institutions in 
every country·s financial system. Their importance stems both from 
their size within the financial sector and from the fact that their 
liabilities determine the money supply. Thus the banking system plays 
a key role in the functioning of the economy. 
The commercial banking institutions are usually the first to appear in 
financial development and constitute an important sector within the 
financial structure. When the economy expands the existing banks 
either adjust their financial instuments to serve the changes in 
savers· and borrowers· preferences, or new financial institutions 
emerge to introduce the newly demanded services. The banks differ from 
other financial institutions in the degree and complexity of their 
market relationships. Banks are vested with a public service 
responsibility. This responsibility is met in three major ways. 
1. providing the principal monetary mechanism for the country of 
operation. 
2. providing credit facilities for all sectors of the ecomony. 
3. providing safe repositories for savings. 
These services are of vital importance to any country, developed or 
developing. However, the deposit and credit services the banks share 
with other financial institutions, but the first service is almost 
limited to commercial banks. In this service, banks create money 
other financial institutions do not, and for this the banks are usually 
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subjected to specific regulations. The performance of the banking 
system is closely related to its structure and organisation, and its 
contribution to development depends on its dual function of carrying a 
smooth payment system on one hand and extending credit to economic 
development on the other. In addition the establishment of sound 
banking systems in the developing countries take priority over the 
other type of financial institutions, as the demand for money is 
usually high in the early stage of development, because people prefer 
their savings in cash or deposit with banks. 
The purpose of this chapter is to take a detailed investigation of 
banking system in the Arab region. As already indicated, the banking 
system are the region's most important financial institutions. It is 
therefore natural that we should be concerned with the structure of the 
Arab banking industry to explore whether it provide banking services in 
an efficient manner in order to identify the ways on which a possible 
improvement in their operation and strengthening integration may be 
achieved. More specifically, in this chapter we shall examine issues 
like the following: How are the Arab banks born, and how do they 
expand? Is the banking system safe, efficient, and competitive? Who 
regulates banks, how they are regulated, and why they are regulated? 
As we attempt to answer these questions, we shed light on a pressing 
practical problem namely, financing economic development. For this the 
present chapter is presented into three main sections. First section 
will examine the structural changes occurred in the regions banking 
system during the turn of this century. Section two will examine the 
impact of central banks and commercial banks on development. Section 
three will examine some measures for improving the systems mechanism 
and reinforcing moves towards convegence. 
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3.1 The evolution of and structural changes in the Arab banking 
system 
To examine the evolution of and structural changes in the banking 
systems of many countries over a long period is a difficult task, but 
fortunately in the Arab case it is possible to divide the period 
chronologically in such a way as to associate these divisions with 
specific changes in the banking structure. We believe that the 
historical evolution of Arab banking was significantly affected by the 
arrival of the Europeans in the region, the political independence of 
the Arab countries and finally the oil price rise of 1973. Our account 
will be periodised accordingly. 
3.1.1 Up to independance 
In a rudimentary way, banking functions were performed in the region 
for many centuries by the money changers, merchants and others who were 
in a position to extend credit. Some of these practices have continued 
to the present day; indeed the money changers in Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia play an important role in the banking system (1). But modern 
banking faci1ites are of recent origin, having been first introduced by 
the Europeans in the late nineteenth century. A group of British and 
French financiers obtained a currency issue concession from the Ottoman 
Empire so they set up the Ottoman Bank in Turkey in 1863. It is 
perhaps the oldest modern banking institution in the area (2). The 
bank immediately opened two branches in Egypt to benefit from financing 
the cotton trade there. Around that time, French financiers opened 
other banks in Algeria and Tunisia. Then at the turn of the century 
the Ottoman bank opened other branches in the large cities of the 
Fertile Cresent countries (Syria and Iraq), the French opened banks in 
Morocco, and the Italians in Libya. 
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Simultaneously the large foreign communities in Egypt also established 
their own banks in the late ninteenth century (3). The Egyptian 
counterpart of the Ottoman bank, the National Bank of Egypt, was 
established as a commercial bank with a currency issue concession in 
1898. It was completely owned and administered by foreign financiers 
(4) • 
The introduction of banks was accompanied by the introduction of paper 
money. During the Ottoman rule, the gold pound was the only legal 
tender, in the region although other metallic coins such as the 
Austrian schilling (Maria Theresa) were abundant in the Peninsula 
countries (5). This system was replaced by different paper money 
systems introduced by the Europeans in their colonies. For instance 
the French introduced the Franc to Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. 
Likewise they introduced the Syrian pound to Syria and Lebanon. The 
British introduced the Egyptian pound to Egypt and Sudan, the 
Palestanian pound to Palestine and Trans-Jordan. But in the Gulf 
states the Indian rupee was introduced. Italy introduced the Italian 
lira in Libya and part of Somalia. Nevertheless, metallic money 
continued to circulate as a useful means for hoarding and exchange (6). 
The success of the foreign banks and the negligence of indigenous needs 
motivated some wealthy Egyptians to establish their own bank to serve 
the Egyptian people by financing industry rather than foreign trade 
with which the foreign banks were preoccupied (7). Consequently the 
Misr Bank was established by the Egyptians in 1920. It was the first 
bank owned and controlled by an indigenous population. The bank played 
an outstanding role in promoting and financing some industrial 
enterprises that still leads Egyptian industrial activites. Its 
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success incited other local people to create their own bank. In 1924 a 
group of wealthy Syrians in collaboration with Misr Bank established 
the Bank-Misr-Syrian-Libyan to operate in Syria and Lebanon. The 
concept of the establishment of a national bank was spread and accepted 
by the Palestinians who set up the Arab Bank in Jerusalem in 1930. A 
decade later the Iraqi Goverment set up the Rafedain Bank in Baghdad. 
The three above mentioned banks have proved successful ventures and 
today they are amongst the top Arab banks. Other small and family 
banks established in Syria and Lebanon during that period were not 
known outside their district of operation. So they were of minor 
importance. (8) The Peninsula countries hosted their first modern 
banking institution in 1920 when the Chartered bank opened office in 
Bahrain. Two decades later it was followed by the British Bank of the 
Middle East which opened branches in Kuwait, in Dubai and Bahrain in 
the early 1940's. The National banks were later arrivals in the 
Peninsula countries. In 1952, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia established 
their own national bank for the first time, followed by Bahrain in 
1957. Likewise the merchants of Dubai created their own national bank 
in 1963, and 5 years later Abu Dhabi did the same (9). 
The above discussion shows that financial growth proceeded faster in 
the first half of this century in Egypt and the Levant countries 
(Syria, Lebanon, Palestine) than it did in other countries in the 
region. But the whole development was simple and dominated by the 
activities of a few branches of foreign banks. Arab economists 
attribute the slow expansion of the banking system at this period to 
several deterrent factors such as, multiple currency circulation, 
extensive use of gold for transaction and hoarding, deep-rooted Islamic 
precepts condemning usury, mistrust of banking institutions and the 
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lack of banking control (10). But to this can be added the low per 
capita income in the region. Nevertheless the banking habit was 
introduced and the urban areas become monetized to some extent. This 
helped financial growth in the post-independance period to proceed at a 
greater pace than would otherwise have been possible. 
3.1.2 The post-independence period to 1973 
Although the Arab countries achieved political independence at 
different dates during the two decades immediately following the end 
of World War Two, several structural changes in the region1s banking 
system took place at this period. Among others are the establishment 
of comprehensive monetary authorities, the issuance of banking 
regulations, the growth and reorganisation of the banking system and 
the emergence of Beirut as a commercial and financial centre for the 
region. 
3.1.2.1 Banking regulations 
Favourable economic conditions and the increase in oil production at 
the end of the Second World War attracted more banks of local and 
foreign origin to operate in the region. Consequently, the banking 
scene began to change rapidly. By the 1950 l s the number of commercial 
banks stood at 26 in Egypt, about 20 institutions each in Syria and 
Morocco, 7 banks in Iraq and 35 institutions in Lebanon. Likewise the 
number of banks increased in other Arab countries but on a smaller 
scale. 
The growth of the banking sectors at this stage called for regulations. 
This is because banks are institutions whose 1iab1i1ities act as a 
medium of exchange. They are able to create money. So the ability 
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of banks to create money autonomously had to be constrained by various 
institutional and legal arrangements if a reasonable supply of money 
is to be maintained.(ll) 
Consequently, specific banking regulatins were issued during this 
period in most Arab countries. The new regulations cover all 
structural changes in the banking sectors and define their operations. 
What is important in the context of this study is to explore the 
legislation and regulations which affect the operations of the banks 
such as those regulations controlling licensing banks and those 
affecting the bank's portfolio components. 
With regard to the former the chartering laws of the Arab countries 
contain essentially the same general requirements. The prescribed 
considerations to be fulfilled before a bank grants a license are: 
1. The new bank takes the form of organisation specified by the 
law (usually joint-stock company) and has the adequate 
capital. 
2. The organisers of the bank are competent and honest. 
3. The market can support another bank without endorsing the 
solvency of the existing banks. 
4. The public cnovenience and needs would be served by the bank. 
Once a bank has granted a license for operation, it requires 
further permission to open or close a branch within the country 
or outside in the case of a local bank.(12) 
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These regulations ended the preceeding free banking era when anyone 
with some capital could open a bank without fulfilling many 
requirements. Thus the new regulations have helped to create more 
sound banking but at the same time the regulations shield the existing 
banking institutions from the vigours of competition. Some economists 
object to regulations that insulate banks from failure on the ground 
that such regulations inhibit risk-taking, discourage financial 
innovation, circumscribe management decision-making and stifle the 
benefits to the community that can flow from competitive rivalry (13). 
But within the context of the developing economies the argument is not 
valid and banks have to be watched closely to be geared to the economic 
needs and the institutional conditions of these countries. 
The regulations which affect the banks' portfolio composition are those 
which prescribe the composition of the banks liquid assets and those 
which prescribe the area prohibited for lending above a certain ratio 
of the bank's paid up capital and reserve. The prescribed composition 
of liquid assets and the prohibited area for banks are also broadly 
similar in the banking laws of the region. The former include such 
items as: 
1. notes and coin of the national currency. 
2. balances with central banks. 
3. net credit balances with other licensed banks in the country. 
4. net balances in convertible currencies with banks abroad. 
5. Government or Government-guaranteed securities with a maximum 
maturing time of one year. 
6. Foreign securities marketable in international financial 
markets. 
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7. Other assets as may be approved by the central banks as liquid 
assets. 
The imposed liquidity ratio of the banks' total assets varies from one 
country to another, but broadly speaking it is high for the banks in 
the region where it can rise to 35 percent of the banks' total assets 
(14). The important thing about this ratio it determines the type of 
investment for about one third of the Arab banks' total assets. 
In addition banks are required to maintain the legal reserve 
requirements in the form of vault cash or deposits with their central 
monetary authorities. The requirements are set by the board of the 
central banks or the governers within the range specified by the law. 
The specified limits established by laws are smaller than the liquidity 
ratio. 
With regard to the area prohibited for banking operation the laws 
specify which transaction may not be undertaken by banks. Among other 
things: 
1. A bank cannot extend credit to any single customer above the 
specified percent of its paid-up capital and reserves. The 
ratio is hovering around 25 percent at the present. 
2. A bank cannot engage in trade on its own account or on a 
commission basis. 
3. A bank cannot invest in a single project of an industrial 
agricultural or trading nature more than the specified amount 
of its paid-up capital and reserve. 
4. A bank may not extend credit to its directors or companies in 
which its directors have interests above a certain ratio of 
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its capital. This ratio has been less than 10 percent in the 
region's banking 1aws.(15) 
The present legislation and regulations of the Arab banking system 
helped to create a more sound banking system where the safeguarding the 
interest of depositors and exposure of bank to risk constitute the core 
of them. The regulations which impose high liquidity ratio is meant to 
create and provide banks with a cushion. The nature of bank 
liabilities confirms their needs for liquidity. The banks need assets 
that are quickly convertible into cash with little or no loss in value. 
But how much they need is another question. 
Similarly the regulations which impose some restriction on the banks' 
management of their assets are intended to reduce the exposure of the 
banks to the risk and misconduct of a single customer and failure of 
one project. So the regulations limited the amount of credit that 
banks may extend to one customer. Likewise, the reserve requirement is 
justified, although the historical reason for maintaining bank reserves 
was to ensure that sufficient funds would be available to meet the 
claims of the depositor, today the requirement is of paramount 
importance for money management particularly in the developing 
countries. The central monetary authorities use the reserve 
requirements to limit the maximum amount of loans, investments and 
deposits that the banking system can make. The lower the reserve 
requirement the more the banking system can expand and in turn make 
loans to finance industry and commerce etc. 
3.1.2.2 The establishment of comprehensive monetary authorities 
In every Arab country there is now a single monetary authority 
performing the function of monetary management, chartering and 
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regulating banks and other financial institutions, giving directions 
to the classes and purposes for which advances may be made, and 
accordingly issues instructions from time to time. Our purpose in this 
section is to examine why these institutions were established and what 
is their status. 
1. The main factors led to the establishment of fully-fledged 
monetary authorities. 
The increase in the number of banks, the great desire for rapid 
development and the difficiencies of their previous monetary system 
called on the establishment of a fully-fledged monetary authority in 
every single Arab countries. All the Arab countries inherited on the 
eve of their independence a very simple monetary system. The currency 
issue was trusted to either currency board or to commercial bank. The 
latter was chartered by various laws to perform a function similar to 
the currency board arrangements. The currency boards and the 
commercial banks with currency-issue concessions were merely money 
changers, because their function was only to issue and redeem the 
national currency against the receipt of foreign exchange in parity 
for a small commission on each transaction (16). These arrangements 
had some domestic advantages, in the sense of providing a sound local 
currency as its guarantee of full and free convertibility into hard 
currency at a stable rate of exchange. But it had a serious retarding 
impact on internal economic development. The maintenance of the 100 
per cent foreign reserve investment against notes and coins issued 
locally and the absence of any control over banking system did not give 
the boards a role in monetary management and made such arrangements 
vulnerable to critisism (17). 
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The maintenance of the 100 percent reserve system compelled such 
countries to hold their savings in foreign exchange reserves rather 
than investing them in productive physical capital, providing of course 
that they chose to hold such savings in the form of currency. In 
addition the money supply of such countries was tied to the balance of 
payments performance and not to national production. To quote Drake 
"under a currency board type of system, the currency supply is 
wholly determined by the balance of payments, because local currency 
issued only in exchange for acceptable foreign money at a fixed 
rate. In these circumstances, the currency supply will not be able 
to expand in step with growing domestic production unless there is 
also secular growth of external reserves, through a trade surplus 
and/or net capital inflow. Of course, the local money supply 
consists of bank deposits as well as of currency. Bank deposits 
may increase directly through the balance of payments; and the 
banking system through credit creation may also expand the deposit 
money component independently, but not regardless, of the state of 
the balance of payments. The banks cannot disregard the balance of 
payments because their lending is based upon liquid assets 
(consisting of interchangeable local currency foreign exchange 
reserves) which cannot in total grow without a continuing balance of 
payments surplus. So bank credit would, sooner or later, reach a 
maximum level determined by any given volume of liquid reserves in 
the banking system in conjunction with any liquid reserves: deposits 
ration adhered to by the banks. In the absence of an further growth 
of reserves via balance of payments surpluses (the only possible 
way), there is an upper limit to the total quantity of money, and 
not merely to its currency component" (18). 
The second factor is contributing to the creation of the central 
banks in the newly independent countries is the desire to loosen the 
constraints of that system by institutional changes and to give these 
institutions responsibility for separate areas of economic policy.(19) 
The central banks in the developing countries have more responsibility 
and wider area for action. They are expected to perform the following 
functions in the interest of the economy. 
1. participate in the balance of payments management through its 
influence over the setting of exchange rates, over capital 
movement, and over policy related to international payments. 
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2. determine the total volume of domestic bank credit to assure 
maximum utilization of the country's savings. 
3. influence credit distribution among different economic 
activities. They are expected to utilize the credit in 
productive investment and encourage lending to borrowers who 
are regarded by financial institutions as poor credit risks. 
4. formulate the structure of interest rates to encourage savings 
on the one hand while not allowing a high interest rate might 
discourage new investment and cause a heavy burden on the budget 
The promotional role of the central banks in the developing countries 
was one of the major factors speeding their establishment in the 
developing countries. The departure of the central banks in the 
developing countries from the traditional concept of central banks 
was natural and justifiable, because the former would operate in 
economies characterised by simple economic structure, and rudimentary 
money and capital markets. In such an environment the structure and 
practices of a central bank could differ from those of its counterparts 
in advanced countries with diversified economic structure and 
sophisticated money and capital markets if the concrete needs of the 
country's economy were to be met.(20) 
To carry out these functions all the Arab countries have established 
their own monetary authority as seen in Table 3.1. 
3.1.2.2. The statutes of the Arab monetary authorities 
The statutes of the Arab central banks reflect their British and French 
heritage in terms of management. But as the Arab countries were among 
the last to establish their comprehensive monetary authorities, they 
were able to benefit from the experience of the other countries in this 
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TABLE 3.1 
Central Banking in the Arab Countries in 1983 
Country 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Note-issuing 
Institute 
Central Bank 
II II 
II II 
II II 
II II 
II II 
Saudi Arabia Monetary Ageny 
Sudan Central Bank 
Syria 
Algeria 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
Yemen A.R. 
Yemen P.D.R. 
Oman 
U.A.E. 
Qatar 
Bahrain 
II II 
II II 
Bank of Morocco 
Central Bank 
II II 
Bank of Yemen 
Central Bank 
Central Bank 
Monetary Agency 
II II 
Established 
in 
1951 
1949 
1964 
1969 
1964 
1956 
1952 
1960 
1956 
1963 
1959 
1958 
1971 
1972 
1975 
1982 
1973 
1973 
Ownership 
Government 
reorganised in 1961 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
SOURCES: 1. J.D. Rona 11, II Recent Banking Development, I n the Mi ddl e 
East, Bankers Magazine (May, 1962), p. 
2. National Source. 
field. These factors contributed to the common feature of the 
Arab central banks (21). Thus all Arab Central Banks conform to a 
broad uniform pattern in terms of objectives and functions. 
The administrative organisation of the Arab Central Banks with the 
exceptions of those institutions in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, have 
a board of directors. The board is usually chosen and appointed by the 
Council of Ministers. The Governer and his deputy are approved by a 
higher authority such as the Heads of State. But the Arab Central Bank 
with a French heritage (as is the case of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) 
has no board and the Govenor of the Bank performs the function of the 
Board in the British arrangement (22). 
The close relations between the Arab governments and their Central 
Banks are spelled out in their statutes. For instance, the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (S.A.M.A.) is charged with the function of 
assisting the Ministry of Finance and National Economy in centralising 
the receipts and expenditure of the Government in accordance with items 
of the authorised budget and in controlling payments so that all 
branches of the Government shall abide by the budget (23). Similar 
clauses are stated in the other Arab Central Banks' charters, which 
made of the Central Banks the arm of the Ministry of Finance in each 
country. 
The complete independence of the Central Banks is not practical any 
more. The tendency is now to bring the Central Bank under public 
ownership irrespective of the political organisation of the paricular 
countries, but some degree of independence is necessary to stop 
goverments in the developing countries from excessive use of the banks 
facilities (24). The charters of the Arab Central Banks provide some 
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autonomy and make of them the chief executors of the state1s economic 
policy in the monetary field. And their functions have grown since 
their establishment and now include many tasks charged to them by their 
respective governments. 
3.1.2.3 Reorganisation of the banking system 
The growth of the financial sector is closely related to the 
legislative and regulatory arrangements devised to guide its 
activities. The formulation of liberal laws for the financial 
institutions in order to promote growth and development through 
innovation and competition is a difficult task in the developing 
countries with their backward economies. So restrictions on the 
financial institutions are expected in such an environment (25). The 
experience of the developing countries shows that restrictions on the 
banking systems dominated by expatriate banks were not found sufficient 
to involve these banks in the development effort at the desired level. 
So other measures were taken to bring banks under state control. 
In the Arab region, Egypt and Morocco took certain measures aimed at 
associating their national citizens in the control of the wholly 
expatriate banks in the late 1950 1s. The former Egyptianized the banks 
on its territory by transferring the majority shares of expatriate 
banks to local citizens. (26). The latter upon independence in 1959 
associated its national citizens in the financial control and 
administration of the twenty expatriate institutions at those days.(27) 
Similarly a few years later Libya accomplished transferring the 
majority of the capital of the eight expatriate banks to its national 
citizens.(28) The broad objectives of these policies was to transform 
the old banking system into one which is more integrated with the 
- 115 -
national economy and which conforms to the countries overall economic 
requirements. But the transfer of the ownership from expatriates to 
local citizens did little to change the operation of the financial 
institutions. So the call for bringing these institutions under state 
control was pronounced.(29) 
In Egypt, the task of bringing such institutions under state control 
was an easy one. The state had been in control of much of the 
financial sector for a long time. The state owned the Central Bank and 
a great proportion of the national bank, and with the take-over of the 
British and French interests in the financial sector in 1956 due to the 
Suez affair, the state was in control of a large proportion of the 
financial sector there. So this helped the Egyptian government to 
nationalize all banks and insurance companies on its territories in 
1961.(30) 
This policy was followed by Algeria upon independence from France in 
1962, when the state took over the financial institutions. One year 
later, both the Syrian and Iraqi governments brought the financial 
institutions in their respective countries under their control. By 
1967 the drive for public control reached PDR of Yemen which 
nationalized the financial institutions on its territories. In 1970, 
three other countries, Libya, Sudan and Somalia also nationalized the 
financial institutions in their respective countries. The Moroccan and 
Tunisian governments maintained the status because they were already in 
control of most of the financial sector in their countries. 
Nationalization was the first step in the new reform. The second step 
was unification of the financial system. The existing commercial 
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banks in these countries have been merged into one commercial bank, as 
is the case in Syria, Iraq and the Yemen PDR or into a few specialised 
banks as in the remaining countries in this group. 
Structurally the financial systems of the Arab socialist countries have 
been standardised.(31) A part from the central bank the financial 
system tends to consists of one commercial bank and a few other 
specialised institutions. These institutions are autonumous bodies 
with the specific objectives of promoting medium and long-term loans to 
their specified sector of operation. Once set up they are meant to 
deal with their patricular economic activity, operating exclusively in 
the home market. Thus in no way they may be considered competing 
institutions.(32) 
The remaining Arab countries, particularly Lebanon, Jordan and the 
Peninsula countries kept within the free enterprise system and have 
continued to encourage their private sector to set up new financial 
institutions. Consequently new banks were established there. The scene 
of the banking system changed relatively fast. The Gulf states with a 
few branches in the 1950's, show a relatively rapid growth in banks and 
branches. 
In 1966 there were twenty one commercial banks in the Peninsula 
countries with 93 offices. This means that with a population estimated 
at 6 million there was one bank office per 64,000 persons a 
considerable improvement from the 1950's. But the majority of these 
banks were foreign banks. Data shows the nationality of these banks 
and where they were operating. (Appendix 3.1) It shows that Saudi 
Arabia had 2 local banks with 23 offices, 4 Arab banks with 13 offices 
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and 5 foreign banks with 9 offices. The United Arab Emirates had 1 
local and 1 Arab bank each with 1 office and five foreign banks with 10 
offices. Qatar had, one national bank with one ofice, two Arab banks 
with two offices and 3 foreign banks with 3 offices. Bahrain had 1 
local and 1 Arab bank each with 1 office and 2 foreign banks with 4 
offices. And finally, Kuwait had 3 local banks with 17 offices and 1 
foreign bank with 6 offices.(33} 
Jordan is the other country which managed to host eight banks (with 
60 offices) of which 4 were local banks with 44 offices, 2 Arab banks 
with 6 offices and 2 foreign banks with 10 offices. (Appendix 3.2) 
With an estimated population of 2.5 million there was 1 bank office 
per 41,000 persons in Jordan. This ratio is also very high but is 
better than its counterparts in the Peninsula countries. 
A dramatic change took place in the Beirut financial scene. The minimum 
restriction on movement of both capital and goods and the existence of 
a large European community had encouraged the emergence of Beirut as a 
commercial and financial centre for the region. It attracted foreign 
and local banks more than the Peninsula countries and Jordan did. The 
nine banks operating in Beirut in the 1940's had risen to ninety banks 
by 1966.(34} The importance of Beirut as a financial centre will be 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
3.1.3 The Period Since 1973 
By 1973, Arab banks began to operate in a rapidly changing financial 
environment. The foreign trade of the region began to rise quickly in 
parallel to the increase in oil revenues as seen in Table 3.2. The new 
wealth and the increase in trade accelerated the momentum of the 
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TABLE 3.2 
Oil revenues of Arab Oil Exporting Countries 
(million of U.S. dollars) 
Country 1972 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Saudi Arabia 3.1 25.7 36.3 41.1 37.7 57.1 lU2.5 106.3 
Kuwait 1.6 7.5 8.9 8.8 9.4 16.6 17.8 10.4 
United Arab Emirate .5 6.0 8.4 9.2 8.6 12.8 19.4 18.7 
Qatar .2 1.7 2.1 1.9 2.3 3.6 5.4 5.3 
Iraq .6 7.5 9.1 9.5 10.8 21.3 26.1 10.4 
Libya 1.6 5.1 8.3 9.7 9.5 15.2 22.6 15.6 
Others (1) 
TOTAL 8.5 58.8 80.1 88.4 86.9 138.2 211.8 184.1 
SOURCE: Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. 
Oil and Arab Co-operation Vol.9, No.1, 1973, p.56. 
(1) Includes Egypt, Syria, Bahrain & Algeria. 
regions' financial growth at home and more over abroad. 
3.1.3.1 Domestic Financial Growth 
The emphasis on developing the Arab financial markets at this period 
took two directions. In some of the socialist Arab countries a new 
wave of economic liberalization was introduced. The first measure in 
this direction was taken in Egypt. The introduction of law No.43 in 
1974 with its tax holiday capital guarantee and other incentives as 
well as its legal assurance that invested capital may not be 
confiscated, seized, or sequestrated except through legal proceedings 
has caused fundamental changes in the Egyptian banking system.(35) 
The previous four public sector banks and the two regional banks (The 
Arab African bank, 1964 and the Arab International banks) were joined 
by many banks after the introduction of that law and its amendment by 
law No.32 of 1977. These laws opened the banking sectors to private 
Egyptians as well as to foreigners. The present structure of the new 
banks operating in Egypt under the investment law amount to 47 units of 
which 12 are joint ventures with a majority Egyptian share holding, 6 
privately owned Egyptian commercial banks, eight investment and 
business banks and one off-shore bank. These banks are exempted from 
many of the obligations of the Egyptian Banking and Credit Laws of 1957 
and the statutes of each bank determine its operation (36). This will 
be examined in detail in Chapter 7. 
The liberalization policy spread to other socialist Arab countries, 
but none of them has gone so far as to reverse its previous system. 
Sudan is the other country of this group which allowed the operation 
of foreign banks on its territory after a ban of almost 15 years on 
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such operations. As a result two American banks and three U.A.E. banks 
opened branches there. In addition Sudan allowed the operation of 
several Islamic banks (37). 
The other socialist Arab countries such as Syria, Iraq, Libya and 
Algeria kept a ban on the operation of new commercial banks in their 
territories, but established many specialized institutions and 
participated with Arabs and non-Arabs in setting up new institutions. 
Libya has been among the leading countries in promoting financial 
growth with other Arab countries. It established banks with Algeria, 
Kuwait, Egypt, U.A.E. and others (38). Syria created several free 
zones open to foreign banks and aims mainly to modernize the operation 
of its banks. It hopes that foreign banks can help to influence the 
Syrian banks. The latter are often criticized for their rigidity, 
slowness and bureaucracy. Algerian's policy has been centred on 
improving the operation of the established system through the 
encouragement of decentralization where necesary and free operation. 
Thus a new reform was made in the banking sector enabling it to playa 
more important role in assessing projects and ensuring that from their 
inception investments are more tightly managed (39). 
Tunisia is the other Arab country which maintains strict control on the 
operation of private banks, since opening the door to the international 
banks. It has established off-shore banking units, but it seems that 
it is turning to the joint venture investment banks with other Arab 
countries. As a result six such institutions have been established 
there in co-operation with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Qatar and 
Algeria. The newly established institutions are presumably 
allowed to engage in certain off-shore banking activities. Today 
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Tunisia has twenty-six banks of which ten are commercial, eight 
investment consortia and the other eight off-shore banks (40). 
The other Arab countries with a relatively free economic system have 
witnessed a larger growth in their financial system. The number of 
banks rose dramatically in the United Arab Emirates to 53 of which 24 
are local and 29 are foreign banks. Likewise the number of banks now 
operating in the domestic market of Bahrain stands at 21 serving a 
population of less than one third of a million persons. And in 1975, 
Bahrain for its own reasons, announced the creation of off-shore 
banking units. Today the off-shore units amount to about 74. An 
examination of these units will be found in Chapter 7. Then Oman which 
had only one bank prior to 1970 today houses 25 commercial banks of 
which 14 are foreign. Jordan and Qatar allowed more banks but fewer 
than the previous. The former has 16 commercial banks and the latter 
has 13 such banks, 10 of which are foreign banks (41). 
The banking sector in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait did not follow 
the same path as the previously mentioned countries. Lebanon had been 
over-banked for a long time, then came the civil disturbances in the 
mid 1970's and the Israeli invasion in 1982 to make growth in the 
banking sector proceed at a slower pace. In Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
the number of banks has hardly changed since the early 1970's when both 
countries issued moratoria on the establishment of new banks. However, 
within the banking sector, Saudi Arabia instigated a policy of Saudi-
ization in 1976, according to which the ten foreign banks are asked to 
issue shares to be sold only to Saudi's, thereby giving the Saudi's a 
60 percent share holding in the banks. This process was accomplished 
in 1980. Since then Saudi Arabia has had 12 commercial banks two of 
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which are 100 percent locally owned and the remaining ten joint 
ventures with foreign interests (42). 
National control of the banking system in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
induced Jordan to apply a new measure by which the majority of the 
equity capital of foreign banks is to be transferred to Jordanian 
citizens in the three years ending in 1986 (43). The Saudi's and the 
Jordanians' new regulations led to make the foreign banks more 
nationalist in character and ownership and enabled them to expand their 
capital and open new barnaches throughout their countries of operation. 
This was something they could not do before. 
The increase in the number of banks was outstripped by the increase 
in banking offices in the region. The number of banking offices rose 
from about 1661 in 1973 to approximately 3460 in 1983 see Table 3.3. 
The distribution of banks on the national level shows that there was a 
considerable difference between countries and between urban and rural 
areas within each country. For instance the United Arab Emirates with 
53 banks with over 420 authorized branches in addition to other 
financial institutions is probably the most densely banked area in per 
capita terms any where in the world. On the other end of the scale the 
Yemen A.R. with ten banks operating in 33 offices serving about 6 
million inhabitants is the least banked area in the world. The 
remaining Arab countries lie between these two extremes in terms of 
offices per head of population. Saudi Arabia and Lebanon could claim 
to have a reasonable network of bank branches. With regard to the 
distribution of bank offices within each country, the urban areas are 
still favoured by the banks. As a result the banking offices in the 
region are mainly located in the urban centres. 
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TABLE 3.3 
Banking and Banking Offices in the Arab Countries in 1973 and 1982 
1973 1982 
Country Number Number Number Number Population 
of of of of Per Bank i ng 
Bank Banking Banks Banking Offi ce 
Office Offi ce 
Algeria 4 118 4 295 70406 
Bahrain 32 20 102 4313 
Jordan 44 16 124 28060 
Kuwait 78 6 128 12187 
Lebanon 73 208 74 371 7331 
Egypt 4 307 4 361 123760 
Libya 4 79 4 126 25714 
Saudi Arabia 13 71 13 348 25689 
Sudan 5 61 5 101 189207 
Yemen P.D.R. 1 16 1 22 92192 
Oman 2 10 24 14 65625 
Iraq 1 88 1 170 82434 
Syria 1 49 1 50 185060 
Tunisia 117 10 270 24319 
Yemen A.R. 21 10 30 200969 
U.A.E. 89 53 420 2166 
Qatar 11 13 21 14010 
Somalia 10 33 112136 
Morocco 252 474 44907 
TOTAL 1661 257 3460 ~9525 
SOURCE: The Bankers' Almanac and Year Book 1973 and 1983, and 
other national services. 
3.1.3.2 Expansion of Arab banks abroad 
The rapid increase in the Arab foreign trade from about $23 billion 
in 1971 to over $352 billion in 1981 of which the inter-Arab trade 
represented less than 10 percent (see Appendixes 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5) was 
paralleled by the increase in number of the Arab banks which 
established themselves abroad. The presence of the Arab banks on the 
International scene began to be felt in the late 1960s. The first Arab 
banks operation in the international markets took the form of 
consortium banks. In the late 1960s most of the Arab central banks and 
some development banks in the region sought to create their own 
institutions in the international markets, but the size and complexity 
of dealings abroad made them inclined to operate with other European 
banks. France's favourable stand regarding Arab cause during the time 
of Charles de Gaulle created better opportunities for co-operation 
between France and the Arabs. As a result the Arab financial 
institutions in collaboration with the main French financial 
institutions set up the Union de Banques Arabes et Francoises (UBAF), 
Banque Arabe Internationale d'Investissement (BAIl) and the Frab Bank. 
To these should be added the European Arab Bank in Brussels. The share 
holders of the four institutions on the Arab side are composed of many 
Arab financial institutions from both deficit Arab states like Egypt 
and Yemen and surplus states like Kuwait (44). These banks were 
created to promote trade between the two groups, to marry the technical 
experience of European banks with Arab capital and to benefit from the 
technical experience of European banks and gradually transfer it to the 
Arab banks (45). The arrangement worked well and served the mutal 
interest of both groups (46). And these institutions, despite the 
withdrawal of some French interests, are still quite prominent in the 
international markets and their links with the deficit Arab states 
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helped them to participate in recycling some funds to these countries 
(47). 
In the late 1970's the second wave of the Arab financial institutions 
sought an international location. This wave took a different form, 
the Arabs began establishing their own institutions since the 
consortium form showed that some conflict of interest might arise 
between parent and consortium (48). In addition the Arab surplus 
countries were induced to create their own institutions in the 
aftermath of President Carter's freeze on Iranian assets. The Arab 
countries have needed to break free of foreign influence and set up and 
run their own national instiututions. 
The resources available to do this however have varied greatly from 
country to country. The rich Arab countries in bilaterial or multi-
lateral co-operation created several institutions, chiefly among them, 
the Banque Intercontinentale Arabe set up by the Libyan and Algerian 
governments in Paris, the Saudi International Bank in London set up by 
Saudi Arabia monetary Agency SAMA, the two local Saudi banks (National 
and Riyad banks) and other foreign banks as a window in the 
international markets. Then with the appearance of Bahrain as an off-
shore centre of international standing it began to be the base of the 
new large Arab financial institutions. In the mid 1970's the seven Arab 
countries located on the Gulf set up the Gulf International Bank with 
an authorized capital of $100 million. This was increased to $265 
million. Then in 1980 three Arab countries namely Libya, the U.A.E and 
Kuwait set up the Arab Banking Co-operation with a capital $1 billion 
authorized and $750 million subscribed and already paid. 
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The participation of the Arab governments in the establishment of such 
institutions is a clear indicator of their willingness to develop the 
Arab capital markets and to make them effective in recycling Arab 
capital on commercial bases. Thus this group of banks is in the 
forefront of Arab capital market integration and their role will be 
explored more fully in Chapter 7. 
A second group of Arab banks which sought a place in the international 
markets consists of the traditional and new banks. The former include 
the long established traditional banks dominant in their home base, 
such as Rafidain Bank in Iraq, Arab Bank in Jordan, National Bank of 
Abu Dhabi and the National Commercial Bank and Riyad Bank in Saudi 
Arabia. These banks have important branch network in the region. The 
latter consists of many small multi-ownership banks established mainly 
by private invetors. 
The aims of this group vary according to the size of the banks 
concerned. The large banks' aim was to draw for their funds on the 
global interbank market and so playa significant part in the recycling 
of Arab capital surpluses and to play an active role in trade 
financing. The aim of the smaller banks and other types of Arab 
financial institutions was variously to fix up deals to act as 
intermediaries, to advise on the investment of their clients fund and 
to deploy their own resources (49). 
The presence of the Arab financial institutions had been consolidated 
in London, Paris and New York. Today London houses about 48 
institutions of which 17 are registered in the U.K., 18 are 
representative offices, 12 are branches and two are liaison offices 
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(see Appendix 3.6). Paris is the home of 37 Arab institutions of which 
14 are Lebanese banks which choose to follow their clients to France 
after the disturbances in Beirut. Likewise all the major Arab banks in 
the International markets currently maintain a presence in New York 
(50). 
In parallel to the increase in the Arab banks at home and abroad, the 
commercial banking activities have expanded at a rapid pace. In 1981 
there were 60 banks in the region and abroad which managed to build 
up total assets of over one billion dollars each. Together they were 
holding about $230 billion of which 88 per cent originated in the 
region and was held in its banks. The remaining 12 percent was 
distributed between Arab banks in France, Luxemburg, Peru, Spain, U.K. 
and U.S.A. (see Appendix 3.7). 
The distribution of banks, assets among banks in the Arab countries 
as given in Appendix 3.8 reveals that the banks in Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait accounted for over one third of the regions banks' total assets 
in 1981. Egypt's and Algeria's banks also held considerable assets 
and the banks in the U.A.E.'s and Libya were just one step behind, 
while Lebanon with approximately 90 banks held just $10 billion of 
financial assets. The banks in other Arab countries held very modest 
assets. 
In the global context, the Arab banks have progressed rapidly. The 
Euromoney annual list of 1983 of the leading 500 banks measured by 
their assets at the end of 1982 shows four Arab banks among the first 
100 and 15 among the first 200. Altogether 40 Arab institutions were 
listed. This is a great achievement as such lists contained no Arab 
banks a few years back(51). 
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3.2 Banking system and development 
3.2.1 The central banks and development 
The majority of the Arab central banks played a major role in the 
economic development of their repective countries. They are vested 
with the powers to maintain a sound currency system and assist 
in promoting the development of their countries economies by fostering 
the growth of the necessary financial infrastructure. They have done 
that through their various capacities: 
1. As a banking institution, the Arab Central banks regulated and 
issued their respective national currencies in accordance with the 
general economic policy of their governments. Some of them found the 
100 per cent reserve system to be an impediment in the way of its 
assumption of the full responsibilities as a central bank. Thus the 
100 per cent legal reserve system was amended (52). The amendment of 
this provision allowed the central banks wider flexibility in currency 
issue and perform more active role in the development of their 
countries' economy. Although some Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain and Qatar have continued providing 100 percent legal cover of 
foreign exchange in convertible currencies, but it is only huge oil 
revenues accruing to such government which allowed such a conservative 
approach to continue. 
2. As agents of their national government, the Arab Central Banks 
administer the foreign exchange regulations. Prior to the establish-
ment of these institutions, the commercial banks were in control of 
foreign assets and in the absence of any exchange controls undertook 
to redeem domestic money for foreign exchange on demand at the going 
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rate of exchange. But upon the creation of the Central Banks this 
function was transferred to the Central Banker, mainly to maintian a 
reasonable fluctuation in the rate of Foreign Exchange and to reduce 
the spreads charged to customers by banks who depended for much of 
their income on exchange profit (53). 
In addition, the Arab Central Banks, as. agents of their government 
managed their government national debts. The vast majority of the Arab 
central banks have made some treasury and bond issues on behalf of 
their governments. But in the Gulf states there have been no such 
issues. The development of the government securities is of paramount 
importance to the integrated Arab market and the development of local 
markets. The trade in these instruments is one of great importance to 
control both liquidity and interest rates within the market (54). 
3. As financial advisors to their respective governments the banks 
are eminently placed and well equipped with a high calibre staff. 
Through their various contacts with the economy in general and the 
financial sectors in particular, they offered valuable advice with 
respect to monetary policy and economic development. The periodic 
bulletins of the Arab Central Banks have been the most valuable 
sources of reliable and expertly designed statistical series on general 
economic and financial data in each country. 
4. The promotional function is one of the important functions of 
the Central Monetary Authorities in the developing countries.(55) The 
charters of the Arab central banks in many cases allow them to sub-
scribe to the capital and loans issued by the financial institutions 
or enterprises set up with the approval of government for the purposes 
of promoting economic development. (56) Within this provision the Arab 
central banks helped in the creation of the development financial 
institutions and in the development of money and capital markets in 
general. In addition they regulated the quantity, quality and cost of 
credit to meet the requirements of economic growth and monetary 
stability. 
3.2.2 The Central Banks and Exchange Rate Management 
A number of important steps towards Arab monetary integration have 
been taken by the Governors of the Arab Central Banks. Outstanding 
among these are the adoption of a joint position in international 
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economic organizations, and strong monetary and financial co-operation 
among the Gult States' Central Banks. (57) However, there are many 
areas in which Arab Central Banks and other monetary agencies can 
co-operate. These include: co-ordination of monetary and fiscal 
policies and the introduction of some measures to improve monetary 
stability. One of these measures which cou-ld help considerably is the 
creation of common currency. (58) 
This can be achieved by promoting the Arab dinar as a regional or 
parallel currency. The Arab dinar could be made a basket composed 
of national and foreign currencies instead of its present link with 
the Special Drawing Right(SDR). Each currency's share in the basket 
may be weighted broadly in line with each respective country's gross 
national product and foreign trade. 
Today, the Arab countries have unsatisfactory monetary arrangements. 
Data in Appendix 3.14 show the exchange rate arrangements of the Arab 
currencies in 1985, and the variation in the Arab national currencies' 
exchange rate. Twelve Arab countries - Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria and both Yemens - pegged their 
currencies to the U.S. dollar. Algeria, Kuwait, Mauritania and Tunisia 
pegged their currencies to a basket of other convertible currencies. 
Jordan pegged its currencies to the Special Drawing Right (SDR). While 
Lebanon has left its currency independently floating, Morocco's dirham 
has been subject to managed floating. Finally Somalia's shillings 
adjusted according to a set of internal indicators. Variations in 
exchange rates between 1978 and 1984 for the Arab national currencies 
is wide and differs in direction. The movements of the Arab 
currencies' exchange rate mainly follow the pegged currencies. The 
dollar is used as a standard in which the Arab Central Banks express 
and compare all rates. 
The oil boom of the 1970s, and its aftermath caused balance of payments 
problems for every single Arab countries. The Governors of the Arab 
Central Banks of major oil-exporting countries were pre-occupied by 
their currencies' appreciation which resulted from persistence of 
large current account surpluses. The Governors of the Central Banks 
of the remaining Arab countries were also pre-occupied by severe 
balance of payments deficits. Their exchange management was directed 
to balancing payments. (59) Both took the view that policy objectives 
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should as a matter of principle, dictate the appropriate exchange rate 
arrangement and not vice versa. The Governors of central banks with 
overvalued currencies such as Saudi Arabia, the lower Gulf States and 
Egypt feared losing competitiveness. This fear went along with the 
view that a strong currency would reduce domestic output and worsen the 
current account balance of payments, as it would make the exported 
goods uncompetitive on one hand and imported goods relatively cheap (60). 
General economic disequilibria in the Arab countries affected directly 
the Governors' efforts to solve these problems and to create a real 
Arab monetary system to free them from excessive dependence on dollars. 
The Arab dinar was introduced as a unit of account in 1976 to be 
promoted as regional currency a few years later. Progress towards 
creating a single Arab currency has fallen far from expectations which 
existed when drawing up the Arab Dinar with a view to achieving 
monetary union. The pre-occupations of the Governors of the Arab 
Central Banks with their national balance of payments problems has 
hardly left for the Governors to establish a system of exchange rate 
links between their national currencies such as that established in the 
European Monetary Systems' snake, nor have they made sufficient efforts 
to co-ordinate policies as regards their financial markets. Likewise 
they have not agreed on the method of financing deficits or utilizing 
surpluses. Consequently, the Arab Capital Markets have not unified, and 
the essential Arab Monetary System has not materialized. 
3.2.3 The commercial banks and development 
The gradual extension of monetization and subsequent financial 
transformation of the economy is usually carried out by the financial 
sectors. In the developing countries the banks usually carry out most 
of this task due to the absence or weakness of other types of financial 
institutions. Their role in development can be examined through their 
dual function. Firstly, their monetary function focuses attention on 
the money supply, inflation and the need for banks to be soundly 
managed. Their second function is the finance function which focuses 
on the role of the banks in mobilizing saving and channelling them to 
investment. 
To show the banks role in monetizing the economies and institution-
alizing savings of their countries of operation, we shall examine some 
financial indicators presented in Appendix 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11 for 
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individual Arab countries. The data in Appendix 3.9 shows the narrow 
money ratio/GOP, the domestic liquidity ratio/GDP, the foreign assets 
to domestic liquidity and finally the total deposit to GDP for the 
individual Arab countries. From this data many observations can be 
made. 
The first observation is on the ratio of M1 (narrow money i.e. currency 
and demand deposit) to gross domestic product where we find that M1 
ratio has a wide range and varies from one country to another. It is 
high in a few Arab countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen A.R. and 
Yemen P.O.R. and is low in the rich countries namely the United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain but it is in 
between these extreme cases for the remaining Arab countries. It is 
low in the rich countries and high in the relatively poor countries. 
The secular relation between the M1 ratio and the per capita income in 
the Arab countries is unusual. The strange phenomenon depicted by Ml 
ratio in the two extreme cases can be explained by the pecularities of 
their economic structure. The low ratio in the rich countries may be 
attributed to the lag of their financial sectors behind other Arab 
countries, but we should observe other factors which make this ratio 
very low in these countries and high in the other countries. 
These factors are:-
1. The enormous income generated from oil sales increased the gross 
doemstic products of the rich countries and was not matched by 
increasing local currency when a greater part of their income has been 
accumulated abroad. 
2. The gross domestic product of these countries is also larger 
than their national income due to the existence of a great number of 
foreign corporations and expatriates who usually remit their earnings 
outside these countries. 
In contrast the countries with a high Ml ratio such as Lebanon and 
Jordan, undoubtedly have a developed financial sector, but the high 
ratio is also magnified by the fact that these countries have a GOP 
smaller than their national income as they have been the major 
reCipients of oil money in terms of workers remittances and official 
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assistance. Thus their M1 ratio is magnified by the smaller 
denominator. The two Yemens have undeveloped financial systems and the 
high M1 ratio is also magnified by the enormous amount of their workers 
remittances from the oil countries. 
The second observation is on the M2 ratio. As financial development is 
associated with an increased range of financial instruments, narrow 
money and quasi-money can serve as better indicators for domestic 
financial intermediation and the degree of financial deepening and 
growth. And for this reason there would be more correlations between 
per capita income and the M2 ratio. The most noteworthy feature in the 
M2 ratio is the movement of Kuwait and Bahrain from a low M1 ratio. 
This is an indication that the financial sectors in both countries are 
more developed than their counterparts in other rich countries. The 
diversification of financial instruments diminishes the importance of 
narrow money in both countries. Likewise, the M2 ratio in Jordan and 
Lebanon increased greater than either of the Yemens because the first 
two countries have a more developed financial system. 
However, M1 and M2 ratios both have their limitation as indicators 
of financial growth. These ratios are given for some advanced and 
developing countries in Appendix 3.10. The m1/GDP ratios of the 
advanced countries are in the range of 15-32 with the lowest ratio 
for Britain and the highest for Japan. The non-Arab developing 
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countries also had almost the same ratios. While the M1/GDP ratios in 
the Arab ountries ranged from 8 to 101, the M2/GDP ratios for the 
advanced countries ranged from 33 in the United Kingdom to 88 for 
Japan. In the non-Arab developing countries they range from 17 to 83, 
while the same ratio in the Arab countries goes from 20 to over 390. 
Thus the Ml/GDP ratios and the M2/GDP ratios for the Arab countries 
show more variation than exists in advanced and non-Arab developing 
countries. This is an indication that the Arab financial markets are 
in a transitional period. 
Interpreting these ratios needs greater caution. For instance the 
United Kingdom indicators are the lowest among advanced countries. 
Does this mean that the British financial system is lagging behind? 
The answer, of course is no. The reality is that Britain has the most 
sophisticated financial system which is second to none. The wide range 
of financial instruments in Britain relatively dwarfs M1 and M2 among 
other financial instruments. In contrast Ml and M2 ratios in many Arab 
countries do indicate that these countries are lagging behind. This is 
clear where the currency in circulation has continued to be the major 
component of the money supply in many Arab countries and where cash is 
the most popular means of payments. This is also clear in the large 
number of people served by banking office and the concentration of 
banks in the urban centres. 
The third observation is on the ratio of total deposit to gross 
domestic product. Here the ratios are similar to M2 ratios. This 
ratio points to the effectiveness of the banks in mobilizing doemstic 
savings. The low ratios in the majority of the Arab countries are an 
indication of their weak role in mobilizing funds. The banks which 
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may claim to be performing better are in Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon and to 
some extent Bahrain with 68, 62, 339 and 47 (total deposit/GDPx100) 
respectively. In general the above ratios show the distinctive 
characteristics of the Arab financial markets which may be classified 
according to the stage of their development into a high monetization 
group comprising Lebanon and Jordan. A low monetization group 
consisting of the oil producing countries and a moderate monetization 
group which includes the remaining Arab countries. 
With regard to the intermediary role of the Arab banks examination of 
the sources and uses of their funds will show their impact on the 
saving investment process within the region. The data in Appendix 3.11 
show that the private sector is the main source of funds for the Arab 
banks which hold these savings mainly in current and savings accounts. 
The government's savings deposited with banks constituted for the 
majority less than 5 per cent of the banks total assets. The central 
banks are important as a source of funds to the banks in Somalia, 
Tunisia and Algeria. The foreign liabilities of the Arab banks consist 
perhaps mainly of non-residents, accounts, while the certificate of 
deposit has been of minor importance as a source of funds for the Arab 
banks. The composition of the Arab banks liabilities discussed above 
points to the short-term nature of funds available to the banks and to 
the banks failure to attract deposits from the Arab governments. 
The role of the banks in extending long-term credit to industry and 
agriculture has been very small. The sectoral distribution of the 
banks lending in Jordan and the United Arab Emirates (see Appendixes 
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3.12 and 3.13) show the fact that trade finance is the banks' favourite 
operation. It accounted for an average of 40 per cent of the Jordanian 
banks' total credit during the 1970s and it was in the range of 37 per 
cent to 51 per cent of the United Arab Emirates banks' total credit in 
the period 1975-78. The decline in the share of trade in bank credit 
was paralleled by the increase in the share of construction in bank 
credit in both countries. In general the trade and construction 
accounted for over two thirds of banks' total credit in the region. 
This leaves about one third to be distributed among other activities. 
This indicates that the efforts of the Arab central banks to integrate 
banks in the process of economic development through the expansion of 
medium and long-term credit have only achieved limited success. 
The argument always raised by banks in the region in defending their 
conservative policy of lending is their short-term obligations. But in 
fact, the conservative policy of the Arab banks is due to the banking 
tradition inherited from he British banks; to quote Croham, 
"There is a marked difference of emphasis between the 
banking traditions of different countries .•. in Britain 
the banks provided working capital to finance trade credit. 
In many other countries there was a great tendency for the 
supply of saving to industry to go through the banks and 
for a closer involvement of banks with industry."(61) 
The Laissez-faire economic policy of Lebanon and the wealth of the 
public sectors in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia can excuse the 
current conservative policy of the banking institutions there. But in 
countries where capital is scarce, for banks to have any role in the 
process of development, they should be properly organised and 
orientated towards specific objectives. This can be aChieved by 
applying the appropriate credit controls. The central banks may impose 
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credit ceilings in order to ensure the most efficient use of the banks 
resources. 
3.3 The way to improve commercial banks operations in the savings/ 
Investment process and increase their integration 
Deficiencies in the banking system either in terms of its structure 
or in terms of the financial instruments can influence economic 
development. The foregoing discussion made it clear that the Arab 
banking systems have achieved considerable growth in recent years, but 
they still have some operational and structural gaps which have impeded 
them from performing effective roles in financing development on the 
national and regional level. Bridging these gaps is a great step 
toward changing that role and the establishment of the Arab capital 
market. 
The banks have increased in number and offices. Although the banking 
offices in the region have more than doubled they are still fewer than 
one half of the bank offices in the U.K. with a population in the 
region three times that of the U.K. the average number of inhabitants 
served by a bank is very large and as the banks are concentrated in the 
urban centres, the banking habit is not yet established in the rural 
areas and among a large proportion of people even in the urban areas. 
Thus one of the main problems facing Arab banks is taking banking 
facilities to the people in rural areas for there will be no well-
balanced economic development unless such services are introduced to 
the rural areas in order to involve the inhabitants in the saving 
investment process. 
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A branch expansion programme should assume prime importance in the 
Arab countries' drive to build up the institutional machinery required 
to mobilize resources from the traditional household sector and to 
channel these resources into development projects. The severe 
competition between banks increases the banking offices in the urban 
areas,(62) and is not expected to compel banks to open branches in the 
poor area. This was clear in the experience of banks in Saudi Arabia, 
Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates where the increase in banking 
offices was caused by competition between banks. 
In addition the absence of the Lebanese and Oman banks and the 
appearance of only one bank in Jordan and three in the U.A.E. within 
the list of top 60 Arab banks points to the small size of the majority 
of the Arab banks as these countries are housing over two thirds of the 
Arab banks. 
To establish an integrated Arab banking system their structural and 
operational gaps have to be solved. The building up of the Arab 
banking system requires a policy imposing merger on the smaller banks, 
expanding the branch network to cover the rural area, spreading 
chequing accounts, strengthening the depositors confidence and bringing 
about a more extensive coverage of the banking system services both 
geographically and functionally. 
The present legislation and regulations of the Arab banking systems 
helped to promote currencies' stability and sound banking practices, 
but they still have some short-comings that have impeded the 
effectiveness of banks in the savings/investment process and reduced 
the link between the Arab financial centres. For instance, the 
provisions relating to the composition of legal cover in the Arab 
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Central Bank's laws together with the provisions relating to the type 
of assets accepted for the calculation of the liquidity ratios have 
rendered the securities of the Arab countries unsuitable for such 
purposes. Foreign convertible securities and currencies are only 
available in the international markets and none or few if any Arab 
securities can be accepted for these purposes. Thus unless such 
regulations are amended, the integration of the Arab capital markets 
would continue indirectly through the international financial markets. 
Another action the Arab Monetary Authorities ought to carry out is 
to improve the operations of banks. At present, the regulatory 
agencies in the Arab region with the exception of the Lebanese Agency, 
have not yet initiated a deposit insurance scheme to insure depositors 
against loss in case of bank failure. Deposit insurance has been 
viewed by some economists as having a major contribution towards the 
development of the banking sector, to quote Marlin, its 
"increasing confidence, encouraging savings, promoting the 
growth of financial institutions and increasing the flexibility 
of monetary pol icy. II (63) 
This view was supported by other economists, Friedman and Schwartz 
wrote, 
II federal insurance of bank deposits was the most important 
structural change in the banking system to result from the 
1933 paniC, and, indeed in our.view, the structur~l.changell 
most conducive to monetary POllCy ... after the C1Vll war. (64) 
Therefore, the establishment of a deposit insurance scheme or other 
equivalent scheme is essential for the development of the regions 
banking system. It stops depositors from running to banks at a time of 
panic, creates more confidence in the banking system and saves it from 
the adverse effect of failing a bank. 
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Similarly, the present legislation and regulations in force on the 
banking institutions in the region affect the ability of the banks to 
obtain funds and deploy them. These regulations are of two types. The 
first is mainly concerned with the structure of interest rates and the 
second is concerned with qualitative and quantitative credit control. 
With regard to the first, in most of the Arab countries there has been 
a specified maximum rate for various types of deposit the banks have to 
observe. Likewise there has been a ceiling on the interest rate that a 
bank can charge for its loans. In addition in few cases the Arab 
Central Banks have applied quanitative and qualitative credit control 
aimed at channelling more funds for some target group. 
The ceiling on time and savings deposit rates imposed by the Arab 
monetary authorities is intended to keep the cost of funds low for the 
banks to be reflected in their lending to investors. And the 
application of the quantitative and qualitative credit control is 
intended to direct more capital for some sectors of the economy of 
vital importance neglected by the banks on the ground that it involves 
higher cost to service and with relatively higher risk. These policies 
have been controversial issues among economists. Some economists 
justify a policy of low interest rates on the grounds that a low 
interest rate encourages investors to invest more. And they justify 
the quantiative and qualitative credit control on the grounds of the 
existence of externalities and other market imperfections.(65) Within 
this context Dorrance wrote, 
"objection to total ceiling or detailed regulations of 
bank lending should not be carried too far where government 
policy is based on well-considered development plans ... 
designed to foster growth in specific directions, ~r?hlbltl0n 
or limits on lending for purposes which the authorltles do 
not wish to encourage or encouragement to lending for purposes 
which considered to be in the national interest, may often be 
appropriate. II (66} 
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Other economists object to these policies, on several grounds. With 
regard to low interest rate policy some economists argue that this 
policy would encourage savers to revert to non-productive forms of 
savings.(67) So they argue that developing countries should allow 
their financial institutions to offer depositors a realistic rate on 
financial assets to be able to mobilize their savings. They point to 
the experience of Korea and Taiwan in the 1950's when these countries 
increased the interest rates on deposits, the latter grew rapidly.(68) 
Likewise, the ceiling on the interest rate that a bank can charge for 
its loan is also criticised on the ground that interest rates are an 
indicator of the capital cost and in repressing the interest rate, the 
criteria for allocating capital will be destroyed and this would lead 
to the uneconomical use of credit. The distortion of interest rate by 
the imposed ceiling on it is reflected in the distorted use of capital 
there. It;s common to find in such countries, many capital intensive 
projects were established while they presumably have abundant labour 
supply. 
Similarly, the policy of differential interest rates aimed at a target 
group which has been difficult for lenders to service and which often 
involves higher costs of servicing than for other borrowers ;s 
criticised on the grounds that the low interest rates, combined with 
higher costs, give lenders a double disincentive to extend the loans to 
the intended group, and moreover if such lenders were offered discount 
facilities the cheap finance would lead to inflation. 
Similarly, other economists object to the quantitative and 
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qualitative credit control applied in the developing countries on 
several grounds. First, the institution may re-define a sufficient 
number of its loans and meet the quota requirements without changing 
the real pattern of its lending. Secondly the bank may find it 
difficult to place and administer loans effectively outside its area of 
specialization. And sometimes loan quotas for a borrower may be less 
than its need. 
The arguments in support and against these policies although have some 
validity but may not be taken in totality within the context of the 
Arab efforts to integrate their capital markets. We support the policy 
of liberalization the interest rate structure in the region. Such 
policy could prove effective, as some economists have argued, in 
speeding the development of the Arab financial markets as it did in 
other markets through removing the financial constraints. The ceiling 
on interest rates in the region reduced the sensitivity of capital 
movements to differences in money conditions within the region. In 
addition liberalization the interest rate structure in the peninsula 
countries to the level of international interest rates could be the 
only solution under the liberal foreign exchange control inforce and 
the absence of real foreign exchange risk-as the value of their 
currencies move with dollar movement-to stop the flow of capital 
outside these countries caused by the large differential between local 
and international interest rates. 
Within the context of economic development the Arab central banks 
should continue using the quantitative and qualitative credit control 
because the externality and the market imperfections is very high in 
the region. However, the ceiling should be re-examined and readjusted 
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in the light of the economic activities. These measures are 
justifiable in these countries which suffer from a shortage of capital 
and whose commercial banks remain the principal source of finance. 
If banks are left uncontrolled and allowed to act entirely according 
to profit criteria, development will be far from satisfactory, since 
the trade sector is the only sector which is willing and able to pay 
higher interest rates on bank loans. Awareness of the nature and 
significance of credit as an instrument for development has brought 
the banks under social control. Banks have to participate in 
development if they want to survive in developing countries. 
To encourage banks to extend credit to target groups, the Arab 
governments should provide budget guarantee to the banks, that they 
will repay capital and pay interest on the due date in the place of a 
defaulting debtor. This would encourage banks to extend loans and the 
likelihood of any permanent default may be regarded as slight. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Although the Arab commercial banks were the first to emerge as the main 
financial institutions trusted by depositors and approached by 
borrowers, their contribution to the economic development of the region 
has been insignificant. The Arab banks limited their operations to the 
urban centres from which deposits largely derive and where short-term 
loans are demanded. Consequently the savings of the rural areas were 
left largely untapped, and so such areas have not been integrated into 
the markets. In addition, the banks were not very successful in 
lengthening the term of financial instruments issued to savers. The 
Arab banks showed great interest in dealing with the international 
markets through opening offices and lodging the balances left after 
trade finance there. 
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The extensive integration between the Arab commercial banks with the 
international financial markets and their concentrations on trade 
finance and short-term self-liquidated loans are not in line with the 
real economic development of the region nor in line with creating an 
Arab common banking market. The large growth in the Arab governments 
especially the oil rich countries - domestic expenditure and the 
associated expansion in private income allowed the financial assets to 
grow faster than the banks ability to build up professionalism. The 
lack of trained manpower, the lack of quantity and diversity of 
experience were all reflected in the type of financial instruments 
developed by the Arab banks and the way these institutions deployed 
their funds. 
At the regional level, few Arab banks have extensive system of branches 
in the region, designed to provide normal banking facilities in the 
region as well as to finance trade between the Arab countries. The 
operations of the majority of the Arab banks is concentrated into the 
country of origin. The lack of direct relations between the Arab 
financial centres reflects the pattern of regional trade for not more 
than 10 per cent of total Arab exports and imports is accounted for by 
inter-Arab trade. And more importantly, the rigid legislation and 
regulations affect the ability of Arab banks to obtain and deploy funds 
at the regional level. These factors have limited the Arab capital 
markets integration to a low level. 
In view of the structural and operational gaps of the regions banking 
system, the growing needs of industry and agriculture for long term 
credit and within the context of great divergence between private and 
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social costs and benefits, new financial institutions have emerged to 
bridge these gaps. Some of them were orientated towards serving 
domestic needs, others were intended to serve the region as a whole. 
The establishment of certain specialised financial institutions 
catering for the needs of certain sectors of the economy such as 
industry, housing and agriculture is felt to be of great importance, 
since the specific conditions prevailing in these sectors would render 
the satisfaction of their needs by the non-specialised financial 
institutions difficult. 
Similarly, the development of the capital market (stock exchange) was 
thought to be an essential element in the process of growth and for the 
integration of the Arab capital markets by opening the region to Arab 
investors who had been hindered by exchange restrictions on capital 
movements. These developments were accompanied by the emergence of the 
Islamic financial institutions to serve people who objected to dealing 
with conventional financial institutions on religious grounds, and by 
the emergence of the offshore banking units in Bahrain. The evolution 
and operations of these institutions are the subjects of the following 
Chapters. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DEVELOPMENT BANKS 
Development Banks 
Introduction 
The development banks are comparatively new institutions of the post-
world war two era(I). They are unique financial institutions and 
are mainly created by the public sector in the developing countries 
with few or no institutions comparable to them in the advanced 
countries(2). These institutions introduced the philosophy of long-term 
investment in the economy of the developing countries which had 
traditionally been characterised by a short-run outlook(3). They have 
been the traditional form of financial institutions, involved in a 
high-risk, long-term financing of agriculture and industry in these 
countries. 
The development banks have been expanding rapidly in the Arab region 
and their number reached over 70 in the early 1980's see 
(Appendix 4.1). As a result, the development banks have been the 
second important segment of the Arab financial markets after the 
commercial banks and more important the main source of long term 
finance on the national and regional level. The majority of them were 
established by individual Arab countries to serve a specific purpose, 
very few were set up by rich Arab countries or by all the Arab 
countries see (Appendix 4.2). At the regional level, the setting up of 
such institutions was to supplement the existing institutional 
framework in order to cater to the growing demand for credit in the 
low-saving Arab countries. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the structure and operation 
of these development banks in order to identify the problems and the 
prospects of these institutions within the flow of funds in the region 
and the integrated Arab financial market. To achieve that an attempt 
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is made to examine the rationale behind these institutions, their 
evolution in the region, the framework of their operation, the problems 
of their operation and the way to improve their effectiveness and to 
enlarge their contribution to development objectives. Finally a 
concluding remark will be presented concerning the improvement of their 
operation and integration into the Arab capital market. The discussion 
will show how these institutions played an important role in 
development through the provision of long-term finance and technical 
assistance to the productive sectors, and it will show the importance 
of the regional institution in the flow of funds on the regional level 
and the efforts of the two pan-Arab institutions with special mission 
of integrating the Arab financial markets. 
4.1. The rationale behind the development banks 
There have been many theses in the economic literature trying to 
explain why such institutions emerge in the developing countries. The 
main interpretations are:-
1. The emergence of various types of financial institutions in 
the advanced countries has been spontaneously in response to market 
forces, as private profit considerations are almost sufficient to 
induce further financial specialisations and diversification. But 
in the developing countries where the economy is usually fragmented 
and suffers many structural imbalances, a poor infrastructure and a 
shortage of skilled manpower, the expectation of profit is uncertain 
and low, private institutions with profit maximising objectives are 
unlikely to become involved in high-risk long-term finance through 
market forces alone. The failure of the market forces to create the 
appropriate institutions to finance development efforts in the 
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developing countries led the governments in these countries to sponsor 
the establishment of various special credit institutions(4), to provide 
the necessary funds without much stress on the profitability criterion 
and to serve the national interest in the long-run. 
Thus the main function of the development banks is to provide long-term 
and medium term finance to firms that could not otherwise obtain such 
finance in the absence of institutions with some public 
responsibility. 
2. The creation of such institutions was not only necessitated 
by the lack of finance in certain economic sectors but it was also 
encouraged by the lack of finance for small and medium-sized 
industries(5). This argument has been supported by the experience 
of the developing countries where the small farmers and small scale 
industralists receive only token aid. For instance in 1979, 0.4 per 
cent of all private firms and individual borrowers in Jordan received 
48.7 per cent of the total credit extended by the country·s banks(6). 
This is an indication of the low chances of small business getting 
access to credit in the developing countries. 
3. The experience of many developing countries revealed that the 
obstacles hindering development have financial as well as technical 
aspects. So it is not a matter of finance alone(7). The development 
banks are required to make finance available as well as to provide 
managerial guidance and technical advice and initiate feasibility 
studies(8). All of these are necessary for encouraging domestic 
entrepreneurship. So the promotional role of these institutions is 
valued as much as the finance role.(9) With this context some 
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economists have described development banks as catalysts for investment 
in the private sector through their provision of finance and 
management. 
4. The inadequacy of commercial banking arrangements in countries 
which inherited British banking arrangements is another factor behind 
the creation of development banks. The commercial banks patterned 
on the British commercial banks, have been reluctant to extend 10ng-
term credit and have concentrated their lending on profitable trade 
self-liquidating loans. They have justified their conservative policy 
by the short-term structure of their liabilities and have shied away 
from the policies of their counterparts in Japan and Germany. The 
deficiency in their arrangements was first highlighted in the historic 
Macmillan Report(10) in Britain. It led the Macmillan Committee to 
recommend the establishment of specialist finance institutions - The 
Industrial Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Industrial Commercial 
Finance Corporation (ICFC) - in Britain. This gap to some extent had 
persisted in the operation of the British banks up till now and it is 
on the British banks' lending record that the case for nationalisation 
has been chiefly based.(ll) But the British financial system as a 
whole can take care of this gap. If it is suggested that the machinery 
is still not adequate to meet the demand, the banks argue in defence of 
their lending policy that the finance most suitable for transformation 
into long-term funds is primarily that held by life assurance companies 
and pension funds.(12) 
Under these circumstances it is essential for the developing countries 
in the process of their socio-economical structural changes to 
accelerate the rate and formation of the financial institutions, which 
are required to support these changes. 
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4.2 Evolution of the development banks in the region 
The early experience of the region in financing agricultural activities 
began in the early years of this century when the Turkish agricultural 
credit institutions opened branches in Syria, Iraq, Jordan and other 
areas in the region but the activities of these branches were limited 
due to the inadequacy of their capital. 
In Egypt some foreigners established such institutions there in the 
early years of this century, but excessive speculation and the 
exploitation of small farmers(13) obliged the Egyptian government to 
set-up the Agricultural Credit and Co-operative Bank in 1931 to provide 
loans for farmers to buy fertilizers, improved seeds and agricultural 
equipment. The bank grew rapidly and by 1945 it had 100 branches 
throughout Egypt.(14) The bank has made an effective contribution to 
the development of agriculture. 
In the field of industrial finance, the region had very little 
experience before the second world war.(15) The only initiative came 
from the Egyptian government when it deposited with the Misr Bank about 
EP 50,000 to be used in financing industry with short - and medium-term 
funds. But the Misr Bank, relying mostly on its own resources, carried 
the larger part of industrial financing in the period before 
independence. The Bank subscribed to the capital of many companies and, 
its equity investments amounted to about 11 million Egyptian pounds in 
1954.(16) No attempt was made to create industrial banks before 
independence in any Arab countries. 
In the post-independence period, in the process of the Arab planning 
their development, it was clear that the existing financial 
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institutions, mainly commercial banks, were not equipped to handle the 
required finance. Commercial banks were the only financial 
institutions with some significance, but provided mainly short-term 
credit, largely for trade financing. And this type of finance is of 
less significance in support of economic development needs. The 
creation of new institutions was thought essential to provide the type 
of credit required by industry and agriculture since both need 10ng-
term rather than short-term credit. 
The objectives of the development banks were seen to be the assistance 
in and promotion of economic activities in their specific sector of 
operation. In the industrial field such institutions would promote the 
establishment of privately-owned industry, assisting in operating new 
industrial enterprises and the expansion and modernisation of existing 
enterprises.(17) Also they were expected to promote the participation 
of private capital in such enterprises, by providing managerial 
guidance and technical advice, initiating feasibility studies and pre-
investment surveys in their industry. By exploring and identifying 
viable domestic avenues of investment, local and foreign investors 
would be encouraged to take advantage of the new investment 
opportunities. 
Under these circumstances the Arab governments like other developing 
countries took the initiative by establishing these institutions. 
Progress in the 1950's and 1960's was slow but the growth and 
sophistication of these banks started after the mid 1970's, when 
efforts for development were intensified to transfer the Arab liquid 
wealth into real wealth. Since then the Arab governments have embarked 
on a policy of creating such institutions where they are 
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needed. By the early 1980's each Arab country had its own development 
banks, mostly owned by the public sectors but in a few cases owned 
either by private interest, or by a combination of private interests 
and governments. But in the latter case the government guarantees the 
private capital invested in these institutions implying a high degree 
of public responsibility.(18) 
The region has at present over 70 such institutions (Appendix 4.1) 
operating mainly at the national level and 8 operating at the regional 
level. Some of them concern themselves with only one economic sector, 
others are multi-purpose giving assistance to several sectors. 
In general the scope of the region's development banks' activities 
cover the following areas:-
1. Financing housing projects and real estate 
2. Financing agri cul tural projects 
3. Financing industrial, touristic and vocational projects 
4. Financing the co-operative movement 
5. Financing various rural and urban development projects (19) 
The distribution of the development banks according to their activities 
shows that 15 institutions are assigned to finance housing and real 
estate, 10 banks are specialised in agriculture, 9 development banks 
operate in industry and another 9 institutions are mUlti-purpose 
development banks. The rest are involved in credit, savings, co-
operatives and other social aspects. As the emphasis on the 
development of various economic sectors differs greatly between the 
Arab countries, so the development banks differ too. For instance 
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the emphasis in the Gulf states has been on the development of the 
housing sector, so the development banks concerned with this sector 
were the first to be developed. Then came the interest in the 
industrial sector to promote institutions serving its activities. The 
scarcity of arable land and water in such countries made agricultural 
development banks the last priority. In the other Arab countries with 
more balanced sectors interest has been shown in the establishment of 
all types of development banks. 
The increase in the number of institutions has been paralleled by an 
increase in their financial assets. By 1980 the total financial assets 
held by the Arab national development banks amounted to about $89 
billion as can be seen in Table 4.1. The distribution of the banks' 
assets according to country reveals that the development banks in Saudi 
Arabia and Algeria together accounted for about 72.5 per cent of the 
total Arab development banks' financial assets. 
This leaves about 27.5 per cent to be shared by the development banks 
of the remaining twenty countries. And within the last group the 
development banks of Kuwait, Iraq, Libya and Syria accounted for the 
greater proportion. 
In fact the developing banks in Oman, Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania and 
both Yemens together held less than one per cent of the total Arab 
development banks' assets. Thus the distribution of capital among the 
Arab development banks reflects the difference in wealth and 
determination between Arab countries in pursuing their development 
objectives. 
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TABLE 4.1 
Development Banks - Source and Uses of Funds (in million dollars) 
1 1 
Country Number of Source 1 Use 1 
Institutions 1 1 
1 4 1 
Domestic Foreign Total % 1 Loans & % 1 
1 2 3 ~ 1 I nves tment 4/3 1 
1 1 
Algeria 2 31526.2 945.8 32472.0 2.9 1 31766.6 97.81 
Iraq 3 6842.8 6842.8 1 5812.1 84.91 
Kuwait 3 3868.5 425.0 4293.5 9.9 1 2052.3 47.dl 
Saudi Arabia 5 31956.4 31956.4 1 28203.9 88.31 
Libya 4 2922.0 2922.0 1 2192.3 75.0\ 
Jordan 6 749.0 53.1 802.1 6.6 1 528.6 65.91 
Bahrain 1 239.6 239.6 1 181.6 75.81 
Tunisia 7 576.8 266.8 843.4 31.6 \ 694.4 82.31 
Syria 4 4819.8 377.1 5196.9 7.2 1 4365.5 \ 84.01 
Oman 2 75.3 75.3 1 42.5 1 56.41 
Egypt 4 687.7 41.0 728.7 5.6 1 583.1 1 80.01 
Morocco 5 1601.9 624.2 2226.1 28.1 1 1833.2 \ 82.4\ 
Sudan 4 109. 13.5 122.5 11.0 I 96.7 1 78.9\ 
Somalia 1 45.6 3.2 48.8 6.6 \ 33.9 I 69.51 
Yemen A.R. 4 102.0 13.4 115.4 11.6 \ 37.7 \ 32.71 
1 1 1 
\ 1 \ 
TOTAL 86122.5 2762.9 88885.4 3.1 \ 78424.4 \ 88.2\ 
1 \ \ 
SOURCE: The Role of Specialized Credit Institutions in Development Activity 
in the Arab World. (Amman: Central Bank of Jordan, 1983) (in Arabic) 
Examining the source of capital for such institutions as given in Table 
4.1. The data indicates that the bulk of the capital with the 
development banks came from domestic resources. For the development 
banks of the region as a whole, 97 per cent of the capital originated 
locally. But at the country level the picture varies considerably from 
one country to another. For instance for the Tunisian and Moroccan 
development banks, foreign sources of funds are important. These 
sources amonted to 32 per cent of the Tunisian development banks and 28 
per cent of the Moroccan development banks in 1980. The foreign source 
for the Tunisian banks increased further in the early 1980's when six 
joint-banks with large capital were set-up in Tunisia.(20) 
The other Arab countries with a relatively high use of foreign sources 
were Algeria, Kuwait and Syria. Each of them shows foreign capital 
exceeding in absolute terms that in Tunisia, but because their 
institution had large domestic sources, the foreign sources in terms of 
percentage are dwarfed. The other Arab deficit countries, such as 
Jordan, Yemen A.R. and Sudan had a small amount of foreign resources, 
but because the assets of their institutions were small, the foreign 
resources show a relatively high percentage. The other development 
institutions with no foreign resources were those of Saudi Arabia, 
Libya, Bahrain and Iraq. See Table 4.1. 
Concomitant to the evolution of the national development banks which 
are mainly concerned with financing development in their host 
countries, other national and regional development assistance funds 
emerged to operate at the regional level. The first ambitious Arab 
financial institutions for Economic development was broached in 1945 by 
the British Government as part of the Anglo-American oil agreement 
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proposed at that time.(21) This project did not materialise, but 
fourteen years later, at the meeting of the Economic Council of the 
Arab league in Cairo (January 1959) subscription quotas for a similar 
institution were agreed.(22) 
The second initiative came in 1961, when Kuwait on its independence in 
a real desire to consolidate its position with other Arab states, 
established the first Development Assistance Fund (23) namely the 
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED). As the name of the 
fund implies, it was empowered to lend only to the Arab states. A 
decade later Abu Dhabi got its independence from Britain and 
immediately set up a similar institution namely the Abu Dhabi Fund for 
Arab Economic Development (AFAED) but on a smaller scale. At the same 
time, the members of the Arab league set up the first regional 
assistance fund namely the Arab Fund for Social and Economic 
Development (AFSED). 
After 1974 when the region began to receive enormous oil revenues, the 
development assistance funds began to propagate on the national level 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Libya each set up its own development assistance 
funds. And on the multinational level, in solidarity with the African 
people came the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) 
sponsored by the majority of the members of the Arab league. Similarly 
in solidarity with the Islamic countries and third world countries came 
the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and OPEC Special Funds respectively. 
The last two multilateral funds are of mixed Arab and non-Arab 
sponsorship, but the Arab countries have pledged large amounts for both 
institutions. 
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In the last decade or so the national and regional development funds 
have grown significantly in their capital base. The (KFAED) and 
(AFAED) started with modest amounts of capital in 1961 and 1971 
respectively, but they have been increased several times. Likewise the 
capital of other national and regional development institutions has 
increased but on a smaller scale because the latter started with a 
large capital base from the beginning. The aggregate paid-up capital 
and reserve of all these institutions amounted to about $18 billion at 
the end of 1982 as given in Table 4.2. 
The largest among them have been the (KFAED) and the (SDF): together 
they held over 55 per cent of the total paid-up capital and reserve 
with all institutions. However, the capital of the (AMF) and the 
(AFSED) was doubled in 1982. The rapid increase in the paid-up capital 
of both institutions reflected the great desire of the Arab countries 
for further co-operation at the regional level.(24) 
4.3 The Framework of the development banks operation 
As the Arab development banks of national and regional institutions by 
no means came out of the same pod, there had been specific assignments 
and guidance for the operation of each institutions. 
To begin with regional institutions, the Arab Bank for Economic 
Developmnt in Africa is limited in its operation to non-Arab members of 
the Organisation of African Unity. Likewise the Islamic Development 
Banks is limited in its operation to the Islamic countries and 
communities. The third development institution funds with a special 
assignment are the AMF and the AFSED both of these funds are limited 
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TABLE 4.2 
The Capital of the Arab National and Regional Deyelo~nt Funds as at End 1982 
---------------,-------;;-------.,.-----
Development Institutions 
National Institutions. 
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development 
Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development 
Saudi Fund for Development 
Iraqi Development Fund 
SUB TOTAL 
Regional and Multilateral Institutions. 
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development 
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa 
Islamic Development Bank 
OPEC Fund for International Development 
Arab Monetary Fund 
SUB TOTAL 
GRAND TOTAL 
Date of 
operation 
1962 
1974 
1975 
1974 
1974 
1975 
1977 
1976 
1978 
Authorized 
capti al 
7000.00 
1089.03 
7288.63 
924.00 
16 301.66 
2760.00 
738.25 
2146.00 
4000.00 
953.86 
10 598.11 
26 899.77 
------------
SOURCE: Co-ordination Secretariat, Arab Fund for Ecomomic and 
Soical Developments. Development Financing Operations 
of Arab National and Regional Financing Institutions as 
at End 1982. Kuwait, 1983. 
Paid 
Capital 
3904.00 
693.04 
6272.95 
616.00 
11 485.99 
1680.0U 
944.00 
1295.53 
2074.00 
828.21 
6 821.74 
18 307.73 
=========== 
in their operation to the Arab region. However, the other national 
funds such as the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED). 
The Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (ADFAED), have joined 
the Sauid Fund for Development (SFD) to operate at the global level 
since their charters were amended to allow them to do so in 1974. 
This equally applies to the Iraqi Fund for External Development (IFED) 
and the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (LAFB).(25) 
Within this broad assignment each institution has a special objective 
to fulfil. The objectives of the Pan-Arab Institutions namely the AMF 
and the AFSED have been to promote Arab Economic integration together 
with integrated money markets and unified currencies. The main role of 
the AMF has been to provide balance of payments support to the Arab 
deficit countries, and to co-ordinate the Arab financial and monetary 
policies. The Agreement of the Fund stresses, both in letter and 
spirit the role of the Fund in the development of Arab financial 
markets as a means of assisting in Arab economic integration in general 
and monetary and financial integration in particular.(26) The 
objectives of the AMF as stated in its Articles of agreement are: 
1. Adjustment of balance of payments imbalances among member 
countries. 
2. Stabilization of exchange rates of the Arab currencies with 
the aim of maintaining their convertability and suppressing 
current payment restrictions among Arab countries. 
3. Strengthening Arab monetary integration with the aim of 
increasing Arab economic integration and accelerating economic 
development to achieve the desired rates of growth among member 
countries. 
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4. Establishment of appropriate means of expanding the use of the 
Arab Accounting Dinar (AAD) in a manner promising the 
establishment of a unified Arab currency. 
5. Settlement of current payments with the aim of promoting trade 
exchanges among member countries. 
The charter of the AFESD of 1968 also stresses the role of the Fund in 
financing economic and social development and encouraging private and 
public capital investment in those projects consolidating Arab 
integration. Article 2 of the charter stipulates that priority should 
be given to projects vital to Arab unity and joint Arab projects (27). 
The charters of the national Funds in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and 
United Arab Emirates stress their role in promoting development at a 
global level in different degrees. The Iraqi and the Kuwait Funds 
stress the idea of closer economic co-operation between the Arab 
countries. The former consitution provides that the fund should 
concentrate its activities on Arab countries and should give priority 
to those projects that would contribute to closer economic co-operation 
and integration between the Arab countries.(28) 
The operation of all these institutions is guided by economic 
considerations. Only projects that are financially feasible and sound 
may get a loan from such institutions provided that such projets are 
approved by the recipient country and the government must be either the 
borrower or the guarantor of the loan. The exception is when the 
Islamic Development Bank assists in the form of equity participation no 
government guarantee is required. The basic procedures of project 
identification, loan implementation and follow-up are similar within 
all these institutions and are based mainly on the World Bank guide-
lines. 
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The loans are usually extended on very soft terms, loan maturities are 
usually in the 20 to 30 year range and the degree of concessionary 
finance is high. A period of grace of four to six years and interest 
rates between 2-6 per cent are usual. The variations in lending rates 
have often been in function of the type of projects being financed and 
the degree of development in the recipient country. (29) The Islamic 
Development Bank operates as an Islamic Bank and thus charges no 
interest on its loans. To avoid using the notion of interest, project 
aid can be provided in the form of equity participation or using 
profit-sharing or leasing arrangements. Similarly, the Saudi Fund does 
not charge interest and only collects a small amount as a service 
charge. But the ADFAED charter allows for equity financing to a 
maximum of 15 per cent of the total cost of the project. And in 
departure from the other funds its charter was revised to allow the 
Fund to accept deposits from local public corporations and organize 
various financial institutions in the domestic markets.(31) 
In recent years the Arab regional institutions have begun intensive co-
ordination of their policies and procedures which have resulted in more 
similarity in their operation. This was possible because Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia are the owners of the largest institutions and together 
hold the majority vote in the other multilateral institutions. 
The other Arab development banks, which are concerned with finance and 
technical advice for specific areas within their host countries are 
larger in number and the majority are limited in their operation in 
terms of country and economic sectors. The regional 
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institutions are free to lend to all economic sectors. But similarly 
to the regional institutions, the majority are prevented by their laws 
from accepting deposits. The institutions of this kind which are 
allowed to accept deposits are those which perform both banking and 
development functions as in the case of La Societe Tunisienne de 
Banque. Its status allows it to receive deposits of current or term 
types from all persons public, semi-public and private.(32} But the 
other development banks in the region with a right to accept deposits 
are limited to time deposits.(33) 
On the assets side, the majority of the development banks of the 
national and regional type are limited in the maximum amount of funds 
an institution may extend to a single project. This limitation is 
related to the cost of the project and the paid-up capital of the 
institution. The development bank may not exceed a certain ratio 
specified by its law as to the cost of a project or to its paid up 
capital. For instance, the Industrial Bank of Sudan is precluded from 
investing in any project more than two-thirds of the total cost of the 
project. The maximum investment by the Bank is limited to 15 per cent 
of its paid up share capital, reserves and loan capital.(34) 
The other area stipulated in the operation of the development banks is 
long-term finance. Development banks according to their regulations 
should extend mainly long-term finance for projects and some of them 
are prevented from extending any sort of short-term finance. For 
instance, the statutes of the Banque Nationale pour le Developement 
Economique of Morocco stipulated that the institution is allowed to 
provide long-term loans of at least two years duration.(35) 
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The operation of these institutions is mainly influenced by their 
sponsors in so far as charging interest rates is concerned. The 
government and semi-government institutions were allowed to charge 
modest interest rates while the privately-owned institutions were 
almost free to charge and set their own rate.(36) Thus, in the main, 
the rates ranged between zero and the existing commercial rate at the 
time of extending a loan. But the common characteristic of the 
interest rates was their general stability within each institution. 
In rich countries with government-owned development institutions the 
wealth of such countries exerts a decisive influence on the policies of 
setting the rate. Loans have normally been extended under the most 
favourable terms with long pay back periods and no interest charges, 
merely a small service charge. In Saudi Arabia, farmers usually 
received 50 per cent of the cost of machines and equipment bought by 
the loan as a gift from the Agricultural Development Bank. Likewise the 
Real Estate Development Bank usually granted a 20 per cent deduction on 
the total loans if loans were paid on time.(37) In Kuwait the interest 
rates charged by its development banks varied greatly from one 
institution to another. For instance the saving and credit bank, the 
oldest and largest of the Kuwait development banks, was created in 1960 
to extend loans for the promotion and development of industries, real 
estate, agriculture and for people of limited means who were unable to 
borrow through normal banking channels. The Bank granted loans for 
maximum period of 45 years at an interest rate of 2%. Although this 
was a small charge, it was usually paid by the Ministry of Finance. 
The Industrial Bank of Kuwait is owned jointly by the government and 
the private sector. As the Bank has access to cheap government loans, 
there was a ceiling of 4% on interest rates that the Bank should 
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observe in its lending. While, the Kuwait Real Estate Bank as a jOint 
stock company operated on a commercial basis.(38) 
In Bahrain, the Housing Bank is the only development bank there. The 
Bank extends loans to those eligible to enable them to build their own 
houses. Borrowers make repayments over a maximum of 25 years in the 
form of rent, giving the bank a return on its investment of no more 
than 5 per cent.(39) 
Iraq, has three development banks of which the largest was the Real 
Estate Bank. The Bank usually granted long and medium term loans on 
soft terms. In addition the lending policy favoured rural projects by 
granting borrowers in rural areas 60 per cent of the projects estimated 
cost at an interest rate of 3 per cent while the borrowers in the urban 
areas were given 40 per cent of the projects estimated cost at an 
interest rate of 6 per cent. The Agricultural co-operative Bank also 
granted borrowers medium and long-term loans on soft terms. The Bank 
also helped farmers by insuring the life of the borrowers and the 
machines or equipment on the farm. This policy relieves the family of 
the farmer from the burden of the loan should he die. Insurance of the 
farm itself guarantees any loss on the loan that the bank might 
incur.(40) 
Morocco is one of the Arab countries with a long experience of the 
development banks operations. The government supports the borrowers 
from the development banks by paying on their behalf part of the 
interest rates. For instance, the government pays 3-5 per cent of the 
interest rate charged by the Credit Immobi1ier Et Hotelier on loans 
extended to individuals to construct their houses, but 2 per cent 
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of the interest rate if the loans are used for constructing hotels. 
Also the government pays 2 per cent of the interest rate charged by the 
Banque Nationa1e pour 1e Development Economique if loans are used to 
finance one of the projects stated in the Law for the Promotion of 
Investment. The policy of interest rate support by the government was 
used also in Tunisia and Oman.(41) 
In Jordan, the interest rates charged by the development banks greatly 
varied from one bank to another. In the period of 1980-1983 the 
cheapest rate was charged by the cities and villages Development Bank 
on long-term loans of up to fifteen years to rural councils at a rate 
of 4.5 per cent, increasing to 7.5 per cent in the last year. The 
Housing Corporation had continued to extend long-term loans over 
fifteen years at a 5 per cent interest rate. Also the Agricultural 
credit corporation maintained a 7 per cent interest rate on all its 
long-term loans. The rate of interest charged by the Jordan co-
operative organisation on its long term loans was in the range of 6.5 
to 8 per cent. The Industrial Development Bank and the Housing Bank 
charged higher rates close to those interest rates charged by the 
commercial banks. 
The other requirement made by the charters of the development banks is 
the provision of adequate collateral when loans are extended. Some of 
the banks required collateral in the form of the assets of the projects 
and others included raw materials in the size of the loan extended. 
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4.4. Appraisal of the development banks operation 
4.4.1 Regional development funds 
The aid disbursed by the national and regional development funds 
reached about $18.4 billion during the period 1962-83 (See 
Appendix 4.2). The figures show that all of them had been active in 
extending and disbursing funds during that period. However, the three 
most active institutions have been the Islamic Development Bank (lOB) 
based in Jeddah. the KFAED in Kuwait and the SFD in Saudi Arabia. 
Together they have provided about 62 per cent of the institutions total 
aid during the period under consideration. 
However, the contribution to financing development of the Arab region 
is far less than one-half of the amount extended by these institutions. 
The region received about $8.4 billion from these institutions as can 
be seen in Appendix 4.3. Of that the infrastructural sectors 
(transportation, power, water and sewerage) accounted for 54 per cent. 
The productive sectors received about 33 per cent and the remaining 13 
per cent went to other sectors. The aid is very small compared with 
these institutions' expenditure more importantly when compared to the 
enormous resources at their disposal. None of them has utilized its 
full capacity nor taken full advantage of the opportunities. 
However the aid extended to the 18 Arab countries has contributed to , 
their development. Through soft loans it helped the capital shortage 
countries to build their infrastructure, which is essential for further 
development. (42) However, the productive sectors received a small 
share but nevertheless probably larger than those contributions 
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made by these countries' own development banks to these sectors. In 
the coming years the productive sectors' share of the regional 
development Funds loans is expected to increase as the infrastructural 
projects are completed or near completion, Likewise the development of 
infrastructure facilities helped the establishment of new industries 
and improved the conditions for investment in the productive sectors. 
In addition, the development banks have gained more experience in 
evaluating and appraising new projects. This would help the expansion 
of their operations in lending to industry. It is believed that the 
shortage of professional staff and expertise was the reason behind 
their small loans to the productive sectors since the problem has been 
identifying and evaluating projects rather than a shortage of capital. 
Apart from extending finance, these funds have contributed to the 
region's economic development and have also helped to build up the Arab 
capital markets. For instance KFAED promoted and succeeded in the 
establishment of the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation 
(IAIGC) in 1974. The Corporation, as its name implies ensures all 
investment, portfolio investment loans, etc. The creation of this 
corporation is believed to facilitate and increase the investment in 
the region.(43) Likewise, the ADFAED helped in saving some banks from 
bankruptcy in the 1977 crises in the U.A.E .. (44) This helped to 
maintain a sound banking system and gave people confidence in the 
financial system there. Similarly the Libyan Foreign banks helped in 
the integration of the Arab financial centres through their policy of 
establishing joint-banks with other Arab countries. It has already 
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set up many such institutions in Beirut, Tunisia and U.A.E. 
Similarly, the AMF in collaboration with the Arab central Banks has 
made vigorous efforts through support loans, maintaining stable 
exchange rates between the Arab currencies and encouraging the adoption 
of a unified Arab currency to accelerate economic integration and to 
develop the Arab financial markets and integrate the Arab currencies. 
However, the significance of the impact of these efforts has been 
limited due to the political factors which so often bedevil wider Arab 
co-operation. (45) 
However, despite these positive factors made by the regional 
institutions, their insistence on the bankable projects undoubtedly 
limited their contribution to development, because not all bankable 
projects are necessarily important for economic development nor is 
every economically essential project necessarily bankable.(46) Thus it 
is more helpful to the development of the region and for increasing the 
flow of capital within the region if such institutions shift to 
programme lending and increase their aid to the national development 
institutions. 
4.4.2 The national development banks 
The national development institutions' loans and investment reached $78 
billion in 1980, see Table 4.1. This is almost ten times the fund 
allocated by the regional bank to the region, and more importantly it 
accounted for 88 per cent of their resources. This points to the fact 
that the national development banks have been more successful in 
utilizing their resources than the regional ones. But this achievement 
varies considerably at the country level. The data in Table 4.1 shows 
that the Algerian and Saudi banks were the leading ones in terms of 
fund utilization. 
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The former extended over 97 per cent of their total assets and the 
latter 88 per cent. This is a great achievement as these institutions 
were holding almost three quarters of the total financial assets held 
by all development banks in the region. These were followed by the 
development banks in Iraq, Tunisia, Syria and Morocco with the 
utilization of over 80 per cent of their resources while the Libyan and 
Bahrain development banks only utilized three-quarters of their total 
resources. At the other end of the stand the development banks of 
Yemen A.R., Somalia and to some extent Kuwait where they utilized 
between one third and one-half of their resources. The low utilization 
indicates the poor performance of these banks. 
The main factor which weakened the operation of these institutions was 
the shortage of qualified and competent staff, which in the case of 
Yemen and Oman led to delay and inefficiency in processing loan 
applications. The same factor was noted in Jordan where development 
banks were criticised for being two passive in their lending operations 
and for failing to take the inititative in identifying new investment 
opportunities and in attracting clients.(47) 
The fact that developing countries suffer from a chronic shortage of 
local managerial and organisational capabilities and competence has an 
effect on their ability to plan and present their projects properly. 
So development banks should possess the competence to identify projects 
and invest their scarce resources to useful purposes and not merely as 
administrative devices to handle their government's own 
investment. (48) 
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The lack of competence is perhaps the main cause for the failure of 
some development banks in Jordan and in the majority of Arab countries 
to employ fully their resources in the development of the region.(49) 
With regard to the second factor the development bank's operation is 
affected by the interest rate and the collateral requirement. The 
interest rates charged by the Arab development banks seem to have been 
governed largely by the cost of capital to them so that development 
banks with greater access to government capital extended loans on very 
moderate terms and sometime free of interest. This policy helped the 
borrowers and encouraged them to borrow more. But the development 
banks with private interests tended to charge a higher rate and the 
small concessionary aid they offered was more than offset by the funds 
of the public sector deposited with some of them. 
The high interest rate policy considerably reduced the demand for their 
finance and this they were left with much of their resources. 
However, the interesting aspect of the interest rate policy of the 
majority of the Arab development banks was that they charged the same 
rate of interest to all customers irrespective of the difference in the 
risks involved. This policy may lead to a higher rate of default, as 
some economists suggest(SO) but it has been motivated by social 
considerations, especially the desire to avoid charges and complaints 
of favouritism and discrimination. In addition, most of the local 
business is directed to the local markets with little competition from 
outsiders thus making the enterprises in each economic sector face the 
same risk. 
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The security requirement in extending loans by the development banks 
has not been lenient but strictly observed. This policy undoubtedly 
cut down the rate of default. But it can be argued that the inability 
to provide acceptable security was one of the main reasons why most 
small farmers and small scale industry could not obtain credit from 
commercial banks.(51) Thus if the development banks were to perform 
their basic function of lending money to correct social and 
geographical imbalance, they must not lay emphasis on security 
requirements. Such a policy may be acceptable when the capital of such 
institution is inadequate since a high rate of default on the part of 
loan recipients adversely affected its operation, and deprives such a 
bank of financial resources which could otherwise have been applied to 
meet fresh loans demanded by the bank·s clients. But in all cases 
development banks should consider the viability of the project intended 
to be financed by the loan more than the availability of collateral. 
4.4.3 National development banks and national priority 
To examine the Arab national developments institutions· operation 
against their countries national priority we have to examine how they 
have deployed their funds among the various economic sectors and then 
relate this deployment to planned investment in each sector. 
Information permitting the analysis of the development banks· loans and 
investment by sector or sub-sector is scarce and only available for 
several Arab countries and for 1980 only. What follows is an 
examination of the operations of such institutions within the 
constraints of the available data as given in Table 4.3. From the data 
it is clear that the Arab development banks in seven countries laid 
great emphasis on the construction and housing sector, a sector which 
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TABLE 4.3 
Development Banks, Loans by sectors and maturities in 1980 
I 
I Total Loan Agriculture Industry Contruction Others 
I Country Loans % of 
I in the % % % % % % % % % % 
I $ total Long Short Long Short Long Short Long Short Long I Short 
I 
I 
I Jordan 205.5 1.5 I 96.8 I 3.2 I 9.6 I 3.2 10.3 72.3 I I 4.6 
I 
Iraq 2 939.8 22.1 I 96.3 I 3.7 8.7 2.6 1.1 1.1 I 86.5 
I I I 
Saudi Arabi a 7 898.9 59.5 I 99.9 I 0.1 9.4 0.1 47.7 I 42.8 0.6 
I I I 
Kuwait 369.7 2.8 I 100.0 I 0.7 32.0 I 61.5 5.8 
I I I 
Bahrain 79.8 0.6 I 100.0 I 1100.0 
I I I 
Morocco 1 746.1 13.1 I 79.8 I 20.2 14.9 9.6 36.3 I 26.2 8.2 2.4 2.4 
I I 
Sudan 43.7 0.4 I 63.4 I 36.6 11.5 36.6 39.8 I 12.1 
Total 13 283.5 1100.0 96.2 3.8 9.7 2.1 34.5 0.3 51.1 1.1 0.9 0.3 
SOURCE: Central Bank of Jordan, liThe Role of Specialized Credit Institutions in the Development 
Activities in the Arab World", (1983), p.99, in Arabic. 
accounted for about 52 per cent of the total loans and investment 
provided by development banks of the seven countries under considera-
tion, while the industrial sector accounted for one-third, and the 
agricultural sector for just 12 per cent. 
At the national level the development banks in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan 
and Kuwait channelled to the construction and housing sectors 100 per 
cent, 86.5 per cent, 72.3 per cent and 61.5 per cent of their loans 
respectively. This left a small amount to be shared by the industrial 
and agricultural sectors in these countries. In Saudi Arabia, Morocco 
and Sudan development finance was spread more evenly to cover various 
economic sectors. 
Although the construction and housing sectors received the largest part 
of the development banks' total finance, development of the industrial 
and agricultural sectors has continued to be the top priority in many 
Arab countries. The small shares of these sectors do not reflect the 
national priority in most of these countries. 
12 per cent of the development institutions total loans for the 
agricultural sector is very low in a region where over one-half of the 
population earn their living from this sector. This can be made clear 
by examining the development banks' loans and investment in relation to 
the planned investment in each economic sector. From the data is Table 
4.4. It can be seen that the loans extended by the development banks 
were not in compliance with these countries development plans. For 
instance, the development banks in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan 
extended loans to the housing sectors many times greater than the 
planned investment for housing in their respective countries. In 
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TABLE 4.4 
Country 
Iraq 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Morocco 
Sudan 
Bahrain 
SOURCE: 
The Development Banks, loans and the 
Planned Investment in Several Arab Countries in 1980 
Items Agriculture Industry Construction 
Loans 256.0 33.2 2539.5 
Investment 1285.0 2599.6 959.6 
Loans/Investment 19.9% 1.3% 264.6% 
Loans 739.8 3769.8 3327.9 
Investment 266.4 2562.0 1095.2 
Loans/Investment 277.7% 147.1" 303.9% 
Loans 19.8 21.1 148.7 
Investment 24.2 138.0 51.8 
Loans/Investment 81.8% 15.3% 287.1% 
Loans 2.6 118.3 227.4 
Investment 22.6 682.6 1408.4 
Loans/Investment 11.5% 17.3% 16.1% 
Loans 259.6 633.8 456.9 
Investment 287.0 162.2 609.6 
Loans/Investment 90.0% 390.8% 75.0% 
Loans 5.0 17.4 5.3 
Investment 293.3 182.0 174.0 
Loans/Investment 1.7% 9.6% 3.1% 
Loans 79.8 
Investment 2.0 69.2 
Loans/Investment 
Others 
2625.4 
.0 
49.8 
14180.4 
0.4% 
9.4 
\ 246.8 
\ 3.8% 
\ 
\ 21.4 
\ 1228.0 
\ 1. 7% 
\ 
\ 43.4 
\ 572.0 
\ 7.6% 
\ 
\ 
\ 446.1 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 4.2 
\ 
\ 
Central Bank of Jordan, "Report on the Role of Specialised Credit 
Institutions in the Development Activities of the Arab World", 
(1983), p.101, in Arabic. 
Total 
2828.7 
7469.6 
37.9" 
7887.3 
18104.0 
43.6" 
199.0 
460.8 
43.2" 
369.7 
3341.6 
11.1% 
1383.7 
1630.8 \ 
85.5%\ 
\ 
27.7 \ 
1095.4 \ 
2.5%\ 
\ 
79.8 \ 
75.4 \ 
105.8%\ 
\ 
contrast, the agricultural and industrial sectors received less than 
the planned investment in Jordan and Iraq. 
However, some argue that the emphasis on the housing sector in these 
countries was a natural response to the circumstances of the 1970's. 
A brief digression is necessary to shed light on those circumstances. 
During that period of increased oil revenues the recipient countries 
spent lavishly on building a new infrustructure: electricity, sewage 
facilities, the expansion of the ports and imports; on initiating and 
improving social services, especially education and medical facilities; 
and also on introducing extensive subsiduaries for food and other 
consumption items. These, of course, meant an improvement in the 
income of the people which led to a rise in their prosperity to spend 
and also to save. Consequently the demand for housing increased and 
resulted in a sharp increase in rents particularly in the urban areas. 
People with small means suffered a great deal. 
In tackling this problem the governments in the Peninsula countries 
began constructing new houses for their citizens with average and low 
incomes and distributing plots of land to those who had money to build 
their houses. But when demand went up, they resorted to the 
establishment of special development banks to provide loans on soft 
terms to their needy citizens.(52) 
In the non-oil Arab countries, money sent home by their national 
workers in the oil countries and the official assitance from the oil 
countries made some of them experience the boom although on a smaller 
scale. The demand for houses increased and speculation in land made 
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it possible for the middle and low income groups to secure their 
houses. So the need for specialised development to support this sector 
was felt and led to the establishment of appropriate institutions in 
countries such as Jordan and Lebanon. 
Thus we have the reasons why so much was spent in the housing 
sectors. (53) However, despite these reasons, it can be concluded that 
the banks in the housing sector had more capital at their disposal than 
would be allowed given the national priority in these countries. This 
of course does not apply to banks in Saudi Arabia where all the 
development banks have substantial funds and extended more than the 
planned investment. In contrast the development institutions 
specialised in financing industries were short of funds in many 
countries. The development banks provided only one per cent of planned 
investment in Iraq, 10 per cent in Sudan and approximately 15 per cent 
in Jordan. It was only in Morocco and Saudi Arabia that the industrial 
banks extended loans greater than the planned investment. This is an 
indication of the small amount of capital at the disposal of these 
institutions in other Arab countries. 
The agricultural credit institutions were the poorest in terms of 
capital. This can be seen by the relatively small amount of finance 
channelled through the agricultural credit institutions compared to the 
planned investment in this sector. For instance Sudan with its heavy 
dependence on this sector only managed to channel about 2 per cent of 
its planned investment in this sector through the development bank. 
Therefore, demand on development banks for loans and other forms of 
financial assistance was much higher than that which they could meet 
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with their available resources as is clear in many cases. Hence the 
amount of loanable funds available tends to determine the level of 
loans and investment and the shortage of funds had been the main 
constraint on the financial operations of most of the national 
development banks. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The development banks, both national and regional, have contributed 
significantly to the development of the productive sectors and the 
infrastructure in the region and filled the gap in medium and long-term 
finance left by the operation of the commercial banks in the region. 
The former has been the main source of medium and long-term loans, 
unlike the commercial banks which have opted for easy profit by serving 
mainly the export and import sector. The latter has been the main 
channel for transferring capital from the high saving countries to low 
saving countries in the region. 
In addition, the development banks have been the catalyst in the 
economic sectors of their operations by providing finance and technical 
guidance which have helped to strengthen domestic entrepreneurship, and 
encourage the establishment of new industries and joint stock 
companies. In addition the issuing of bonds through these institutions 
contributed greatly to the development of the Arab capital markets. 
Although most of the development banks suffered from a number of 
deficiencies which adversely affected their contribution, the said to 
have had sufficient resources to meet all demands for the backing of 
feasable projects, the majority had insufficient capital and as the 
latter are prevented by their statutes from taking deposits or unable 
to attract sufficient deposits. 
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They have looked to their central banks for financial assistance. In 
essence their activities have been rationalised within the overall 
programme of development in their countries. It is clear, in order to 
aChieve self-reliance in the long run and to be more effective in their 
operation, that they should make serious efforts to attract time 
deposits by offering more liberal interest rates and should tap the 
capital market as far as possible on the one hand and hire more 
qualified and efficient personnel on the other. 
However, the limitation on the capabilities of such banks to offer real 
interest rates on deposits and the absence of developed secondary 
markets to promote their securities have persisted as have other 
structural gaps in the Arab Financial markets. These gaps were to some 
extent filled by the emergence of the Islamic banks and the recently 
organised stock exchanges in the region. These matters will be dealt 
with respectively in the following two chapters. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTION 
Introduction 
The Islamic financial institutions have rapidly established themselves 
in the past few years within both the Arab region and abroad. Today 
many Arab countries have one or more of such institutions and a few 
countries in the region have embarked on a policy of converting their 
modern financial systems to operate on the commercial practices of 
Islam. The Islamic financial institutions operate by coordination the 
cultural and economic principles of Islam, whilst the conventional 
financial institutions often neglect the intricate interplay between 
cultural and economic factors. 
The rise of Islamic Financial Institutions and their operation on 
principles emanating from the regional culture is of paramount 
importance to the Arab capital market. For any arrangement or 
innovation in the financial market to be accepted by the participants 
in it has to spring from their needs and comply with their culture 
otherise it would fail. Thus the wide acceptance of market 
participants of financial instruments based on the Islamic code was the 
force behind the emergence of these institutions. 
Islam has been the public faith of the region for so long that it has 
marked the regional culture. Islam, in the words of the planning 
Minister of Saudi Arabia, 
lIis a decisive and basic reality, an all-embracing value 
system that permeates and regulates every aspect of public 
and private life ll .(l) 
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The prohibition of interest in Islamic law has been one of the major 
obstacles to conventional financial institutions in fully mobilizing 
the available savings in the Moslem countries. The usurious practice 
of the conventional financial institutions militate against their 
acceptance by a large proportion of the communities in the region and 
restrain their development. The negative attitude to usury practice 
among a large proportion of the communities compelled the vast 
majority of Arab governments to maintain a ceiling on interest 
rates.(2) The long imposed ceiling on interest rates has weakened the 
conventional financial institutions in their ability to compete with 
the international markets. This combined with a liberal foreign 
exchange control policy in the majority of the peninsula countries led 
to the flight of enormous amounts of capital outside the region. 
The introduction of modern banking practices came when the Arab 
countries in Wilson's words, 
"were so locked in a virtual colonial relationship 
with European powers that they were concerned to do nothing to 
offend".(3) 
In the post-independence period, such institutions were already there, 
so the Arab governments turned to a variety of conciliatory gestures 
to reconcile the operation of such institutions within the context 
of their Islamic objectives. Some Arab countries nationalised such 
institutions, others officially do not legalize interest payment as 
in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.(4) The long-standing 
Arab governments' imposition of an interest ceiling on the banks' 
lending is another gesture. The latter measures in the context of 
the changing international interest rates and liberal foreign exchange 
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control at home have led to successive liquidity crisis in the region 
( 5 ) • 
So there has been a moral and practical need for the development of 
financial institutions operating on Islamic principles to offer people 
the financial instruments accepted by them and yet avoiding the usury 
question. The moral need came from the Islamic teaching which 
considers money purely as a means of exchange with no intrinsic value 
of its own. Unless money is translated into a productive process it is 
considered immoral to payor receive premiums on it.(6) The practical 
need for such institutions is inter-linked with the moral one. The 
conventional banks have failed to mobilize saving and to extend credit 
to a great proportion of the communities in the region because they 
deal in fixed interest rates and as hoarding of capital is also 
forbidden by Islam, so it is essential for the Moslems to find a way 
to utilize their savings and to secure their needed capital in 
compliance with their culture. Finally, it seems difficult for the 
Arab governments to free the interest rate for the conventional 
institutions. Thus the development of the Islamic financial 
institutions is of paramount importance to the development of the Arab 
capital market and may fill some of the structural and operational 
gaps in their market. 
In this chapter an attempt is made to explore the economic principles 
of Islam then the evolution and operation of the Islamic institutions, 
assess their intenmediary role between savers and investors and finally 
their effect on the Arab capital market and the economy as a whole. 
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5.1 Economic principles of Islam 
The economic doctrine of Islam is closely related to the Islamic 
concept of life. This concept is based on a network of interrelated 
concepts concerning God, humanity, and human beings' relation to God. 
Islam views the human being as composed of two elements, body and soul. 
Consequently, a person should not neglect either of them for the sole 
profit of the other. Within this context, believers should be active 
in their individual and social lives, to satisfy their material needs 
and fulfil their social obligations within the principle of justice and 
fair dealing.(7) 
Apart from many passages in the Koran which sets down such values, the 
Koran also provides some specific ordinances in the economic field. 
The most important for thi s study a,'e: 
1. The prohibition of Riba 
The Koran states in several verses how the people should exchange goods 
and services and condemns some of the prevailing practices of money 
lending where the debtor has to pay a fixed amount above the principal 
to the creditor for the use of money loaned. Within this context the 
Koran states: 
"Trading is pennitted and Riba is forbidden".(8) 
This passage stopped the previous practice in the Moslem communities 
and introduced the interest-free lending concept for the small loan, 
or participation in the gain or loss of the borrowers economic 
activities resulting from such a loan. 
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In recent history when the banks spread in the region, Islamic sCholars 
brought up the Riba question and strongly opposed the operation of 
modern banking. This led to further investigation into the concept 
of Riba which literally means excess or addition and may be translated 
as usury or interest. 
So Islamic scholars differ in their interpretation of the word Riba. 
For the minority with a modernist view (9) Riba means only usury. 
Within this interpretation this group regards interest as legally 
prohibited when money is lent at exorbitantly high interest rates and 
thereby exploits the borrower otherwise interest is accepted. So it 
seems that the imposition of a ceiling on the interest lending rate 
within the region complied with this interpretation. 
But for the vast majority of Moslem economists (10) Riba means usury 
and interest. They argue that money should not be allowed to grow 
passively through mere passage of time by earning guaranteed interest 
when money itself has no intrinsic value. And if a lender of money 
gets back more than his principle, it is exploitation because this 
would mean unequal exchange of assets of an equal value. According 
to this view all dealings in money involving predetermined interest 
rates violate the religious code and are prohibited. This applies 
to both loans and deposit. 
The last interpretation of Riba as usury and interest is contained 
in the code governing the operation of the present Islamic institu-
tions. (11) And in analogy to that recent years the conventional banks 
in the United Arab Emirates failed to collect interest on their loans 
to customers because the courts of the U.A.E. ruled that the 
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interest provision in a loan agreement is void according to Islamic 
law. (12) 
2. On the validity of a contract between parties the Koran strongly 
recommends writing the term of the contract in categorical and 
unambigious words. The commodity should be clearly specified, be truly 
owned by the seller, be accessible and deliverable and of economic 
value. Contracts involving legally inconsumable material for Moslems 
such as wine or pork are not valid. The parties should be responsible 
free agents of sound mind. (13) These recommendations were meant to 
reduce the causes of social tension and to promote an optimal climate 
of peace in the community. In analogy with these recommendations, the 
Islamic institutions usually enter with depositors and borrowers into a 
contract binding both parties. (14) 
3. The other passages in the Koran. concerning specific ordinances 
are the rate of tax on capital and income. (15) The distribution of 
a deceased persons estate and the prohibition of capital hoarding.(16) 
The tax on capital and income and the distribution of the deceased 
persons estate are meant to reduce capital accumulation in the hands 
of a few people. The Koran requires a Moslem to pay Zakat on his 
accumulated wealth in excess of a certain minimum of 2.5 per cent 
annually, and another ratio of his or her income. The imposed 
percentage of Zakat on incme is generally related to the source of 
income. The Zakat was usually collected by the state treasury, but in 
the absence of government, Moslems should give the accrued Zakat to 
needy people themselves. In compliance with this the Islamic financial 
institutions put the due Zakat on their business in a special account 
and provide from it interest-free loan. (17) 
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The condemnation of capital hoarding in the Koran is meant to encourage 
the circulation of money and increase demand for goods. This goes 
along with Keynesian theory of increasing demand as a pre-condition for 
further growth in output. Within the context of these codes the 
Islamic teaching seems to stress harmony among communities and reJects 
the concept of individuals maXimiSing their own economic interests when 
pursued as an end in itself. (18) 
5.2 Evolution of Islamic Financial Institutions 
The Islamic financial institutions are of recent origin. They were 
initiated by the private sector for the first time in the early 1960s, 
consolidated by the establishment of two Islamic banks by the 
governments of the region in the early 1970s. Since then the number of 
such institutions in the region as well as abroad has risen rapidly. 
The simple style of life that had prevailed in the region for so long 
did not call for the establishment of the present type of financial 
intermediaries before. The region's business was simple and did not 
need great amounts of capital and the savings of the business owner 
were sufficient for the businesses' growth. If a business required a 
great amount of capital and this exceeded the means of an entrepreneur, 
he was able to get the extra capital needed from relatives and friends, 
or by entering into partnership with others. 
In the first half of this century economic activities did not improve 
very much where small craftsmen and merchants had continued to dominate 
the scene the introduction of conventional banks was mainly directed at 
faCilitating trade with the Metropolitan countries and at serving the 
colonial administration in the colonies. 
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In the post-independence period the region began to witness some 
structural changes in its economies. The change began very slowly 
during the 1950's and 1960's but picked up after the adjustment in oil 
prices in the early 1970's. In parallel to that the per capita income 
was very low in the first two decades but increased rapidly in the 
1970's. In analogy to that the conventional banks grew along with the 
economy but their operation on usury principles began to encounter more 
and more objections. People who objected to the usurious system 
resorted to investing their savings in real estate or in interest free 
deposit accounts with the conventional banks. This led some people to 
think in the establishment of financial institutions operating within 
the context of an interest free system. 
The first attempt to set up financial institutions operating within 
the interest free concept came in 1962 when a local Savings Bank was 
established in Mit-Ghamer a small town 1n Egypt by a group of people. 
The system grew steadily and opened branches in eleven other localities 
before it was liquidated, perhaps for political reasons in 1971. (19) 
The institution had operated successfully, the number of its clients 
increased rapidly and its contribution to development was widely 
appreciated. 
In the early 1970s, the governments in the region showed interest in 
the operation of the Islamic financial institution. This was evident 
when the Egyptian government set up the Nasser Social Bank to take 
over the commitments of its predecessor and proceeded to operate on the 
same principles. The new bank was required to extend all loans free of 
interest. In addition to providing mobile banking facilities for 
residents in rural areas, it has specialised in helping small 
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businesses, the self employed, and students to complete their 
education. Then in 1974 the Islamic Ministers of Finance Conference in 
Jeddah established the Islamic Development Bank based in Jeddah as an 
intergovernmental institution, to promote economic co-operation among 
Moslem countries in accordance with Islamic teaching. The bank 
performs many activities; chief among them are: 
1. Participating in equity of various projects in the member 
countries. 
2. Extending loans to Institutions and Governments. 
3. Promoting trade between member countries. 
4. Extending technical advice, particularly in training personnel 
in economic activities and banking in accordance with Islamic 
principles. 
The new institutions capital was provided by the governments unlike 
the savings Bank capital which was subscribed by individual.(20) So 
the new institutions began with the support of the Governments and in 
a very short time their operations felt by many people. 
The successful operations of the two Egyptian Banks and the Islamic 
Development Bank of Jeddah were instrumental in making more people 
rethink the morality of interest payments while showing at the same 
time that Islamic alternative interest-free finance houses were 
possible and could prove successful. This coincided with the massive 
increase of oil revenues that began pouring into the region for the 
governments, but eventually passed in several ways to the private 
sector. At this stage individuals began to appear who had enormous 
wealth but who were reluctant to deal with conventional banks. 
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These wealthy people in collaboration with governments have embarked on 
policy of establishing more Islamic institutions. As a result a new 
wave of Islamic financial institutions, be it Islamic bank, investment 
company or other types of such institutions began to appear. But the 
new institution began operating on a commercial basis unlike the 
Islamic institutions before which were not profit-oriented. The first 
of the Islamic financial institutions of the new type was set up in 
Dubai in 1975 by a group of local merchants with a small stake for both 
governments in Oubai and Kuwait. The institution was modelled on the 
successful experience of Mit-Ghamer Bank and some modification was 
introduced in its operation to fit its goal of commercial operation. 
The immediate success of the new experience was copied in Kuwait in 
1977 by setting up the Kuwait Finance House as a joint venture between 
the Kuwait public with 51 per cent, the remaining 49 per cent being 
owned by the government of Kuwait. At the same time Faisal Islamic 
Bank was established in Cairo as a joint venture between the Egyptian 
government (51 per cent) with the rest being held by Saudis 
individuals. A year later the private sector in Jordan set up their 
own Islamic bank, then the Islamic institutions have spread further 
with the emergence of the two largest group of investors namely Dar Al 
Maal Al Islamia (OMI) and Al Ba~~aka. As both groups have enormous, 
funds at their disposal in very short period they have established in 
collaboration with many governments new Islamic banks, investment 
banks, and other type of Islamic financial institutions. 
In response to the demand of people for institutions where they can 
deposit and borrow money without transgressing fundamental Islamic 
tenets, in 1980 Misr Bank the oldest Arab bank in the region opened its 
first Islamic branch but the rest of the bank continued normal 
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interest-based business. Likewise. Al Rajhi company for currency 
exchange and commerce the largest of its kind in Saudi Arabia started 
operating in 1983 as an Islamic Bank.(2l) The order on money chargers 
to cease taking deposits by the end of 1984, led this company to secure 
a license to change its status to that of an Islamic Bank. (22) Today 
the region has over 12 such banks with wider participation among people 
and government in the region as can be seen from the figures for the 
major shareholders of such institutions in Appendix 5.1. 
The growth of the Islamic financial institution was not limited to the 
region, in fact, the Islamic financial institutions which have been 
established so far outside the region perhaps outnumbered the ones in 
the region and their number is increasing. The Islamic financial 
institutions outside the region are mainly in other Moslem countries 
and in the major international financial centres such as London and 
Switzerland. Some of them have taken to some of the offshore 
territories as a place for registration perhaps for tax reasons. Today 
the Islamic financial institutions outside the region are over 13 in 
number as seen in Appendix 5.2. The Islamic institutions have shown 
considerable interest in overseas countries. The aim seems to be for 
such institutions to find investment opportunities. Evidence of that 
is the great number of financial institutions of this type abroad and 
the large capital base of some of them. 
The largest Islamic financial institution both at home and abroad is 
the Islamic House of Funds known as (DMI) registered in the Bahamas for 
tax reasons. Its operating headquarters are in Geneva. 
The House adopted a modern. sophisticated and agressive approach in 
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building its liabilities and deploying its assets. To aChieve that 
it has been the main force behind the spread of Islamic financial 
institutions. It is collaborated with many countries in West Africa, 
Turkey, Sudan and jointly established new Islamic banks in these 
countries and to help such banks in deploying their resources it 
established other investment companies. (23) The other important 
development introduced by DMI is the establishment of the Takafol 
Group, two such companies were recently incorporated in Sudan and the 
Bahamas. The aim is to eventually establish 12 Takafol companies. (24) 
The important thing about the Takafol companies is the fact that they 
are the Islamic alternative to insurance. These companies offer the 
public solidarity trusts whose funds are managed as in investment 
companies. These trusts assume indemnity payment to policy holders if 
an agreed risk occurs to the bearer of such policy certificate. The 
Takafol company in the Bahamas has undertaken to underwrite any default 
by the Takafol company by providing an interest free loan to such 
company to meet its Takafol requirements. 
In 1982, a new leading Islamic house emerged in Jeddah with a paid-up 
capital of $240 million. The new house is known as Al Baraka. In 
a very short period it began operating through its jOint ventures in 
Bahrain, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, U.K. and with many associated 
companies in Jordan. The rapid expansion of the Islamic institutions 
was in response to the demand of a large number of people in the 
communities for institutions where they can deposit and borrow money 
without transgressing fundamental Islamic tenets. (25) 
The increase in number of Islamic banks called for the establishment of 
training facilities for newly recruited staff. Consequently in 1981, 
- 194 -
the international institute of Islamic Banking and Economics was 
founded; its main objective is the selection and training staff for 
the rapidly growing Islamic Bank. (26) In 1981 the Islamic Banks were 
subjected to the commercial banks' regulation in all the Islamic 
countries which have such institutions. (27) 
In addition to the above development in the Islamic financial 
institutions a few countries envisaged a plan for a comprehensive 
switch to the Islamic system rather than making merely symbolic 
gestures as is the case in many Hoslem countries. The planners in 
Pakistan after nationalizing and reducing the number of conventional 
banks gave the depositors the choice of depositing their savings at 
fixed interest rates or on the profit-and-loss-sharing concept. They 
hoped to achieve their ambitious goal of switching to the new system in 
a few years. (28) Iran too nationalised and reorganised its banks and 
perhaps the banks are now oprating under the new system. (29) Finally 
Sudan has prepared for such a change. Tody it has five major private 
Islamic banks currently operating in the country. These banks have 
been very successful in the past and amassed rich experience in the 
field of credit management and project evaluation and the switch over 
to Islamic banking is expected to be smooth. (30) 
5.3 How does an Islamic Financial Institution build its liabilities 
and deploys its assets? 
The deve10pment of the Islamic banks and other Islamic financial 
institutions is a relatively recent phenomenon. Thus their structure 
and strategies are still immature as economic institutions and should 
therefore be viewed as a process rather than a finished product. But 
the main concept controlling their operation will continue. 
The experience of the Islamic finance houses has shown in the past 
few years that there is no shortage of mechanisms available for such 
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institution to build up their liabilities and to deploy their assets in 
a profitable way without paying or taking fixed interest rates for 
money transactions. In Islamic financial institutions operations, 
interest is replaced by profit sharing. Funds are received from savers 
and advanced to borrowers on the basis of a profit and loss sharing 
arrangement. In this way such institutions perform the real 
intermediary role between savers and investors. They pool the savers 
funds and advance them to clients. Then they pass the profit or loss 
gained or incurred by the investors to the savers on the predetermined 
ratio agreed upon before. To do so that Islamic financial institution 
have developed several financial instruments to mobilize savings and 
others to deploy funds. With regard to financial instruments used in 
mobilizing savings, the Islamic financial instruments are similar to 
their counterparts used by the conventional banks. The difference is 
only that the depositors with Islamic financial institutions share in 
the profit and loss of the bank or of a specific project into which 
their savings are channelled. 
5.3.1 The financial instruments for mobilizing funds 
An Islamic bank is usually established as a public shareholding 
company. It starts up by using capital provided by its equity share 
holders then the bank may secure more funds by offering depositors 
several types of deposit accounts, chiefly current and savings 
accounts. 
a. Current Accounts 
A customer may open a current account with an Islamic bank; such an 
account is not subject to any condition in terms of drawing or 
depositing and does not receive any remuneration. The bank guarantees 
payment of these funds on demand and checking facilities are offered. 
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b. The Joint Investment Accounts (saving accounts) 
The current account seems to be deposited with an Islamic bank for 
transaction and contingency purposes. But the saving accounts are 
opened with Islamic banks to earn income and they do participate in 
the profits realised from investment activities in accordance with the 
allotted ratio of each individual account under which they are placed. 
This ratio varies according to the period that money in the account is 
tied up. For instance, Jordan's Islamic Bank used to announce at the 
beginning of each year the basis of investment deposits' share in the 
overall profit and loss of the bank. This basis was almost the same 
from one year to another. Such ratios have been for the depositors 
with Jordan Islamic Bank for the period 1979-1981 as follows:-
(i) Savings accounts participate with 50 per cent of the deposit. 
(ii) Notice accounts participate with 70 per cent of the deposit. 
(iii) Fixed accounts participate with 90 per cent of the deposit. (31) 
Here the principal difference from commercial banking practice emerges. 
Customers have been encouraged to deposit their funds in investment 
accounts on the basis of predetermined profit and loss sharing. The 
profit and loss ratio is usually higher for the long-term deposit 
accounts because they are more stable and the bank may use the funds 
for long-term investments. But it is natural for the savings account 
for depositors to receive a smaller percentage because the money 
deposited in this account is partly to earn income and partly to 
provide protection against unexpected expenditure. And such an account 
fulfils the functions of an investment account as well as those of a 
current account. (32) 
In addition to the current and joint investment accounts Islamic banks 
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have offered specified investment accounts. Here, depositors deposit 
theirfunds with a bank to be invested in a specified field or project, 
on the basis of receiving their profit and bearing their loss, where 
the bank obtains a certain per cent of net profit realised from the 
investment as compensation for its work and efforts. (33) 
Similarly the Islamic banks have developed several instruments used in 
deploying their funds. These instruments are mainly based on early 
intruments formerly in use in the Islamic countries such as Modaraba, a 
partnership form of contract; and Takafal mutual guarantees against 
hazards. But with the increasing sophistication of present economic 
activities other instruments are being introduced. Today the Islamic 
institutions use the following instruments: 
1. Morabha (trading finance) This technique has been used as an 
alternative to an interest-based letter of credit in financing 
trade by Islamic banks. Banks act as merchants by acquiring 
domestic or foreign goods at the request of their clients who will 
pay the bank for these goods in a lump sum or in installments, 
which includes a mark-up fee. 
2. The second instrument Modoraba (trust financing) is one of the 
most important Islamic methods of financing an economic project. 
An Islamic financial institution may provide risk capital for 
the project in the form of equity and loans with equity features. 
Modaraba is a contract under which capital is advanced by an 
institution with the business and management efforts being the 
responsibility of a client. Profits are split according to a 
negotiated agreement and not as a percentage of capital. But loss 
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is borne by the institution alone, unless it can be proved that 
it was caused by negligence on the part of the client. This 
instrument has been used by Islamic financial institutions 
in advancing most types of long-term finance. 
3. The third instrument is Musharaka, a system whereby a bank enters 
into partnership for a limited period of time with the client for 
a particular project. Both the bank and the client contribute to 
the capital, with the client maintaining the right to buy back 
gradually the bank's shares. Profits emanating from such a 
project are normally shared by the bank and the client according 
to predetermined ratios agreed by negotiation and not by the 
prevailing rate of borrowing capital. This technique is used in 
financing house building as in the case of the Housing Bank in 
Bahrain. The bank extends the loans fully or partially to the 
borrowers to build their own houses. The rents of the houses are 
received by the bank against the funds advanced for their 
construction. When the advanced funds are completely amortized 
the bank has no other right in regard to those houses. (34) 
To these major instruments others have been added, such as the rental 
or lease agreement. This instrument has been used by the Islamic 
Development Bank and other Islamic institutions; they buy equipment 
which is then leased or given on a hire purchase basis according to the 
chairman of D.M.I. The system differs from normal rental because 
profits earned on repayment to such institutions are deducted from the 
total sum owed. Thus the borrowers end up paying much less than the 
principal if the institution makes significant profits on its overall 
investment operation. (35) 
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In the insurance field, the Takafol companies have developed a 
solidarity certificate. These companies assume indemnity payments to 
their participating member if an agreed risk occurs to any of them. The 
funds of the company are managed as investment companies. Investment 
premiums paid into such companies and their accruing profits are re-
invested in favour of the participants and remain their property until 
they withdraw from it. These certificates have been used for all types 
of insurance. The Takafol is achieved by the creation of a Takafol 
fund. Each policy holder agrees to donate a small poportion of the 
premiums to the fund. Takafol benefits are paid from these funds which 
receive further support from the re-Takafol company where the Takafol 
fund premiums from different Takafol companies are pooled.(36) 
5.4 The importance of these instruments: Jordan Islamic Bank's 
experiment 
Examining the structural changes in the financial position of the 
Islamic banks would shed light on the importance of such instruments. 
Information to permit us to do so is not available. We shall examine 
here the available data on the Jordan Islamic Bank for finance and 
investment for the period 1979-82. 
From the data available for this bank see Table 5.1 we can see that on 
the asset side, cash and investment is the major area in which the 
bank's financial assets were deployed. The cash in hand and at other 
banks constituted approximately 80 per cent of the Bank's total assets 
in 1979, the first year of operation, but drastically dropped in 1982 
to about 26 per cent. In contrast the bank's investment through the 
new financial instrument Morabha, Modaraba and participation started 
modestly at about 10 per cent of the Bank's assets in 1979. It had 
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TABLE 5.1 
Jordan Islamic Bank for Finance & Investment Balance Sheet as at 
end of each period in percentages 
I I 
1979 I 1980 I 1981 1982 
I I 
I I 
Cash in hand and at Banks 79.21 42.6 44.8 25.8 
Financial Investment 10.11 43.6 39.1 53.1 
(Mudaraba, Marababa & Participation) I 
Other Investments I 3.9 8.3 
Securities Portfolio I 0.4 
Bills Discounted 0.51 0.2 0.4 0.2 
Fixed Assets 5.4 3.9 3.1 3.0 
Specified Investment Project 5.4 4.0 2.5 
Other Assets 4.8 4.3 4.7 6.7 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Current Accounts & Other Deposits 34.8 31.3 36.3 39.4 
Joint Investment Accounts 19.4 43.9 40.7 36.0 (savings, notice & fixed term accounts) 
Bank Deposits 0.2 3.6 
Specified Investment Accounts 13.8 5.5 3.8 2.2 
Cash Margins 4.4 2.9 4.5 4.9 
Provisions of Investment Risks 1.0 0.5 0.9 
Statutory Reserves 
Voluntary Reserves 0.2 
Profits Brought Forward 7.7 Paid up Capital 26.1 12.9 11.0 
Other Liabilities 1.5 2.5 3.0 5.1 
SOURCE: Jordan Islamic Bank Annual Report Various Issues. 
substantially increased to about 53 per cent in 1982. This is an 
indication of significant progress toward the Bank's objective. 
Likewise. specific project investment increased in absolute terms but 
dropped in ratio terms in relation to the Bank's total assets. In 1983 
the investment through Modaraba and Morabha increased 42 per cent on 
the 1982 figure; likewise specific project investment increased three 
fold. (37) These facts point to the savers' acceptance of some 
instruments more than others. 
On the liability side the current account has been one of the main 
sources of funds for the bank: it accounted for approximately one third 
of the bank's liabilities during the period under consideration. The 
second important source of funds for the bank is the joint investment 
accounts (saving notice and fixed term account). Although it accounted 
for about one-fifth of the bank's total liabilities in 1979, it 
significantly increased to almost 44 per cent of the total bank 
liabilities a year after then again dropped by 3 per cent in the third 
year and stood at 36 per cent in the last year. In contrast the share 
of the specified investment accounts and the equity started high in the 
first year of operation, but they steadily declined and stood 
respectively at about 2 per cent and 8 per cent of the bank's total 
liabilities in the last year. 
The structural changes in the bank's liabilities as discussed above 
seem to indicate the similarity between the Islamic banks and convent-
ional banks in terms of the importance of saving, for both types of 
bank. Also the high share of the current account among the bank's 
liabilities which earn no income point, to the fact that depositors are 
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ready to forge some income if there is any conflict with their cultural 
beliefs. This is evidenced by the maintenance of such accounts with the 
Jordan Islamic bank while customers have the alternative of going to 
the conventional banks and earning 2 per cent interest on such 
accounts.(38) Likewise we can conclude that the increased share of 
jOint investment accounts in the bank's liabilities indicates the 
confidence and good response of the public to the new system. In 
contrast the drop in the share of specified investment accounts in the 
bank's liabilities points to the weak response of the public to such an 
instrument. But this is to be expected, since if the savers have in 
mind some project to invest in why should they ask the bank to do this 
for them when they have the choice of investing directly and earning 
the whole income instead paying some proportion of it for the bank. 
The sectoral distribution of the bank's credit facilities is only 
available for a very short period as seen in Table 5.2. In fact the 
trade sector was the major recipient of the Banks' funds, although its 
share in the bank's facilities dropped from approximately 65 per cent 
in 1979 to about 43 per cent in early 1981 but it continued to be 
higher than for the other sectors. The amount of the drop in the share 
of the trade sector went to the construction sector whose share leapt 
up from just 1.3 per cent of the bank's credit to over 22 per cent in 
1981. The increase in construction's share of credit is natural, 
because Islamic banks are usually allowed to invest in their own 
business or to part their funds as a complementary part into someone 
elses business efforts. It seems that housing projects attract their 
funds as is evident from the projects carried out by the Islamic Bank 
of Kuwait and its counter part in Jordan. Each of them developed a 
site of its own containing flats, schools, commercial buildings and 
other facilities. 
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TABLE 5.2 
Jordan Islamic Bank's Credit Facilities to various economic 
sectors for the period December 1979 to January 1981. 
Economic 
Sectors 
Agriculture 
I n d us try & r>1 i n i n g 
Construction 
Transportation 
Trade 
Tourist 
Others 
1979 1980 1980 1981 1981 
Dec June Dec June Dec 
1.0 
5.7 5.2 10.6 9.1 6.5 
1.3 3.3 11.4 12.6 22.4 
25.9 4.4 10.9 8.9 16.6 
64.9 82.8 63.5 58.3 43.3 
1.4 2.3 1.7 7.7 
2.2 1.9 1.3 9.4 2.5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
SOURCE: A Study on liThe Role of Islamic Banks in 
Development". Jordan Central Bank (1982), p.24. 
The bias towards the trade and construction finance leaves a small fund 
to be channelled to the agricultural and industrial sectors. Thus the 
credit facilities extended to the productive sectors rose at a slower 
rate than those extended to finance constructuion activities. The 
relative importance of credit facilities extended to the agricultural 
sector rose to one per cent at the end of the period and those extended 
to industry and mining fluctuated sharply from 1.3 per cent to 11.4 per 
cent then back to 6.S per cent during the same period. 
Against this background of the distribution of credit facilities by 
Jordan's Islamic bank it seems that the perception of risk among 
commercial and Islamic banks is the same.Both types of bank have 
favoured trade activities when extending their credit, because it is 
the most profitable way of deploying their funds. And this points to 
the fact that Islamic banks are profit oriented institutions and 
neither the banks nor their depositors are motivated by purely 
philanthropic considerations. They reject the interest-based employ-
ment of funds but replace it by a mark-up price technique. If this 
trend in the lending policy of the Jordan Islamic Bank continues this 
will mean that the Bank's role in the development process will not 
differ from the role of commercial banks but in objective terms it must 
be admitted that data for a short period and for only one bank in no 
way gives conclusive results. 
In addition, one has to be realistic enough to see the limitation of 
bank operations in the early years. If the bank has to employ its 
funds in such a way that an overall profit will result and which can 
be distributed to the capital owners and depositors every year, the 
bank cannot invest all long-term deposits into investments which earn 
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profits immediately. In addition to these objective reasons, some 
banks are simply too conservative in their loan application procedures 
and the lack of well-trained staff to evaluate loan applications in the 
light of the enterpreneurs personal capacities rather than actual 
guarantees, and taking into account the firm's potential after 
expansion rather than its present situation would lead to such result. 
It seems from the above discussion that the Islamic institutions found 
the way to mobilize funds and to channel long-term finance for 
investment. But on short-term borrowing the Islamic banks are less 
clear. How can they satisfy the demand for consumer credit. The 
extention of interest-free loans in cases of hardship is not sufficient 
and in no way can solve the problems in this area of rapidly growing 
demand. Likewise, the hire-purchase agreement developed by Islamic 
banks can partially solve the problem because not all goods can be 
purchased by the Islamic banks to be sold to their clients for payment 
in instalments. 
The suggestion by some that such loans be granted either through a 
government agency or through people's co-operative societies points to 
the deficiency in the newly developed financial instruments. The 
micro-economic conception of Islamic financial institutions on the 
basis of profit-sharing was originally developed under the explicit 
assumption of the general prohibition of interest and that the system 
would function and be successful in modern industrializing economics of 
Moslem countries. (39) 
To some, the apparent impossibility of squaring these difficulties 
simply under lines the need for further innovation. The co-operation 
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of Central Banks is essential to promote the development of such 
institutions as is interest-free dealing. 
5.5 The developmental impact of the Islamic financial institutions 
The introduction of the Islamic financial institutions was not merely a 
response to the desire of those looking for Islamic legitimate 
dealings, but also a fulfilment of a consistent need for such a 
specialised institution functioning profitably and in a way that makes 
usurious transactions unnecessary. According to its proponents it 
ensures a better allocation of resources and a more equitable distri-
bution of income and wealth.(40) The advantages, as we see them, are 
as follows: 
1. The deposits in the Islamic financial institutions originate from 
two different groups of customers: those who had accounts in 
conventional banks (41) and transferred them to the new Islamic 
institutions; and those who had refrained from dealing with 
traditional banks even to the extent of depositing funds without 
claiming any interest. It is difficult to know exactly how much 
money is kept outside banks because of religious convictions. It 
has been estimated, however, that such funds are worth several 
thousand million dollars in Saudi Arabia alone. Others kept 
substantial sums in non-interest bearing accounts in commercial 
banks in Arab countries. About a quarter of deposits in these 
banks are thought to be of this nature. (42) 
The importance to the Islamic bank in mobilizing savings is 
related to the number of new depositors with no previous contact 
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with the financial institutions. The larger the number, the more 
important are Islamic banks from the perspective of economic 
development. 
2. In analogy to the savers who had no bank accounts with the 
conventional banks there had been some entrepreneurs who refrained 
from borrowing from such banks. The introduction of the Islamic 
financial institutions made it possible for them to finance their 
projects which they would not have been able to do had there been 
no legitimate Islamic way. Thus the Islamic financial 
institutions have contributed substantially in increasing savings 
on one side and demand for investments on the other.(43) And the 
contribution of the financial institutions to economic development 
is usually related to their role in the saving investment process. 
Indeed this is the developmental function of every financial 
institution and by the volume of funds mobilization and allocated 
by the financial institution its impact on the growth and 
prosperity of the economy is judged. 
3. Developing new financial instruments based on the religious code 
accepted by the people added to the traditional ones and enlarged 
the number of financial instruments available to savers and 
borrowers alike. The developed financial market aids the market 
with a wide range of financial instruments. 
From the developmental point of view the introduction of financial 
instruments accepted by people with savings may stop the flow 
of capital outside the region and eventually alleviate the 
liquidity problem which has been the chief feature of the 
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financial system in the Peninsula countries. The problem was 
picked out by Wilson as the greatest threat to sound banking 
practice in such countries and called for the introduction of new 
domestic savings instruments in harmony with Sharia Law. (44) 
4. The joint venture principle of the Islamic institutuions is more 
ethical according to A1-Sabah, vice chairman of D.M.I., 
II no proj ect wou1 d fa 11 due to the heavy debt servi ce it 
has to cope with". (45) 
This approach prevents the waste of productive human energy. 
The participation of the Islamic financial institution in profit 
and loss would release the borrowers from the burden when things 
go wrong. (46) There are always certain economic and social 
events, beyond the control of individuals, which may lend to a 
fall in profits. In the interest rate system this increasing 
loses of the sponsor who have to pay interest on its borrowed 
money. In the joint venture arrangements both possibilities are 
minimized. 
5. As the Islamic financial institutions face restrictions on all 
interest-based employment of funds, they cannot rely as the 
commercial banks and other conventional institutuions do on the 
differential between the deposit and lending rate. They have to 
accelerate the development process in the communities by using 
full force of their potential and capabilities in the investment 
resources. (47) And as they are partners with the borrowers they 
have to examine carefully all the available projects and channel 
their funds into the most productive ones, which means better 
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allocation of scarce capital. In addition with a repressed 
interest rate structure in the region, unification of financial 
markets is difficult and eventually efficiency in the allocation 
of resourrces is remote. The Islamic financial institutions with 
their operation on the profit-and loss-sharing concept avoid the 
issue completely. Thus it stands a better chance of unifying Arab 
markets and allocating resources more efficiently than the 
commercial banks with their sticky financial instruments. 
Nevertheless, the Islamic institutions must find profitable 
outlets for their fast-growing deposits. The ceiling imposed on 
depositors to discourage them from depositing with such banks is 
not the answer. (48) The Islamic banks have to take all deposits 
coming to them and should not discourage new depositors. The 
finance of trade is the area where strong competition with commer-
cial banks reduces their profit. Therefore, Islamic banks are 
expected to give more attention to areas which have been neglected 
by the conventional banks but could bring reasonable profits. 
Such an area could be financing of new or expanding manufacturing 
or agro-industries on the basis of profit and loss sharing 
arrangements. Balancing the chances and risks of medium and long-
term investment, most coventional banks prefer to employ their 
funds in self-liquidating loans usually secured by collateral. 
Many Arab banks have found in Euromoney and international markets 
an attractive outlet for placing large sums of their money. All 
such areas which are most attractive for conventional banks are 
closed for Islamic banks. Under these constraints, the strategies 
of the Islamic banks are expected to be directed towards 
participation in the establishment of new firms. People with 
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entrepreneurial talent find it difficult to get capital from a 
conventional bank for the establishment of new ventures since they 
cannot offer the commercial banks the required collateral; and 
without a well developed capital market, there is usually no other 
way of obtaining the necessary. 
The Islamic banks' investment on the basis of profit and loss 
sharing arrangements cannot rely on collateral. The banks must 
base their decisions about the participation on the entrepreneur's 
qualities. Thus they have to train and acquire highly qualified 
personnel who are able to understand and asses enterpreneuria1 
decisions and plans. So Islamic banks should have on their staff 
lawyers, engineers, economists and others if they want to 
contribute effectively to the development of the region. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The introduction of the Islamic financial institution in the Arab 
region has filled the gap left by the conventional financial 
institutions in serving the community as a whole. In addition the 
operation of these institutions on the profit, and loss-sharing 
principle, which is not subject to any control, may keep part of the 
capital in the region which otherwise would find its way abroad in the 
absence of such an instrument. 
However, it seems that the number of Islamic financial institutions 
which has been established so far is not sufficient to cover the 
increasing demand on their services. The imposed ceiling on the amount 
of funds a depositor can save in some Islamic banks is evidence of 
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that. The other shortcoming of the Islamic financial institutions is 
the fact that they took to the urban areas as a place of operation. 
Thus for the Islamic financial institutions to be effective in the 
saving/investment process, they should expand in number and 
geographical coverage to the rural areas. This will help to pay for 
the savings of such forgotten areas and allow the bank to identify the 
investment opportunities in the countryside. The experience of the 
past few years show that the Islamic financial institutions have 
emerged in response to the strong demand on their services which in one 
respect makes them the beneficiary of growth rather than the cause of 
it. But their operation on the profit-and loss-sharing principle makes 
them active partners in the process of development, and gives them the 
feature of the development banks or the supply led institutions. 
The prospects of the Islamic financial institutions are promising, but 
they need further innovation and imagination in order to introduce 
further instruments. On the short-term borrowing policy of the Islamic 
banks is less clear and on maintaining liquidity Islamic banks have to 
strike a balance between income and solvency. Leaving aside the 
difficulties the Islamic financial institutions may encounter in the 
management of their affairs. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SECURITIES MARKETS 
Introduction 
The securities markets are the markets for the exchange of financial 
claims for capital. They are an indispensable part of the mechanism 
of a capitalist economy since they facilitate borrowing by governments 
and industry and the movements in the price of financial securities 
on them reflect a country's economic prospects. Their significance for 
economic development lies in their potential role as a catalyst by 
which long-term saving may be channelled into productive real 
investment.(I) 
Given this important function expected of such markets, some Arab 
countries have established their own organized stock exchanges and 
others are in the process of establishing them. However, the growth 
of such markets is a slow process and the outcome of the overall rate 
of development. It is not expected that Arab stock markets will be 
found to be of much significance in the flow of funds for development. 
However, the policy of developing the Arab financial intermediaries 
must be supplemented by the development of securities markets. An 
efficient well developed national or regional stock exchange might 
prove essential for the transfer of resources to the sectors in the 
region where the desired expertise and entrepreneurship are abundant. 
This chapter attempts to examine the nature and importance of these 
markets in general, the evolution and development of these markets in 
the region, and their role in development. This will allow us to 
explore the conditions of these markets and identify the factors 
impeding their development and also enables us to propose some measures 
which could strengthen the existing markets, and other measures to 
create a regional market. 
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6.1 The nature and significance of the stock market 
Securities markets usually begin as an informal agreement between 
borrowers and lender of funds. Governments and private enterprises 
usually sell their stocks and shares to the public on such markets. 
The markets where funds are raised for the first time are known as the 
primary markets. The holders of these securites may sell them for 
funds if they wish on the secondary market. The stock market provides 
facilities for dealing in these securities and in particular out-
standing securities. When the securities grow large along with their 
buyers and sellers, some of these markets become organized through the 
efforts of their participants or public authorities. The best known 
organized market of securities is the stock exchange. 
The stock market is the prime institution in the capital markets of 
Britain and the U.S.A. Historically, the stock markets in these 
countries evolved at an early stage of their financial development 
to provide long-term finance for housing or plants and equipment. 
This allowed the banking system in both countries to became too 
specialized. In Germany and Japan, where the climate was not 
favourable for the stock markets, the universal bank was introduced and 
the stock markets remained small and dependant on banks for their 
growth.(2) In the developing countries, the stock market made its 
appearance when the governments, public authorities or private 
enterprises began borrowing 10cally.(3) 
The significance of the securities market for a country's economic 
development emanates from the two functions of the market: Firstly, 
the market acts as a link between borrowers and savers in the economy. 
Secondly the market via the stock exchange provides the holders of 
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such securites with a mechanism to reshuffle them and restore their 
liquidity. This enables savers to place their funds in long-term 
securities with firms and governments, and so keep up the flow of funds 
demanded by the latter since the savers know that they will be able to 
withdraw their money at the time of their choosing by selling their 
securities for a reasonable price on the stock exchange. 
In an efficient market, long-term investments in real corporate assets 
do not have to be financed by equally long-term commitment of funds by 
anyone investor. The funding is long-term for investors as a group, 
but it can be short-term for any individual investor who can sell 
his securities to another investor. 
Within this context the Wilson Committee Report outlined four ways 
in which the capital market may contribute to the economy: 
1. By balancing saving and investment at a high level. 
2. Facilitating saving and investment by providing a wide range 
of securities which borrowers may wish to issue and savers may 
wish to hold. 
3. By valuing securities so as to reflect consistently the returns 
expected from them. 
4. Facilitating pressures on management to use the resources under 
their control efficiency.(4) 
In the developing countries with different institutional arrangements, 
many economists have been very sceptical regarding the importance of 
stock exchanges or economic development.(5) This scepticism emanates 
from several factors. First, the necessary condition for the effecti-
veness of these markets does not exist to the same content as in the 
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the developed countries. Few, if any, of the present developing 
countries can claim to possess a high monetised economy, a large number 
of savers and borrowers or more importantly an established habit of 
investment in financial assets. Without these conditions a stock 
market would remain weak and ineffective.(6) Secondly even if all 
these conditions did exist, creating an efficient market according to 
any reasonable definition (7) would not necessarily take care of the 
need to channel resources into socially desirable projects not subject 
to the price mechanism.(8) 
Other economists have called for the development of the capital market 
(including the stock exchanges) as one of the major instruments in 
mobilizing savings and channelling them for investment. (9) This issue 
has been discussed before but I feel it is necessary to add some 
arguments relating to the stock exchange itself. Newlyn justified the 
establishment of stock markets as being complementary to financial 
intermediaries in countries where the formal banking system is 
patterned on the conventions of the 'British' type of banking 
system.(10) Williams called for its establishment to speed up the flow 
of long-term saving from comparatively capital-rich countries to the 
capital-hungry developing countries, and to ease rich countries 
problems involing balance of payment.(11) Drake acknowledged the fact 
that although the securities market is not a key to rapid economic 
growth it does enlarge the financial sector and so increases the 
opportunities for specialization, the division of labour and a 
reduction of costs in financial activities.(12) 
6.2 Evolution and development of the Arab stock exchanges 
The Stock Exchanges in the Arab region are of recent origin and the 
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vast majority of the Arab countries have yet to establish such 
institutions. This is due, among other things, to the fact that 
institutional conditions for the operations of such markets do not 
yet exist in many Arab countries. Such institutions were first 
introduced in the early years of this century in Lebanon, Tunisia, 
and Morocco by the French colonial authorities, and in Egypt under 
the influence of the foreign community. 
However, their introduction at that time, in the absence of any 
indigenous financial securities and low per capita income, meant that 
these institutions were only markets for gold and some foreign 
securities, and when foreign interest was liquidated their activities 
almost ceased. 
It was only in their post independence period that the Arab countries 
began to truly develop their financial systems. This proceeded slowly 
during the 1950's and 1960's, but the 1970's saw an increase in 
development. In the early 1970's, after the oil prices rise, the 
region witnessed an unprecedented flow of liquid wealth, which was 
reflected in considerable structureal changes. During the course of 
development in the last three decades, the Arab governments have 
played a major role in economic activities and have invested heavily in 
various economic sectors. Consequently, some important economic 
measures have been undertaken and controlled by government agencies or 
corporations. However, business and industry have primarily remained 
in the hands of the private sector. 
To encourage the private sector to playa more active role in the 
development efforts and so improve productivity, absorption of modern 
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technology, and fuller utilization of their capacity, the Arab 
governments initiated and organized the appropriate facilities. So 
many specialized credit agencies were created as examined in chapter 
four. In addition investment allowances were introduced for local and 
foreign investors. These include, tax incentives, risk insurance, 
joint ventures, project preparing institutions, local training 
facilities, but incentives are usually accompanied by limitations.(13) 
Other Arab countries governments have followed this line of private 
sectors promotion and have thus established their own organizational 
stock markets in order to facilitate to the private sectors more long 
term finance. Kuwait and Jordan officially organized their stock 
markets for the first time in the late 1970's. In the Peninsula 
countries with enormous liquid wealth the laws for such markets was 
passed but not implemented yet. Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt reviewed 
their previous stock institutions and officially reorganized them. So 
today, the organizational pattern governing the Arab securities markets 
ranges from an almost total absence of rules to a pattern which is 
based on extensive regulation. 
6.2.1 Structure and practice of the Arab stock exchange 
The organized stock exchanges in the Arab region (in Jordan, Kuwait, 
Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco) are public autonomous institutions, having 
an exclusive right to operate an exchange for public trading in, and 
quotations of, equities, bonds and similar securities.(14) However, 
beside these organized markets there are also unofficial markets for 
securities in these countries. The organized markets are supervised 
and run by their respective committees. 
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A Stock Exchange Committee is usually appointed by the Minister for 
Industry and Finance for a period of three years. But the committees 
differ in their number and in their representation of economic 
activities. For example, the Amman Financial Market Committee is made 
up of six members of which three represent the public sector and two 
the private sector in addition to the director of the market.(15) 
Whereas, Kuwait's Stock Exchange Committee is broader than AFM's 
committee and more representative of the private sector. It is made up 
of eleven members and chaired by the Minister of Commerce and Industry. 
The other members, apart from the market director, comprise three 
representatives of the public sector and six of the private 
sector. (16) 
The securities and exchange committee's main function is to protect 
individual investors by ensuring that prices are fair, open and 
competitive and that market advice is impersonal and informal. To 
achieve these objectives, the Committees have by law, been given the 
power to issue further regulations, specifying the information needed 
in the published prospectus, setting the rate of commission collected 
by dealers, enforcing discipline, hearing disputes or complaints 
between members, authorising the quotation of equity shares, bonds 
similar securities, cancelling the quotation of stocks and if necessary 
suspending all operations for a short or long period.(17) However, any 
decision of the latter nature made by these committees must be ratified 
by the Minister for Industry or the Council of Ministers as set out in 
their acts.(18) 
The securities traded on these markets are on the whole specified by 
their laws. These securities fall into two main groups, the fixed-
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interest paper such as debentures and government bonds, and dividend 
certificate-shares. The law governing Amman's Financial Market defined 
the financial papers that may be traded on the Market as the negotiable 
shares, bills and bonds issued in Jordan by the government, government 
institutions, municipalities or public and private Jordanian share-
holding companies, or any other negotiable financial papers.(19) The 
Kuwait Stock Exchange law defined the financial paper that may be 
traded in the same manner of AFM's law but adds foreign securities if 
accepted by the Market.(20) 
However, the provisions of regulations on listing financial instruments 
on these markets differ from one country to another. For instance 
Amman Financial Market's law make listing compulsory for all bonds 
issued by government or governmental institutions, public share-holding 
limited and private companies. Also every Jordanian public share-
holding limited company with a paid capital of JD 100 000 or more is 
obliged for listing its stock on AFM.(21) This is in contrast to 
Lebanon where governments securities are not allowed to be traded on 
the market.(22) In the other Arab stock exchanges the listing of 
financial instruments is optional but the requirement for admission by 
the markets differ from one country to another. For instance in Kuwait 
and in Jordan, companies seeking admission to the markets must show 
profitable activities in the previous two years to their application to 
be accepted into the markets. In Morocco such companies may be 
accepted without fulfilling many of these requirements.(23) 
The brokers in the Arab stock exchanges differ also from one country 
to another. In Saudi Arabia and Morocco, commercial banks are the 
only brokers on both markets. This is an analogy to the German 
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practice. In Jordan, Kuwait and Egypt brokers are limited to those 
holding a stock broker's licence. That means anyone person or legal 
body filling all the conditions prescribed by these markets can apply 
for a license and act as broker. This is in line with London Stock 
Exchange System. 
The laws of these markets stipulate that all dealings have to be made 
through the brokers. The latter buy and sell securities on these 
markets for clients on commission basis at a rate fixed and supervised 
by the Markets ' Committees. (24) 
The Kuwait Stock Exchanges ' new regulations prudently stated that 
brokers are strictly forbidden to deal from their own account and must 
execute such trade through another licensed broker.(25) While in AFM 
recently abandoned this practice. Here brokers are classified 
according to their functions, into five categories: 
1. Broker's acting as agents for buying and selling to the public. 
2. Broker's acting for their own account. 
3. Broker's acting as underwriters for shareholding companies which 
offer their shares for public subscription and underwrite the 
new issues of bonds. 
4. Broker's acting as sellers of new issues. 
5. Broker's acting as advisors.(26) 
For a broker to take underwriting business or to operate for his own 
account AFM's regulation requires it to be a public share-holding 
company with a specified amount of capital.(27) The discrimination 
between brokers on the basis of capital is not justifiable and it is 
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considered to represent a bias towards certain interests. This is clear 
in the regulations as these leave it at the discretion of the Committee 
to allow a broker to operate on his own account. If those brokers 
allowed to underwrite public issue were also allowed to deal for their 
accounts they might manipulate the sale of securities in their own 
interest. Furthermore, if those allowed to deal for their own account 
were also allowed to deal as agents, a conflict of interest would soon 
arise, particularly if prices went down. Such a broker may sell his 
shares before taking the interest of his customer. 
The broker on the Arab stock exchanges are changing over time. The 
number of brokers on AFM reached 27, of which two are ordinary 
,companies, while the other 8 are joint - stock companies with a total 
capital of about JD 40 million.(28) The number of brokers in the Kawait 
stock exchange amounted to 16, but since 1983 a new formula has emerged. 
The 16 brokers have emerged into four brokerage houses.(29) For a long 
time the brokers in the Moroccan Stock Exchange have comprised the 
eleven Moroccan national banks and the Moroccan broker company. In 
Egypt the number of brokers has declined from over 300 a few years back 
to just 22 in 1983.(30) Dealing and quotations take place on these 
markets on all week days, except public holidays, during fixed hours. 
Quotations take place on the basis of the bids and offers made. In 
Kuwait quotations were originally based on free dealing between 
members,(31) but recently this was changed to an auction system. 
Dealing, closing prices and turnover are marked on the exchange board 
and published for the ~nterest o' the puolic. Non of them had a 
clearing system. Secllnties bougtlt are l..ollected by the buyer at the 
sellers place of business but there are time limits for settlement. 
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In addition to these organized markets there have been other unofficial 
markets for financial securities. These markets have been operating 
in less stringent fashion than the organized ones. No committees 
supervise their operation and no admission requirements are laid down 
for the securities or brokers. On the regional leel few if any co-
ordination measures were taken between the Arab Stock Exchanges. Apart 
from the establishment of the Federation of the Arab Stock Exchanges. 
(32) The Arab Stock Exchanges remain national markets with their own 
management, regulations and powers relating to their own members. 
Their operations are limited to their national financial securities and 
citizens. No foreign securities are currently quoted or dealt on any 
of them. The adoption of an investment code recently,(33) by the Arab 
states based on multilateral support and recognition of the interest of 
both investor and host country could play an important part in regional 
development by encouraging a greater volume of inter-Arab capital flows 
which may lead for listing Arab securities on all Arab Stock Exchanges. 
To explore the Arab Stock exchanges growth operation we shall proceed 
to examine the two active markets separately, followed by an overall 
development of other markets. 
6.2.2 Amman Financial Market 
The call for the establishment of a stock exchange in Jordan was first 
made in the 7 Year Plan of 1964. It noted: 
"considering the state of recent economic and financial 
development in Jordan, serious efforts must be made to 
encourage and accelerate the growth of the capital market 
in the country. Although the development of such an 
institution is essentially a slow process, its early 
establishment would be instrumental in orienting Jordan's 
financial structure to the long-term growth requirements 
and potentialities of the economy",(34) 
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Considering the state of Jordan's economic structure in those years 
during which agriculture was the predominant sector contributing to 
the GDP of the country, and the industrial sector was mainly composed 
of small hand crafts, the call was not based on solid grounds. In 
short, the institutional conditions required for such a market to be 
effective did not exist. However, in the late 1970's continuous spill 
over of neighbouring countries' wealth to Jordan created considerable 
structural changes; the industrial sector grew, new financial 
institutions were created, more joint stock companies were established 
and, moreover, people became interested in holding financial assets. 
These changes were confirmed by the International Finance Coporation1s 
feasibility study in 1976 concerning the establishment of a stock 
exchange in Jordan.(35) Among other things the study estimated a rough 
figure of JD 200 million in securities outstanding by 1980,(36) an 
amount which was considered adequate to warrant the establishment of a 
Stock Exchange in Jordan. So the provisional law No.31 of 1976 was 
passed to provide the framework for the operations of AFM. 
Jordan has resorted to domestic borrowing unlike the oil rich 
countries. Since 1969 the Government of Jordan has introduced Treasury 
Bills to even out seasonal variations in the normal flow of its 
revenues and to provide local outlets for the retention of funds. Then 
in the early 1970's it began issuing bonds to secure long-term funds to 
finance development. Since then the government securities have grown 
in size. 
The outstanding treasury bills and bonds stood at the end of 1983 at JD 
96.5 million and JD 85 million respective1y.(37) Corporation bonds 
were late arrivals. The first of such instruments was issued in 1979. 
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Since then there have been fourteen such issues amounting to JD 62 
million at the end of 1983.(38) The equity shares appeared in Jordan 
in the late 1940's and since then there have been subsequent issues. By 
1978, the shares of the public shareholding companies with a capital of 
over JD 100,000 reached about 85 million capitalised at JD 246.(39) 
When AFM began operation in 1978 there was some government securities 
and equity shares in the market. The trade in equity shares began on 
the market in 1978, and one year later some government and corporate 
bonds were listed on the market. 
The trade in shares had grown steadily but the bonds market were on the 
whole left outside the market. This is clear in examining the 
securities transacted on AFM during the period 1978-1983 as given in 
Appendix 6.1. In terms of number and value the major proportion of 
transaction has been in equity shares. The number of traded shares was 
about 2-4 million in 1978, and steadily increased to approximately 36.4 
million in 1983. In parallel to this the volume of trading rose from 
JD 5.6 million in 1978, to slightly over JD 119 million at the end of 
the period under consideration. During the same period, transactions 
in government and corporate bonds has been insignificant. The highest 
was in 1981 when about 217 000 bonds to the value of JD 2.3 million was 
traded in the market. This fell to 43 000 bonds with a value of JD 0.6 
million in 1983. This left the bonds market in the hands of the 
financial institutions as it can be seen in Appendix 6.2. 
The relatively active trade in equity shares caused the price to 
increase rapidly. So to curb this AFM applied a ceiling on price 
movements in 1980.(40) The ceiling was kept for two years then 
abolished in 1982. With speculators now left with no control over 
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their activity, the overall traded shares price index went up sharply 
from 199 in 1981 to 263 in 1983.(41) 
In dealing with this problem, the supply of shares was thought to be 
small, and so the Market agreed in 1982 to allow trade in the shares 
of the newly established companies to take place on the Market without 
fulfilling the official market requirements (i.e. to have made profit 
in the previous two years). This action was justified on the grounds 
of allowing fair dealing in the shares of these companies by exposing 
their trade for greater participation. Consequently, the parallel 
market began in 1982 in the shares of twenty four companies for half an 
hour before trading hours on the AFM. The volume of trade in the 
shares had grown but continued to be modest. 
Other measures were taken to increase the supply and demand of 
financial securities in Jordan. These included: 
1. Exemption of the net profits of an approved economic project 
from income tax and social services tax for a period of nine 
years, if the project was a public share holding company. 
Otherwise it would be exempted for six years.(42) 
2. Subjecting public shareholding companies to tax rates lower 
than the tax rates on unincorporated business.(43) 
3. Exemption from income tax, and social services tax, all income 
earned from government and corporation bonds as well as capital 
gain originated from trade in financial securities.(44) 
4. Requiring the listed companies to make more disclosures by 
sending their annual and audited balance sheets and income 
statements to the share holders and a copy for the AFM, and 
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prompt notification of AFM of all matters arising which may 
influence the company's share prices.(45) 
In addition to these measures, other measures were taken to attract 
Arab capital towards investment in Jordanian financial securities or 
to allow Arab projects to raise capital on the AFM. 
These included: 
1. Arab investors being exempted from obtaining the approval of 
the Prime Minister to trade in securities listed on AFM.(46) 
2. Arab investor being allowed to buy listed securities of Jordan 
public share holding companies with any currency. Also they 
were allowed to sell these securities and transfer their values 
abroad in any currency, without fulfilling any conditions.(47) 
3. On a reciprocal basis it was made possible for any Arab project 
or citizen to raise funds in Jordan if the Jordanian project 
or national could do so in their country.(48) 
6.2.3 The development of securities markets in Kuwait 
Kuwait was the first of the peninsula countries to develop various 
types of securities markets, since it was the first to enjoy wealth 
and so develop more sophisticated savers. It began receiving enormous 
oil revenues two decades earlier than its neighbours. The oil 
revenues accrued to the government, of course, but they found their 
way to the Kuwaiti citizens in various ways, chiefly among them the 
land purchase programme at inflated prices. Through this programme 
the government bought land from the private citizens valuing over KD 
1260 million during the 1960's and 1970's.(49) Consequently, the 
Kuwaiti private sector became the most prosperous sector in the region 
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and developed the equity shares market and the Kuwaiti dinar bond. 
In contrast, the wealth of the public sector in Kuwait prevented the 
development of any type of government securities. 
Regarding the equity share market: although Kuwaitis wealth was dear in 
the early 1950 1 s, trade in shares did not begin until the early 1960 l s 
and finally became effective in the early 1970 1 s. During the 1950 1 s, 
Kuwait had only two public share holding companies, compared with 15 in 
1963 and 31 in 1973.(50) With the increase in the number of share 
holding companies the market in their shares was consolidated and trade 
began to be very hectic. In the mid 1960 1 s, the World Bank Mission to 
Kuwait criticized the way in which Kuwaitis government channelled funds 
to the citizen, and called for the introduction of an organized 
securities market to deter the flight of capital outside the 
country.(51) This promoted the government of Kuwait to pass Law No.32 
of 1970 which asked the Minister of Commerce and Industry to chair a 
Committee for the study of the possibility of establishing a stock 
exchange and to draft its law and regulations.(52) 
In 1971, the Minister order the Department of Companies and Insurance 
Control in its Ministry to supervise dealings in the securities market. 
Consequently a decree was issued obliging dealers in Kuwait to register 
at the Ministry and to report daily information concerning all 
transactions in securities to the Ministry. So, the Department began 
producing daily data concerning the price and volume of investment of 
shares. This practice continued up until 1976 when the Minister of 
Industry issued a decision (No.61 of 1976) concerning the trade in 
financial securities. In accordance with this decision the financial 
securities committee was established and given great powers to organise 
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the trade in the financial securities. The committee succeeded in its 
assignment and in 1977 the Kuwait Stock Exchange was established.(53) 
In 1977, two separate stock exchanges began operation in Kuwait. Along 
side the official Market where the equity shares of the Kuwait 
companies were traded on, unofficial market emerged better known as 
Sug al-Manakh where the shares of companies incorporated in the Gulf 
States traded. The development of the second market was inevitable in 
the circumstances of Kuwait. The increased number of the public 
shareholding companies in Kuwait in the early 1970s, and given the 
narrow base of the country's economy persuaded the government of Kuwait 
to restrict the establishment of new companies. This caused the 
extremely wealthy Kuwaitis to look elsewhere for establishing their own 
companies. Soon they found the other Gulf states with their liberal 
financial legislations the appropriate place for their companies. 
Consequently many companies were established there. As these companies 
were not incorporated under the Kuwaiti companies law they were not 
eligible to be accepted on the official market. So the unofficial 
market began.(54) 
By the late 1970s, there were about 42 Kuwait public shareholding 
companies capitalized at KD 429 million, and over 30 companies 
registered in the Gulf states. Trading in equity shares on both 
markets was very large but with erratic fluctuations. For instance the 
volume of traded shares on the official market was about KD 176 million 
in 1976, dropped to KD 60 million in 1977 then rose to KD 164 in 1978 
and further to KD 246 million in 1981 then dropped again to about KD 
162 in 1982. See Appendix 6.3. There are no available trade figures 
on the unofficial market but presumably it was almost equivalent to 
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trade on the official market because they had almost the same number of 
listed companies and the share prices on the unofficial market 
witnessed the most dramatic rises that have ever been recorded. 
The speculative activities were facilitated through the use of post-
dated cheques for payment on delivery. In this uniquely Kuwaiti 
mechanism of future trading using post-dated cheques, the buyer 
immediately received the shares which he could then use to keep the 
cycles going. The seller had a post-dated cheque with a built-in 
interest rate reflecting expectations of the shares' future value. The 
interest rates on these cheques was in the mid 1970s about 25 percent 
premia for a 12 month delivery but in 1980/1891 it had risen to over 
100 percent. Under this inflationary system, the buyer could then sell 
his shares, while the seller could secure more funds with his post-
dated cheques. The system could not last, however, as more and more 
traders jumped onto the bandwagon. The result was dramatic rises in 
the share prices in some years followed by steep decline in others.(55) 
In 1982 the unofficial market collapsed leaving about $97 billion of 
unsettled post-dated cheques,(56) and making a drastic effect on the 
future of Stock Exchanges in the region because it left that huge 
amount of debt unsettled.(57) 
Due to successive crashes in the Kuwait Stock Exchanges in order to 
cool speculate fever, new regulations were passed in 1983 modelled on 
AFM regulations. These included six-day a week trading during morning 
and evening sessions of two hours each. This would give the 
participants sufficient time to think. Settlement would be in cash 
within three working days. This implied a ban on post dated cheques 
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which had led to the two crashes in the securities markets in Kuwait. 
All trading must be done on the floor and registered on the 'big board' 
to eliminate any insider trading. If these regulations were observed 
the stock exchange in Kuwait could function properly. 
The other most significant development in the Kuwaiti securities 
market has been the development of the Kuwaiti dinar bond market. It 
was initiated in 1968 when the World Bank effected six private place-
ments in Kuwait dinar totalling KD 130 million through the Kuwaiti 
investment companies. The market was initially supported by the 
government on the grounds that developing financial instruments 
dominating its own currency would reduce the risk inherent in foreign 
exchange and the market would help to diversify the holding of 
financial securities.(58) 
In 1974, the market received the first public issues. This was 
followed by 75 public issues in the subsequent years as seen in 
Appendix 6.4. The market was at its highest between 1975 and 1979 with 
56 issues brought to the market worth nearly KD 390 millions. To 
develop a market in local bond the Industrial Bank of Kuwait issued a 
KD 5 million bond in 1975. This was followed by similar issues by the 
Real Estate Bank. So the Kuwaiti dinar bond was developed for local 
and foreign customers. However, the high interest rate on the dollar 
adversely affected the operation of the market as much of Kuwaiti 
capital left the country. As a result a muratorium was imposed upon 
new issues for some time to ease domestic liquidity. And in organizing 
the market the central bank of Kuwait stipulated that for an issue to 
be raised in Kuwait it must be managed or led by a Kuwaiti institution 
and to give prior information about the issue.(59) 
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The lack of new issues gives rise to continued concern as to the 10ng-
term viability of the Kuwaiti dinar bond market with its implications 
of a declining volume of medium term fixed income investment assets in 
the monetary system. But the favourable investment mechanics of the 
market contributed to renewed interest from borrowers and lenders 
alike. The former came to the market to benefit from the artificially 
low rate against the rising dollar interest rate. The latter also 
bought the bonds because the yields on Kuwait dinar bonds exceeded 
intermediate money market rates by some points. In addition the surge 
in market activity was also related to advances in Kuwaiti monetary 
infrastructure, including the creation of a secondary market mechanism. 
(60) 
Secondary trading got off the ground with the formation of the Arab 
Company for Trading Securities (ACTS) in 1978. Appendix 6.4 shows 
dealing was extremely active with a total turnover of over KD 140 
millions which represented at that time almost half of the floated 
bonds. The high turnover was mainly stimulated by the fact that 
funding costs were in the range of 5-6 percent compared to yields of 9-
10 percent on medium - term bonds. 
6.2.4 Other Arab Securities markets 
The experience of Kuwait can in no way apply to other Peninsula 
countries. Saudi Arabia government has received more oil revenues than 
Kuwait, but the population of Suadi Arabia is almost six times that of 
Kuwait. Likewise the UAEs has received a great deal of oil revenues 
but the oil discovery was late in 1970. The other Gulf states such as 
Qatar, Bahrain and Oman have relatively modest oil revenues compared to 
their neighbours. So under these circumstances none of them has 
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developed securities markets equivalent to those in Kuwait. 
In the early 1980s when the financial instruments grew large enough 
to create organized stock exchanges in these countries, they were 
discouraged by the crash in the Kuwait Stock Exchange. So dealing in 
shares has continued in unorganized markets, although the laws for such 
markets were passed in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, but the 
formal market has not been established yet in anyone of them. 
Bahrain set up a new stocks and shares information centre in the 
Commerce Ministry. Consequently, there are now 19 dealers registered 
in the Ministry and the investment companies are trying hard to assume 
the same function and trade on the market. (61) The drive for the 
establishment of the Bahrain stock exchange is due, among other reasons 
to the efforts of the offshore financial institutions to develop a 
regional capital market there. They hope to see a developed market to 
bring in the Japanese and US stocks and to be listed on the market 
through the issuing of depositary receipts.(62) 
Saudi Arabia had not tried to develop a fully fledged capital market 
probably for fear of internationalizing the riyal, and so proceeded 
cautiously in this direction.(63) The need for the establishment of 
order in the equity market was felt with the emergence of several large 
shareholding companies in recent years. In 1983, the government ended 
the old practice of share trading through the share dealers offices 
when a Royal degree was issued asking Saudi Arabia commercial banks to 
act as share brokers.(64) As the banks are not acquainted with this 
line of business they collectively set up a commercial company to 
register ownership and transfer of shares. This conservative approach 
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is in compliance with the overall financial development policy of the 
country. The desire on the part of the government is to build an 
egalitarian economy and the feeling that share ownership is 
concentrated in few hands prevented it from establishing a full stock 
exchange. 
In the Northern Arab countries namely, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and 
Tunisia, their old stock exchanges were established through the efforts 
of the market participants, so they were not officially recognized or 
based on legal rules. Their organizations were based almost entirely 
on self regulation. The council in these institutions enforced the 
rules against one member on behalf and for the protection of all other 
members. For this they were merely an association in respect of their 
member. 
In the post-independence period, the Egyptian, Moroccan and Tunisian 
governments began borrowing locally to finance their development 
effort. Hence the need for an organized securities markets was 
pressing. So Tunisia and Morocco reorganized officially their own 
stock exchanges in the late 1960s, and Egypt revived its stock exchange 
in the mid 1970's after almost 15 years of closure while Lebanon passed 
a new resolution to modernize its institutions. 
The stock exchanges of these countries have grown very little. This is 
evident in the small size of the securities listed on these markets and 
more important in the small volume of traded activities. For 
instance the Beirut Stock Exchange had attracted little business. In 
its peak, in 1974 the market had succeeded in listing 33 companies with 
a capital share of about 1157 million Lebanese pounds, and the volume 
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of trade was about 49 million. In the following years the market 
activities have declined.(65} In contrast the market for government 
securities has grown very rapidly. The favourable balance of payments 
and the government budget of Lebanon before the civil war in the mid 
1970s prevented the development of any significant government 
securities in those years. But in recent years the Lebanese government 
has resorted to domestic borrowing on a very large scale as its 
revenues fall short of its expenditures. This is so because the long 
civil war and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 destroyed the 
country. Government borrowing began mounting year after year as can be 
seen from (Appendix 6.5). Consequently the outstanding debt rose from 
half a billion Lebanese pounds in 1977 to over LP.17.3 billion in 1983. 
The great amounts of government issued bonds created a de facto free 
wheeling government bond market. As the government securities are not 
allowed to be traded on the stock exchange and left to the banks, the 
Lebanese Bank Association set, in 1981, a Lebanese company as a market 
maker to encourage trade in government bonds. In order for the company 
to carry out this function it has been supported by the central bank of 
Lebanon and its share ho1ders.(66} It is worth noting here that the 
bond market grows many times larger than the equity markets. 
In Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia also the stock exchanges have developed 
modest activities. Although some of them have a listed securities of 
relative importance such as the Egyptian and the Moroccan markets but 
the volume of trade is very small and some time in decline. The volume 
of trade on the Tunisian stock exchange reached about TD 23 million in 
1982 the highest figure achieved during the life of the market.(67) In 
Morocco the transacted shares and bonds amount to only 86 million 
dirham in 1982.(68} Data on share trading on the stock exchange of 
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Egypt is not available but the dramatic decline in the number of 
dealers and brokers from 300 in the first year of the market operation 
to just 23 in 1983 points to the low activity of the market. 
To enhance the activities of these markets some measures have 
been taken. In Morocco, several measure become effective from 1983. 
These include: 
1. exempting 3,000 dirham of the listed companies distribution 
profit from taxes. 
2. Any investors obliged to pay surtax can deduct from his income 
10,000 dirham for the purpose of calculating this tax. 
3. listed companies are allowed 50 percent deduction of stamp 
duties and registration fees on the time of increasing their 
capital or applying for registration.(69) 
Lebanon's efforts to enhance the market were directed toward allowing 
trade in raw material and precious metals, in addition to the 
improvement in supervision of the market operation. In Egypt also, 
there has been an array of suggestions for securities market 
development there.(70) 
6.3. Stock exchanges and economic development 
The establishment of the stock exchanges in some Arab countries and the 
drive for establishing more of such institutions in the remaining 
countries emanates from the great desire to realise a better utiliza-
tion of the available financial resources by mobilizing local and 
foreign savings and directing them towards productive projects. This 
desire is clearly stated in the objective of the established 
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institutions of this type in the region. For instance the aim of the 
Amman Financial Market and Kuwait Stock Exchange in their charters are 
to: 
1. Mobilize savings by encouraging investments in securities and 
channelling savings to serve the interests of the national 
economy. 
2. Regulate and control the issue of securities and dealing in them 
with the financial interests of of their countries and the 
protection of the interest of small savers. 
3. Gather and publish the necessary data to realize the above 
mentioned objectives.(71) 
To what extent these objectives have been attained is the task of this 
section. With regard to the first objective of mobilising the domestic 
and foreign savings, the narrow base of the Arab stock markets and 
speculation activities minimized their role in this respect. It is 
only in those markets with wide range of securities varies in term of 
yield, risk and maturity which give more choice for savers, can some 
influence on the rate of saving occur. The Arab stock exchanges have 
not achieved the characteristics of such market, so they have not 
positively influenced the rate of domestic savings. 
Likewise, the Arab exchanges have not attracted any significant capital 
from abroad. This is clear in the absence or meager flow of portfolio 
investment to these countries. The International Financial statistics 
show that amount the Arab countries with stock exchanges, Egypt was the 
only one receiving portfolio investment in the last four years of the 
magnitude of $3-4 million a year.(72) This is a small amount and not 
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necessarily attracted by Egypt Stock Exchange. AFM prides itself on 
having attracted about JD 4 million from the Arab and Jordanian abroad 
in two and half years.(73) These were the amounts of capital which 
flowed from abroad and were invested in securities traded on the 
market. Both amounts are very small, considering that one of the 
claimed goals of these markets is to attract Arab capital surplus. 
The poor performance of the Arab stock exchanges can be further 
delineated by relating their intermediary function with other financial 
intermediaries in the countries of their operation. This is clear in 
the case of Tunisia, Lebanon and Morocco stock exchanges where the 
total transactions on their markets is very small and merely a fraction 
of the credit outstanding of commerical banks there. This indicates 
the modest role of these markets in the saving investment process. In 
contrast the intermediary role of AFM and Kuwait stock exchange had 
been of some significance compared to intermediary role of other 
segments of the financial markets there. 
With regard to the second objective of the protection of the interest 
of small investors, the Arab stock exchange has achieved very little 
and sometimes harm these interests. For instance the prices of 
securities have been very volatile in the Amman Financial Market and 
Kuwait stock exchange. And the markets were dominated by minority 
traders who set the prices in their interest. The traders of Kuwait 
stock exchange were described by Hollis in these words: 
lithe active traders who set the tone of the market number 
no more than a couple of hundred at the most. Almost.a~l 
are sterling millionaires at the very least to whom.dlvldends 
are of little interest. There is virtually no one 1n the 
market buying for yield and in consequence share prices are 
very high by standards prevailing elsewhere in terms o~ 
yields, earning or assets. In 1980 for example the maJor 
banks stood at dividend yields of less than 1 percent and 
in some cases under 0.5 percent".(74) 
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The speculation activities of these investors distorted the prices of 
securities significantly and caused the market to crash in Kuwait in 
1977 and in 1982. Only government intervention saved the small 
investors from losing all their savings. So the market in an indirect 
way has been a real threat to the future of Kuwaitis financial market 
and caused great damage to the interest of small investors. In general 
the speculation on the market impeded it from achieving its positive 
role in social and economic development and sometimes harmed 
development itself. 
With regard to the second and third objectives of these markets AFM and 
recently Kuwait stock exchange may claim some success. Scrutenizing 
the financial position of companies before admission to the markets 
created confidence in the financial securities. The publication of 
information by the markets on the capital structure, and annual result 
of the listed companies exposed them more to the public and lessened 
the number of insiders dealing on these markets. 
6.4 The factors adversely affecting the growth of Arab stock 
exchanges 
The foregoing discussion showed that the growth of the Arab stock 
exchanges varies from one country to another as the economic situation 
of the Arab countries inevitably varies to a considerable extent, 
depending on domestic circumstances. However, the existing stock 
exchanges, are undeveloped and the factors impeding their development 
can be found in the absence of one or more of the preconditions -
examined earlier in this chapter - which are essential for such markets 
to emerge and to be a reasonably workable market. 
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In chapter three, it was shown that the economies of many Arab 
countries have not yet been monetized, and that if they were monetized 
the low ratio of quasi-money to M2 indicates that savers' sophisti-
cation has not been established yet. This factor alone explain the 
absence of the stock exchange from many Arab countries. 
In other Arab countries where stock exchanges have already been 
established the low turnover of the outstanding securities indicates 
the lesser popularity of stock exchanges, while the high turn over in 
others indicates the extensive speculation activities on such markets. 
The underdeveloped conditions in the existing markets could be related 
in part to the newness of these markets since the development of such 
markets is a gradual process involving gaining increasing acceptance by 
of, and demanders for securities. Apart from the time factor, the low 
degree of trading activities and the thinness of these markets can be 
explained by the paucity of securities. Paucity has been due to many 
factors operating on both sides of the market. 
On the supply side, it is possible to detect many factors all 
contributing one way or another to reducing the supply of securities. 
The predominant mineral activities in some and the service oriented 
economies in others left the industrial activities of little importance 
in the Arab countries with stock exchanges. For instance the 
manufacturing sector's contribution to the GDP of Jordan, Tunisia, 
Kuwait, Lebanon and Egypt in 1982 was 19 percent, 12 percent, 4 
percent, 13 percent and 12 percent respectively.(75} This is an 
indication of the modest industrial activities in such countries and is 
one of the main constraints on the supply of securities. Furthermore 
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the organization structure of industry itself in the Arab region 
militates against the supply of securities. Industrial activities in 
the Arab region are mainly found in the form of a few large plants, 
owned and controlled by the governments or in small plants owned and 
controlled by families. 
Along with the above mentioned decisive factors, it is possible to 
refer to other less important factors involved in reducing the supply 
of securities or promoting the development of fixed interest bearing 
securities against the equity shares. These include: 
1. The relatively low cost of borrowing from Commerical banks and 
other financial institutions. The roll-over of the overdraft 
facilities significantly reduced the need for many corporations 
to issue more financial securities and sell them to the public 
to secure the needed fund. This can be illustrated by the 
structure of lending rates in Jordan. For instance the rate on 
commerical banks loans in 1983 was 8.75 percent and development 
bonds 7.5 - 8.8 percent.(76) The rate is very close, but 
companies issuing bonds might need to add one or two points to 
its rate and must pay the underwriters commission and the risk 
of not selling the issues. These additional points will make 
raising funds through issue more costly. Even if the cost of 
borrowing through the banks were higher than that of borrowing 
through public issues, many corporations would continue 
preffering the bank loans rather than diluting their interest 
through the alternative. 
2. The enormous wealth of the public sectors in the major oil-
exporting countries freed them from all types of borrowing. This 
led to the absence or weak presence of government securities on 
the market of these countries. The government securities 
usually constitute the largest proportion of the financial 
securities traded on the stock exchange of the advanced 
countries.(77) 
3. The central bank's stand to buy and sell government securities 
in some Arab countries reduced the need for trading such 
securities on the stock markets. This is clear from the minor 
trade of government bonds on AFM, as the Central Bank of Jordan 
has been supporting and dealing in these securities. 
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4. The high rates paid on government securities and their exemption 
of taxes, made them attractive instruments for long-term 
investment particularly by those in the high bracket income 
group and banks. This is clear in the Jordan market as seen 
in Appendix 6.3. The holders of these securities usually hold 
them until maturity. This reduces the supply of government 
securities on the market. The main pOint is that a market 
cannot develop properly in a climate where interest rates on 
non-risk instruments exceeded reasonable returns.(78) 
5. The strong relationship between some of the Arab countries and 
the previous colonial power give them access to the financial 
markets of these countries and secure the necessary funds there. 
This also reduces the supply of securities for the markets in 
the region. 
On the demand side it is possible to detect some factors impeding the 
development of the market in the region. These include: 
1. The low per capita income in Morocco, Egypt and to some extent 
Jordan and Tunisia, considerably reduced the demand for 
financial securities particularly in the private sector. This 
claim is true in these countries although there is no data on 
the share of the financial securities held by individuals, but 
the low per capita income in Tunisia and Morocco was echoed in 
the absence of private investors on their markets.(79) 
2. The high inflationary pressure in the region (see Appendix 6.6) 
and the low earnings of the financial securities considerably 
reduced their attractiveness to the investors. Likewise in 
Egypt among the whole range of factors detering investors there 
has been the dramatic devaluation of its currencies. In 1979 
the value of 1 US dollar was equal to 0.7 Egyptian pounds, but 
by the early 1980's, the exchange rate had fallen to 1.2 
Egyptian pounds to the dollar.(80) 
3. In the Peninsula countries the de facto link with the dollars 
and the significant difference in the structure of interest 
rates at home and abroad led to the flight of capital abroad and 
in turn affected the demand on local securities. 
4. The existence of foreign securities in Lebanon and in the Gulf 
States absorbed part of the capital which would be directed to 
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local securities in their absence.(81) 
5. The loose regulations, little disclosure, secrecy and lack of 
ethical standards hardly create confidence to invest in the 
financial instruments. In the current evolutionary stage of 
commercial law in the Gulf region, there are few guidelines 
for the auditor, and public accountant, and firms work largely 
to their own standards.(82) 
6. The speculative activities on the Kuwait stock exchange was 
the most deterrent factor for the development of the market 
there. The crash in the market in 1977 induced the Kuwaiti 
government to reluctantly buy shares to the value of KD 150 
million. With the collapse of the unofficial market in 1982 
the government bought shares valued at hundreds of millions 
of Kuwaiti pounds. As a result the government today control 
over one half of companies share.(83) In addition many people 
lost their investment and the confidence in all financial 
securities. 
6.5 Toward development and integration of the Arab stock exchange 
6.5.1 Financial measures directing the development of local 
stock exchanges 
As the development of capital market institutions is a long-term 
gradual process that takes place during the course of economic and 
financial development, it is natural to find stock exchanges which are 
of recent origin in this process of development. It is true that 
circumstances are different from one country to another, but the 
similarity in the nature of problems facing stock exchange development 
in the developing economies makes it possible to draw on the successful 
experience of other countries in this field. So the development of the 
- 245 -
Arab stock exchange could be fostered and hastened by some promotional 
measures that proved effective in similar circumstances elsewhere. 
In such circumstances, the efforts made to accelerate the development 
of securities markets by policy measures were usually directed to 
create confidence in the financial instruments and increase their 
supply and the demand for them. 
To increase the supply of securities in the Arab capital markets 
several devices may be used. These inc1ude:-
1. Tax incentives 
As the modern corporate sector in the Arab region is still in the early 
stages of its development, characterised by a sharp dichotomy between a 
few large enterprises and relatively numerous small-scale family 
enterprises, tax differential treatment between private and public 
shareho1ding companies would induce some of the unincorporated 
enterprises to go public. The Jordanian tax system in recent years was 
adjusted to allow favouring treatment to public shareholding companies. 
Likewise the Venezuelan capital market law gave certain tax exemptions 
as high as 50 per cent, per company should it convert to an open 
company. (84) 
Such policies undoubtedly induce private companies to go public, but 
this has an adverse effect on government revenues. So caution has to 
be taken in deciding the magnitude of the offered concession: A large 
concession would disturb the market itself. For instance when the 
Pakistan government in 1963 gave support and generous allowances to 
traded shares, obviously many companies issued new shares, consequ-
ently a severe price fall and a loss of private investors' confidence 
fo110wed.(85) 
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2. Divesting of some of the public corporations 
Some countries may sell part of the public corporation to the private 
sector. Saudi Arabia's government divested itself of the ownership of 
some quasi-state organisations such as the National Shipping Company, 
Saudi Basic industries Corporation and the Saudi Consolidated Electric 
Company.(86) Such policies would immediately increase the supply of 
securities on the market, but it is not recommended if a corporation 
has special importance in serving the public or the privatization leads 
to a transfer of ownership from the public to a few private investors. 
3. Indigenization of foreign companies 
The indigenization is another way to increase the supply of securities. 
This policy is used in Nigeria and in Saudi Arabia. In both countries 
the foreign banks were asked to issue a majority new share to the local 
citizen.(87) 
4. Increase the capital of corporation 
Ordering the existing companies to increase their capital 
through a new issue, increases the supply of securities. This policy 
was used in Jordan recently when banks and insurance companies were 
asked to increase their capital, as a way to increase the securities 
and to broaden the ownership of these institutions.(88) 
5. Introduction of the securities of other Arab countries to the 
existing stock exchange. 
At present, dealing in the Arab Stock Exchanges is limited to national 
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securities. Although the law in Kuwait allows the introduction of 
foreign securities, in Jordan the law allows reciprocal treatment. It 
is possible for anyone of them to increase the securities by allowing 
the securities of other Arab countries to be traded on its market. 
6. The support operation 
The specialized financial institutions, and the contractual saving 
institutions such as insurance companies and pension funds may 
encourage promising enterprises to incorporate and increase the supply 
of securities, by offering to take upon their shares after incorpora-
tion. These institutions may sell the securities bought from the 
previous ones and buy shares of the new incorporated ones. By doing 
this they help to increase the supply of securities. 
On the demand side also there are many devices which may be used to 
increase the demand for securities. These include: 
1. Tax incentives 
The tax system may be made to encourage people and institutions to hold 
financial assets In Jordan the tax system encourages holding financial 
securities in the sense of exempting their income from income tax or 
from capital gain tax. Likewise the Venezuela capital market law gives 
100% percent tax exemption to people buying shares in public 
shareholding companies.(89) 
2. Giving advances to individuals 
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This policy can be applied in broadening the ownership of industrial 
financial assets, and to enable people to buy securities. The 
experience of Iran in applying this policy in the development of its 
capital market is of special interest. Corporations were asked to 
issue new shares for workers participation, and staff were advanced the 
equivalent of three months wages to pay for these shares. The loans 
were guaranteed by the state, over a minimum of three years and were 
virtually interest-free. This enabled workers to buy shares in the 
companies for whom they were working. Against that, the new share-
holders were subjected to some restrictions. The shares were not 
allowed to be traded in until the loan was repaid. If the employee 
changed his job before he had paid for them, they must be sold back to 
the company.(90) Kuwait also applied such a policy: In spreading the 
shares among its citizens Kuwait limited the number of shares that may 
be bought by a single investor and gave the right to every Kuwaiti to 
buy shares. To achieve this goal, the price of shares was kept very 
low,(91) and the commercial banks were asked to lend to needy people on 
the collateral of their shares. This policy enhanced the ability of 
small savers to buy new shares. 
3. Opening the stock exchange for non-residents 
This policy can increase the demand for securities tremedously in the 
Arab stock exchanges particularly in Kuwait where the national citizen 
there constitutes less than 50 percent of the population. While 
Jordan, and Egypt encourage other Arab citizens to deal on their 
markets. Thus it may be helpful in Kuwait to allow the resident Arab 
citizen to trade on its market. 
- 249 -
4. Improve disclosure 
The stock exchange authorities can enhance the demand for securities 
by enforcing companies to make further public disclosure and enforcing 
unified accounting procedures. At present, data on Arab companies, 
sources and uses of funds, return on investments, profitability balance 
sheets and capital structure are not regularly published. An audited 
annual and a six-monthly report on business progress helps enormously 
in exposing it to more investors. 
5. Promoting an active network of institutional investors 
The mutual funds, unit trusts, contractual saving institutions such 
as insurance companies and pension funds and other investment companies 
represent the major source of demand in active stock exchange of 
developed countries. For instance the share of such institutions in 
the ownership of quoted ordinary shares on London Stock Exchange rose 
from 16.4 percent of market value in 1963 to about 32.7 percent in 
1975.(92) 
As far as the institutional investors are concerned, the region is 
still in the process of developing them. The insurance companies were 
the first to emerge in the region, but they are of minor importance in 
terms of mobilizing and allocating long-term funds.(93) The other 
institutional investors such as investment companies have spread 
rapidly in Kuwait but on a smaller scale in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In 
recent years, most Arab countries have established social securities or 
pension funds. But the open-ended investment trusts and mutual funds 
are rare in the region. 
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The importance of such institutions for the development of the Arab 
Capital Markets emanates from the long-term nature of their fund. The 
investment companies are corporations that sell their own shares to 
investors, then take these proceeds and invest them in the securities 
of other companies. And the contractual saving institutions are 
financed by the regular contributions from their participants. The 
proceeds are usually invested in securities, and when a participant 
retires, the savings are paid out in the form of an annuity or some 
other type of settlement. 
Besides the above policies, the monetary authority should create the 
conditions conducive to the growth of the capital market. This 
includes the curbing of inflation and pursuing realistic interest rates 
policies.(94) The interest rates in real terms were low but positive 
in most Arab countries, but turned negative in some of them when the 
annual inflation rate exceeded the ceiling on interest rates. However, 
there are several considerations which militate against adjusting 
upwards the level of interest rates in the region to reflect any higher 
rates of inflation. Historically, the Arab countries have not looked to 
interest rates as a tool for promoting the financial development. They 
were concerned with the cost of credit and some people objection to 
the usury system. This policy could be acceptable in rich countries 
which implies a relatively low opportunity cost of capital, other 
things being equal, but one should recognise, the importance of liberal 
interest rates in the process of financial development through its 
effect on both the supply and demand of capital. 
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6.5.2 Financial measures to integrate the Arab stock exchanges 
In the Arab drive to accelerate the flow of funds in the region they 
have established among themselves several agreements concerning the 
capital flow. To the agreement examined in Chapter two is added the 
agreement for the guarantee of Arab investment within the region which 
was followed by the subscription of all the Arab countries to the 
Kuwaiti - supported Inter-Arab investment Guarantee Corporation.(95) 
This was followed by all the Gulf states with the approval of Saudi 
Arabia going ahead with plans to establish a Gulf Currency as a first 
step toward an Arab Dinar. In addition to the Arab Monetary Fund 
efforts to unfify Arab currencies and integrate their financial 
markets. 
Expanding on these efforts it is possible to create the Arab capital 
market by stages. In the first stage therefore, one might suggest 
the creation of a central stock market for the shares of the joint 
Arab ventures. In the second stage one should integrate fully the 
Arab stock markets. In the first stage the Arab countries may 
collectively establish a higher issuing committee and strong 
underwriting houses. The Arabs have already established many 
ministerial and other councils organized on a functional basis which 
meet at regular intervals and constitute an important institutional 
mechanism of control, advisory and co-ordinative service. 
Once could recommend that the deputies of the Arab Ministries of 
Commerce and Industry might make up the higher issuing committee. The 
committee would approve the published prospectus of any joint-venture 
seeking to raise funds and ensure the accuracy of the financial 
information made available to the public. This would create confidence 
among Arab investors and protect their interests. 
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Likewise, the Arab may entrust the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee 
Corporation to work as underwriting houses. This would guarantee full 
subscription for the issuing companies. To enhance the development of 
the Arab capital market, these issues should be denominated in the Arab 
dinar. This would inspire confidence in the Arab dinar as a potential 
regional currency, serve as common denominator for issues floated in 
several markets, and provide a limited guarantee against exchange rate 
changes for debtors and creditors alike. 
In the second stage, when the Arabs experience further integration and 
the movements of capital within the region become virtually free they 
may agree among themselves on: 
1. The introduction of the securities of one country on the stock 
exchange of other country. 
2. The purchase of the securities issued by residents of every 
Arab country, by the residents of other countries. 
3. The issue of the securities by the residents of one country in 
the capital market of another country. 
4. Unifying their tax systems, companies laws, prospectus formats, 
the admission requirements of securities to official listing, 
terms of trading and execution of all financial transaction in 
all Arab stock exchanges. 
This would create a common and unified network of financial services 
for the region as a whole, make for greater interpenetration of 
national securities markets and speed the emergence of the Arab capital 
market. 
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6.6. Conclusion 
The Arab organized securities markets are few, small and late-comers to 
the financial scene in the Arab region. This is a predictable state of 
affairs, as the natural process of such markets is not only related to 
the overall development process, but is indeed an outcome of such a 
process. 
It must be pointed out, that in the prevailing conditions of 
underdevelopment, the region's economy is still primarily geared to 
agricultural and mining activities. Therefore it would be highly 
unusual to find widespread inefficient securities markets. The main 
obstacles to the development of such markets can be briefly described 
as follows. Firstly, the markets have a limited, short-term 
operational period; secondly, the economy has a narrow base and the 
wealth is unevenly distributed through Arab countries; and thirdly, the 
institutions are traditionally rigid and lacking in any effective 
entrepreneural capacity. All these above mentioned factors inhibit the 
rapid development of growth both in the demand for, and the supply of 
securities. 
Under these circumstances the Arab stock markets continue to be of 
minor importance, they have little or no significance in enconomic 
development, and indeed they often produce negative economic effects. 
Unless these markets evolve and are efficiently organized and regulated 
it would be impossible for them to emerge as viable and effective 
institutions, that would enable the mobilization of saving and the 
direction of these savings towards economically productive activities. 
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The introduction of new measures, aimed at increasing both the supply 
and demand of financial securities, and which specifically attempted 
to make financial securities more attractive for savers and borrowers 
alike was quite successful and partially improved the situation. 
Nevertheless, there is still room for improvement, particularly with 
regard to promoting further, the supply and demand of securities. This 
could be achieved by financial and fiscal policies as discussed 
earlier. Additionally, there is a need for a more effective 
regulation, or organization and streamlining of the flow of information 
regarding the result of the shareholding companies. Such measures 
would reduce the manipulative practices of inside trading within the 
market, whilst at the same time decreasing the repercussions of 
speculative activities which continue to hinder development. 
The Arab region as a whole has a fundamental need and a vital interest 
in the development of a sound and efficient regional stock exchange. 
As a means for the implementation of such a market, the Arab countries 
collectively might initially introduce the establishement of a 
regionally regulated committee and an effective number of underwriting 
houses. These two organizations would be responsible for both 
monitoring and publishing information on securities. The establishment 
of such committees and underwriting houses should be restricted to Arab 
joint-ventures securities. The committee decides on the information 
to be published at the time of issue in the prospectus, as well as 
on the contents of successive financial reports to be presented on 
a regular basis in ensuing months by such ventures. 
The underwriting houses in their turn would guarantee the sale of all 
securities. This would centralize the flow of Arab savings and help 
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direct the capital towards the jOint-venture projects, which in turn 
would serve to increase integration within the region as a whole. 
On securing the establishment of the initial phase, a second stage 
could be introduced, which would encompass a radical change in the 
structure of the Arab economy. In the long-term the Arab economies 
might hope to achieve a widening of the industrial base and take 
greater measures towards bringing about economic integration. The 
latter would allow free movement of capital and labour between Arab 
Countries. There would be a need for an overall review of the finance 
sector in the region and this would take the form of a committee to 
review the functioning of all financial institutions, as was carried 
out in the United Kingdom by 'The Wilson Committee of 1980' 
The findings of such a committee would be applied to facilitate the 
creation of a genuine comprehensive and more unified Arab stock 
market. 
- 256 -
1. David Williams, 
2. V. V. Bhatt and 
Alan R. Roe, 
3. Edward A. Arowolo, 
4. 
5. P. J. Drake, 
6. Wai and Patrick, 
NOTES AND REFERENCES 
liThe Growth of Capital and Securities 
Markets", Finance and Development (September, 1966), p.214 
"Capital Market Imperfections and 
Economic Development", World Bank Staff 
Working Paper, No.338 (July 1979) 
4 ' , p. 
liThe Development of Capital Markets 
in Africa, with particular reference 
to Kenya and Ni geri a", IMF Staff Papers (July, 1971) ,p.421 
Wilson Committee Report on the 
Functioning of the Financial 
Institutions (May, 1980), p.184 
"Securities Markets in Less-Developed 
Countries", The Journal of Develo8ment 
Studies Vol.13, Np.3, (January, 177), 
pp.73 
"Stock and Bond Issues and Capital 
Markets in Less Developed Countries", 
IMF Staff Papers (July, 1973), p.254 
7. Modern Capital Markets theorists have developed the concept of 
the 'efficient ' capital market to describe a market in which 
prices fully and instantaneously reflect all available information 
as to the future returns expected from each security and expected 
future returns are reflected in security prices in the light of 
their relative degrees of riskiness. Fama has defined three types 
of market efficiency according to the extent of the information 
reflected in the market. These are weak-form efficient, semi-
strong from efficient and strong-form efficient. 
See: 
Eugene F. Fama, 
8. Irwin Friend, 
9. David Kleinman, 
10. W. T. Newlyn, 
11. David Williams, 
12. P. J. Drake, 
"Efficient Capital Markets: A Review 
of Theory and Empirical Work", Journal 
of Finance, (May, 1970), pp.383-417. 
liThe Stock Market and the Economy: 
the Economy Consequences of the Stock 
Market", American Economic Review 
Vol.62, (1972), pp.212-9 
"Why Developing Countries Need Better 
Domestic Capital Markets", The Banker 
(November, 1972), pp.1404-6 
The Financing of Economic Development 
(Oxord: Clarendon Press, 1977), p.328 
The Growth of Capital and Securities 
Markets, OPe cit., p.212. 
Securities Markets in Less Developing 
Countries, op.cit., p.76. 
- 257 -
13. Most of the.Arab :ountrie~ passed foreign investment legislation 
grant some lncentlves to lnvestors. For a review and discussion 
of such incentives. 
See: 
Alison K. Mitchell, "Foreign Investment Legislation in 
Africa", Finance and Development Vol.7, 
No.1, (March, 1970), pp.7-11 
See also: 
ilLegal Framework for Investment in 
Tunisia, Jordan, Somalia, Morocco and 
Yemen Arab Republic", Arab Business 
Magazine Special issue, (March, 1982), 
pp.43-8 (in Arabic) 
14. The stock exchanges in the Arab region are semi-public 
institutions created by the states. 
See: 
The Amman Financial Market Law No.31 of 1976 as Amended by 
Amending Laws Nos.1 and 29 of 1978, Article 3. 
See also: 
The Decree for Organizing the Market of Kuwait for Financial 
Securities, (August, 14, 1983), Article 1. 
15. The Amman Financial Market Law, op.cit., Article 26. 
16. The Decree for Organizing the Market of Kuwait or Financial 
Securities, op.cit., Article 5. 
17. The Amman Financial Market Law, op.cit., Article 31 and 32. 
The Decree for Organizing the Market of Kuwait for 
Financial Securities, op.cit., Article 6. 
18. Ibid. 
19. The Amman Financial Market Law, op.cit., Article 15, 16, and 17. 
20. The Decree for Organising the Market of Kuwait for Financial 
Securities. op.cit., Article 2. 
21. The Amman Financial Market Law, op.cit., Article 15, 16 and 17. 
22. Hisham Albasat, "Recent Development in the Lebanese 
Financial Market: Direction and 
Prospect", Paper Presented to the 
Conference on "Capital Markets in the 
Aspects of Arab Countries: As5ects . of Reality and Development, A u Dhabl, 
February 4th to 6th, 1984 (Type written 
in Arabic). 
- 258 -
23. M. Altazi and Q. Waniesh, "Technical Aspect of Moroccan Financial 
Market il , Paper presented to the 
Conference on "Capital Markets in the 
Arab Countries: Aspect of Reality and 
Development, Abu Dhabi on February 
4th to 6th, 1984 (Type written in 
Arabic). 
24. The Amman Financial Marketls Internal Regulations No.26 of 1980 
Article 66. 
See also: 
The Decree for Organizing the Market of Kuwaitis Financial 
Securities (1983), Article 4. 
25. The Internal Regulation of the Market of Kuwait Financial 
Securities (1983), Article 25. 
26. The Amman Financial Marketls Internal Regulation (1980), Article 
41. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Hashim Alsabagh, 
29. Doina Thomas, 
See also: 
Kathy Evans, 
30. 
31. John Hollis, 
32. 
"J ordan Securi ti es Markets: Actual i ty, 
Development and Trend", Paper presented 
to the Conference on IICapital Markets 
in the Arab Countries: Aspect of 
Reality and Development ll , Abu Dhabi, 
February 4th-6th, 1984 (Type written 
in Arabi c) . 
liThe Capital Market ll , Financial Times 
Survey/Kuwait (February, 26, 1979), 
p.IV 
IIMonolithic Setting for Virtually Dead 
Market ll , Financial Times Survey/Arab 
Banking (October, 15, 1984), p.10 
1I0pening the Egyptian Stock Exchange 
for the International Markets, Al-Arab 
Arabic daily newspaper published in 
London (July 2, 1984), p.9. 
liThe Kuwait and other Stock Markets 
in the Arab World ll , in Arab Financial 
Markets edited by Peter Field and Alan 
Moore (Euro money publication, 1981), 
p.78. 
An Interview with Tunisian Stock 
Exchange Director Mr. Es-aldien Bibu 
Arab Business Magazine No.46 (March, 
-rnJ!), p .86 
- 259 -
33. In the Arab Summit held in Amman 1980 
the Agreement of Unified Arab 
Investment Code was approved and 
ratified by five states. 
See: 
Critical Review of the unified Arab 
Investment Code, Arab Business Magazine 
Special Issue (March, 1982), p.Sl-60 (In Arabic). 
34. Jordan Development Board, The 7 Year Programme for Economic 
Development 1964-1970, (Jordan: The 
Commercial Press, Jerusalem, p.344-5). 
35. Gerard de la Fortelle, 
36. Ibid, p.36 
37. Central Bank of Jordan, 
38. Ibid, Table No.19 
39. Amman Financial Market, 
40. Amman Financial Market 
41. Central Bank of Jordan, 
"Financial Intennediation in Jordan, A 
Desk Survey", (IFC: August, 1976) 
Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Vol.20, 
No.10 (October, 1984), Table No.40 
Annual Report, 1978, (Jordan: 
Alnamothjab Press), p.13 in Arabic 
Report Achievement of AFM in period 
1978-1980, p.7 (In Arabic). 
Monthly Statistical Bulletin Vol.20, 
No.IO, (October, 1984) Table 51 
42. Encouragement of Investment Law No.53 of °972 as Amended by 
Amending Laws No. 16 of 1977, Article 16 
43. Income Tax Law No.25 of 1966 as amended by Amending Laws Nos.4 
of 1979 and 34 of 1982 Article 25. 
44. Ibid, Article 8 
45. The Companies Law No.12 and its Amendments, Article 115 and 144. 
46. Control of Foreign Business Activities 
Defence Regulation No.4 of 1974, 
Article 3-C. 
47. Ibid, Article 7-B, 8-B, and 9-B 
48. Ibid, Article 11-B 
49. Kuwait Central Bank, 
50. Ibid, p.l03 
Kuwait Economy in Ten Years: Economic 
Report for the period 1969-79 (Kuwait: 
Dar alsiash Press), p.S8 (in Arabic) 
- 260 -
51. International Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development, 
The Economic Development of Kuwait 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1965) 
52. Kuwait Economy in Ten Years, Ope cit., 
p.l04 
53. Ibid, p.106 
54. Michael Field, 
55. Orner Kassem, 
56. Duncan Campbell-Smith, 
57. Kathy Evans, 
58. Osama Al-ansari, 
59. Kuwait Central Bank, 
60. Hikmat S. Nashashibi, 
61. 
62. Ibid, p.16 
63. John Townsend, 
64. Andrew Gowers, 
65. Hisham Albasat, 
'Arabian Investment Companies", 
Financial Times Survey/Arab Banking 
and Finance (October, 2,1983), p.111 
"Kuwait Share Markets, A Dilemma for 
Local Banks", Arab Banker, Vol.11, 
No.5, (September, 1982), p.13-16 
"Clearing up the Avalanche of Post-
Dated Cheques", Financial Times 
Survey/Arab Banking, (October, 4, 1982) 
p.IV 
"Crisis Hits at the Heart of Social 
Structure", Financial Times Survey/Arab 
Banking, (October, 15, 1984), p.XI 
"Recent Development and its Trend in 
the Kuwaiti Financial Market", Paper 
presented to the Conference on "Capital 
Markets in the Arab Countries", Aspects 
of Reality and Development, Abu Dhabi, 
February 4th - 6th, 1984 (Typewritten 
in Arabic). 
Kuwait Economy in Ten years 1969-1979 
OPe cit., p.104 
liThe Development of Capital Markets 
in the Gulf", Journal of Arab Affairs 
Vol.1, No.1, (1981), pp.99-116 
"Arab Equity", Arab Banking and 
Finance, vol.2, no.8, (October, 1983), 
pp.13-15 
liThe Capital Market: Conflict of 
Ideas", Financial Times Survey/Saudi 
Arabia (April, 23, 1979), p.XVI 
"Growing Need for a More Sophisticated 
Financial System", Financial Times 
Survey/Saudi Arabia, (April, 24, 1984), 
p.9 
"Recent Development in the Lebanese 
Capital Market: Direction and Prospects 
op.cit., 
- 261 -
66. 
67. 
Interview with Nassim Saliba Chairman 
of "Leba~on's Finance Corporation", 
Arab Buslness Magazine No.52, 
(September, 1983), pp.28-30 (in Arabic) 
An Interview with the Tunisian Stock 
Exchange's Director Mr. Es aldien 
Ope cit., p.86 ' 
68. M. Altazi, and Q. Waniesh "Technical Aspects of Moroccan 
Financial Market", op.cit., 
69. Ibid. 
70. Hisham Al Bassat, "Recent Development in the Lebanese 
Capital Market: Direction and 
Prospects", op.cit., 
71. The Amman Financial Market Law No.31 of 1976 as amended by 
Amending Laws Nos. 1 and 29 of 1978, Article 4 
72. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 
Supplement Series, No.7 (1984) 
73. AFM The Plan for Amman Financial Market for the Period 1981-85 (1981), p.3, (in Arabic). 
74. John Hollis, The Kuwait and other Stock Markets 
in the Arab World, Ope cit., p.77 
75. Arab Monetary Fund, Arab Countries National Account 1971-82 
(April, 1984) Table 18, 36, 90, 108 and 96 
76. Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Vol.20 
No.10, (October, 1984), Table 13 
77. The value of turnover of securities traded on London stock 
exchange in 1980 was about £196 billion of which £152 billion was 
of British government securities. see: L.J. Kemp, A Guide to 
World Money and Capital Markets, (U.K.: McGraw-Hill book Company, 
1981), Table 17.8. 
78. David Gill, "South East Asia", Financial Markets -
Present and Future. The Role of 
International Agencies - I.F.C.", p.11. 
Conference on South East Asia's 
Financial Markets, Manila, 7-9 July, 
1975. 
79. M. Altazi, and Q. Waniesh "Technical Aspect of Moroccan Financial 
Market", op.cit., 
80. For the exchange rate in the 1970s see: Arab Monetary Fund. Money 
and Credit in the Arab Countries 1971-81. (July, 1982), Table 
~ For the-exchange rate of the 1980s see: David Lennon, 
"Changing Brings Confusion", Financial Times, (June 25,1984). 
- 262 -
81. Hisham-Albassat, 
82. Mary Frings, 
83. 
84. 
85. Claudio Segre, 
86. 
87. G.O. Nwankwo, 
IIR .ecen~ Development in the Lebanese 
Flnanclal Market: Direction and 
Prospect ll , op.cit., 
IIFinancial Services Back up the Banksll 
The Banker, (December, 1981, pp.93-102: 
liThe Shrinking ll Kuwait Private Sector ll 
Arab Business Magazine, (January, ' 
nBJ), p.20. 
IICapital Market ll , Venezuela Supplement 
Financial Times, (November 17 1975) , 
18 '" p. . 
IICapital Markets in Developing 
Countries: Institutional Problems and 
Growth Prospectsll, in liThe Mobilization 
of Internal Financial Resources in 
Latin America ll , p.50. 
IIArab Equityll, Arab Banking and Finance 
op.cit., p.15. 
The Nigerian Financial System, (London: 
The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980), p.70. 
88. The majority of the Jordanian Insurance 
Companies were family enterprises, 
see: Amman Financial Market, Guide 
to Jordanian Public Shareholding 
tompanies, vol.2, (Jordan: Alnamothagia 
Press, 1981), pp.165-288. 
89. IICapital Market ll , Venezuela Supplement, 
op.cit., 
90. IIWorkers Make Good Response to Share 
Purchase Scheme ll , The Times, Iran 
Supplement (May, 22, 1975). 
91. A Royal decree was issued making the price of each share one 
Kuwaiti dinar. See: Kuwait Central Bank, Kuwait Economy in Ten 
Years 1969-1979, op.cit., p.l05. 
92. The European Securities Markets. (Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of The European Communities, 1981), p.24, Table 7. 
93. IIInsurance in Arab Countries, Surveyll, Arab Business Magazine, 
No.63, (September, 1984), pp.67-74 and, "Arab Banking and 
Insurance Speci all ssue", Arab Bri ti sh Commerce, (March, 1981}, 
pp.11-13. 
94. Curbing inflation and freeing interest rates for financial 
development examined by Edward Shane and R. see: 
E.S. Shaw, Financial Deepening in Economic Development. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1973), Chapter 5, and 
R.I. McKinnon, Money and Capital in Economic Development 
(Washington, D.C. Brooking Institution, 1973), Chapter 7. 
- 263 -
95. Anthony M. Underwood, "Inter-Arab Financial Flow", Economic 
Eastern and Islamic Studies, University 
of Durham, 1974). 
96. For the Arab Monetary Integration see: 
Suleiman H. Almunthry, Arab Monetary Cooperation Aspects and 
Possibilities, (Cairo: Rose Alusef, 
1978), Chapter 5, See also for recent 
efforts, "An Analysis of the present 
Arab Financial Cooperation: Prospect 
Burhan A l-Daj ani, for Monetary I ntegrati on", in Arab 
Monetary Integration, Edited by Khar 
El-Din Haseeb and Samir Makdisi 
(London: Croom Helm, 1982), pp.125-
145. 
- 264 -
CHAPTER SEVEN 
OFFSHORE BANKING IN THE REGION 
Offshore Banking in the Region 
Introduction 
The introduction of the offshore banking units to the region since the 
mid-1970s has integrated the Arab financial markets with their 
international counterpart. This undoubtedly increased competition 
between the financial institutions in the region and improved the 
service rendered by such institutions. But integrating the Arab 
financial markets requires more links between the Arab domestic markets 
and less integration with the international ones. 
Beirut had served during the 1950s and 1960s as a regional financial 
centre for the operation of International Banks. It was an acceptable 
place for banks to meet, had an excellent communication system and more 
importantly enough financial expertise on which to draw. But the civil 
war and the massive expansion in business and wealth in the Gulf region 
in the Mid 1970s made the international banks re-examine their position 
and look for an alternative. The banks showed interest in Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia as they have been the richest countries in the region, but 
the latter showed no interest in lifting the ban on the establishment 
of new banks in their territories. So the international banks looked 
to Athens, Cairo, Tehran, Amman, U.A.E. and Bahrain. As they found 
Athens and Tehran not suited to serve the region, they concentrated 
on the Arab countries. 
These efforts coincided with the wish of some Arab countries to receive 
them. In 1975, Bahrain announced the creation of offshore business. 
This policy reflected Bahrainis realization that without significant 
oil resources, it could capitalize on its location and its excellent 
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communications. Dubai was also prepared to receive such banks and had 
introduced so called restricted bank licenses. Egypt was the third to 
pose as a regional financial centre. A major effort to set up the 
necessary legal framework for such centre was persuaded. This 
framework consisted essentially of Law 43 of June 1974 regarding the 
investment of Arab and foreign capital in Egypt which grants Egyptians 
and foreigners the right to undertake banking operations in Egypt in a 
joint venture, merchant banks, investment banks or in branches. 
Tunisia joined this club and also announced its offshore business. 
Consequently the international banks have established themselves in 
these centres on different scales. 
The introduction of this type of banking to the region has increased 
the integration of the Arab financial markets with the international 
banks and caused further drains on the region's accumulated saving and 
adversely affected Arab efforts to integrate their own financial 
markets. 
The present chapter will examine the evolution of the offshore 
financial centres in general and in the region in particular, then 
assess their impact on the international banks, the host countries and 
the region. This would enable us to see these banks in the right 
perspective and therefore to suggest measures to be taken in order to 
bring them into line with the Arab efforts to integrate their capital 
markets and probably to lessen their adverse effect on the flow of 
funds within the region. 
7.1 The evolution of the offshore financial centres 
7.1.1 The evolution of the offshore financial centres in general 
Before tracing the evolution of the offshore centres it is well worth 
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considering what we mean by such centres. Kelen defines the offshore 
financial centre as 
"a place where international financial business can be 
carried on in a fiscaly neutral way."O) 
For the offshore banks to do so they are usually licensed to operate 
under separate regulations, particularly in the area of foreign 
exchange control and taxation.(2) In addition they are allowed to 
receive deposits and make loans denominated in currencies other than 
that of the country in which they are operating.(3) 
The creation of such markets was first caused by the restrictive 
financial environment in the U.S.A. which drove a large proportion of 
the market in dollars to London. The restrictive legislation adopted 
in the U.S.A., (namely interest equalization tax introduced in 1963, 
and the earlier 1934 regulation Q) discouraged foreigners from buying 
U.S. securities. (4) As a result the number of dollars outside the 
U.S. began to increase. This gave London the opportunity to create the 
Eurodollar market to satisfy the needs of foreign holders of 
dollars.(5) The international banks, of course, welcomed this 
initiative as they could avoid domestic monetary constraints such as 
reserve requirements, credit ceilings and interest rate restrictions. 
In analogy to that the offshore financial centres have been developed 
to offer certain advantages for the international private sector not 
available in the traditional financial centres (London and New York). 
This development came about despite the fact that modern communications 
have reduced the importance of the geographical location of a financial 
centre since it is possible to execute financial operations without the 
parties concerned having to be physically present in the same place.(6) 
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In the last two decades or so many small countries have opened their 
territories up to such business. Singapore, Luxembourg, Jersey, The 
Bahamas and Hong Kong are the best known offshore financial centres. 
The prerequisite for any place to be accepted as an offshore centre is 
the ability to offer potential users a means of by-passing fiscal 
regulations in force in their own countries. Some users want a tax 
haven, some want freedom from exchange control or to escape 
confiscatory measures and others perhaps want to manipulate their 
dubious business away from any regulatory influence. In addition to 
the favourable tax and foreign exchange regulations, an advanced 
communication system and access to the major centres by air, sea or 
other means are other necessary conditions for the emergence of such 
centres. The attraction of offshore centres to the international banks 
varies according to their regulations and the profitability of the 
business they expect to be involved in as well as the business they 
might lose by not participating.(7} 
7.1.2 The evolution of the offshore banking units in the the region 
The decline of Beirut's position as a financial centre within the 
region in the early 1970s coincided with the massive expansion of 
business and capital in the Gulf area, resulting from the oil price 
increase. This made the international banks search for an alternative. 
The priority of the international banks was the lucrative Saudi Arabian 
markets, Kuwait and the U.A.E.'s. But the first two countries had not 
shown much interest in opening their doors to the international banks. 
Consequently when the international banks were unable to establish 
themselves in one of these rich countries they sought an alternative in 
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neighbouring countries with good access to these markets.(8) They 
looked to the U.A.E.'s, Bahrain, Egypt and Jordan. 
The international banks exerted great pressure on these countries, and 
in the absence of national pressure in Bahrain and the loose Federation 
in the U.A.E.'s the banks succeeded in persuading the Bahrain Monetary 
Agency and the U.A.E. Currency Board to issue a new form of limited 
banking license permitting the establishment of offshore banking units 
(OBUs) in 1975 and 1976 respectively. Under the licensing system 
adopted in Bahrain (see Apendix 7.1) OBUs can carry out all banking 
operations with non-residents of Bahrain and with Bahrain's government 
and its agencies. The only restriction on their dealing is with the 
private sector in Bahrain itself and here another exception in the 
system is made to allow development projects to raise funds from OBUs. 
These units are not required to maintain any reserves with the Bahrain 
Monetary Agency nor to observe any formal liquidity ratios. The system 
also allows the existing fully licensed banks to hold an OBU license 
for their non-resident business. And in the absence of any tax on 
income or profit in Bahrain an annual registration fee of 10,000 
Bahrain dinars is payable by each unit. 
As the system seems to be tailored to the benefit of the international 
banks many banks immediately applied for a license and their number 
started to increase rapidly. (9) Today, virtually all the major world 
banks have established offshore branches in Bahrain (see Appendix 7.2). 
And in the Bahrain Monetary Agency's drive to consolidate Bahrain's 
offshore financial centre it began issuing investment bank licenses in 
1977 and began to admit other ancillary services such as foreign 
exchange brokers, legal and accounting firms. By 1982, the number 
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of the financial intermediaries that were licensed in Bahrain as 
offshore enterprises reached 149 units of which there were 74 OBU's, 50 
representative offices, 14 investment banks, 11 brokers and securities 
houses. They represent the world-wide financial interest and in 
particular the region with 40 units, western European countries with 
about 41 units, U.S.A. with 21 units and Japan with 25 units. See 
Table 7.1. Consequently the Bahrain financial centre became an 
inseparable part of the international financial markets. 
The offshore business in the United Arab Emirates began when the 
U.A.E.'s Currency Board announced in 1976 its readiness to allow the 
establishment of 12 Restricted License Bank (RLB). The only 
restriction was of opening current account services. The system was 
welcomed by the international banks as they viewed the U.A.E. as a 
natural place for the offshore business. The country has the oil 
wealth of Abu Dhabi and the entrepot trade of Dubai, a combination of 
money and entrepreneure. But soon the Federal government of the U.A.E. 
showed its reluctance to encourage its growth and a decision was taken 
to the effect that no fully licensed commercial bank could also hold an 
RLB license. (10) The decision was intended to discourage the 50 or so 
banks operating in the Emirates from applying for such a license. As a 
result the twelve institutions which had obtained this license dropped 
to just five. So the system had grown very little. This is clear from 
the small volume of business generated by these banks solely through 
interbank borrowing from the domestic market their aggregate balance 
sheets in 1980 were approximately U.S. $ 600 millions compared with 
comparable figures for the commercial banks of approximately U.S. $ 12 
billions. 
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TABLE 7.1 
The number of financial institutions in Bahrain according to Nationality 
---I I I 
I Countries I Commerci al I OBUS Rep Investment Brokers National 
I I Banks I Banks Banks Total 
I I I 
I I I 
I Bahrain I 5 I 12 6 23 
I Kuwait I I 1 1 2 
I U.A.E. I 1 I 1 2 
I Saudi Arabia I I 2 2 
I Oman I I 1 1 
I Jordan I 1 I 1 2 
I Iraq I 1 I 1 
I Egypt I 1 2 3 
I Pakistan I 2 2 4 
I I ran I 2 1 3 
I I ndi a I 2 2 
I Turkey I 1 1 2 
I United Kingdom I 2 8 2 6 18 
I Holl and I 1 1 1 3 
I France I 1 9 1 11 
I West Germany I 4 4 
I Switzerland I 3 3 6 
Belgium 1 1 
Italy 2 l 
Spain 1 1 2 
Greece 1 1 
Luxembourg 4 1 5 
U.S.A. 2 9 7 3 21 
Canada 2 2 4 
Brazi 1 3 2 5 
Sweden 1 1 
Taiwan 1 1 
Philippines 1 1 2 
Hong Kong 1 2 1 4 
Indonesia 1 1 
Malaysia 1 1 
Korea 2 1 3 
Japan 1 16 3 5 I 25 
1 I Australia 
I 
I 
Total 20 74 50 14 11 I 169 
I 
Source: Appendix 7.2 
The other Arab countries which have allowed the operation of offshore 
banking on their territories are Tunisia and Egypt. In their intense 
efforts to speed up development they made a move to attract foreign 
banks. Tunisia issued an offshore banking law in 1976 but as its 
intention was to finance local development it limited the growth of 
such business to eight banks.(ll) 
In Egypt the drive to create financial centres began after the "open 
door" policy was introduced in 1975. The law No.43 of 1974 relating to 
the investment of Arab and foreign capital in Egypt was revised and 
amended to allow the operation of foreign banks and to ease foreign 
exchange controls. According to the provisions of this law foreigners 
are allowed to establish banks in Egypt with up to 100 percent equity 
or participate in joint ventures in which local Egyptian capital 
constitutes at least 51 per cent of the total. The law is too long 
and complicated for a bank established under this law to engage in 
local currency transactions it should in the form of joint ventures. 
(12) The activities of the other banks, the investment banks and 
merchant banks, should be confined to transactions effected in freely 
convertible foreign currencies.(13) This law put an end to the ban on 
the operation of foreign banks in Egypt. Consequently many banks have 
been established there. By 1982 their number reached 49 of which 18 
were commercial foreign ventures, 10 non-commercial banks, 20 branches 
of principal foreign banks and one an offshore bank.(14) 
7.2 The impact of the offshore banks on the international banks 
The establishment of the OBUs has benefitted the world wide financial 
communities and in particular the international banks in three 
different ways. 
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1. The development of the OBUs in Bahrain has introduced an 
alternative to Beirut. 
2. The high volume of the OBUs activities represent a significant 
share of the world Eurocurrency market especially outside the major 
traditional financial centres. 
3. Bahrainis time zone has allowed the international banks to 
complete the chain of money markets around the globe. 
With regard to the first, Beirut was once the undisputable financial 
centre for the operation of international banks in the region. It 
began the development of its infrastructural facilities such as the 
airport and ports during the French mandate half a century ago. And it 
has housed the American University since the early 1940s. Through that 
Beirut emerged as a commercial and cultural centre of the region, and 
many international banks established themselves there. 
To enhance Beirutls financial position in 1956 a banking secrecy law 
was promulgated. Under this law banks were authorised to open secretly 
coded accounts for their customers and it became illegal to provide any 
information to any third party about this account without the prior 
permission of such clients. This coincided with the political unrest 
in the region. Under these circumstances the international banks found 
a lucrative market in Beirut and adopted it as the focal point for 
their activities in the region. Consequently the number of banks 
operating in Lebanon increased from 31 in 1955 to 93 in 1965. (15) 
A decade later, the position of Beirut as a regional financial centre 
began to crack with the failure of Intra Bank, the largest Lebanese 
bank which accounted for about 20 per cent of total deposits with 
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commercial banks in 1965, with several Lebanese commercial banks 
holding large deposits with it. The failure of the Bank with 16,000 
depositors' funds tied up, (16) severely damaged confidence in Beirut 
as a financial centre and capital began to leave Beirut seeking safety 
and profits elsewhere. 
The failure of the Intra Bank, promoted the Lebanese Central Bank to 
carry out its duties by closely supervising the operations of the 
commercial banks. Consequently the central bank asked the small banks 
to merge with other banks. As a result the number of banks fell to 
about 70 in the early 1970s from 93 banks in 1965. This restored some 
confidence in Beirut. But the civil war in Lebanon in the mid 1970s, 
and the increasing sophistication of other Arab countries' financial 
institutions sharply eroded the need for Lebanese banking services. 
(17) In fact at the height of the civil war in Lebanon over 100 firms 
and banks had their regional offices in Beirut moved to Amman, (18) and 
perhaps more of such business moved to Athens or Cairo. Since the 
Lebanon has entered its longest recession which culminated in the 
Israeli invasion in 1982 which shattered and divided the country in all 
but name. However, once political problems are solved, it is by no 
means certain that the attitude of Lebanon to business and banking 
will be the same. 
Beirut's popularity and its traditional role would continue to finance 
the large volume of trade going through its port. But Beirut's 
financial prosperity is seriously threatened by political uncertainty 
and the loose supervision of the central banks. As one observer noted 
recently, 
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"The Lebanese banking sector's envied control-free 
foreign exchange and bank secrecy laws will become 
worthless myths."(19) if indiSCipline persists. 
The international banks by establishing themselves in Bahrain obtained 
a place in one of the richest virgin territories in world banking. 
Bahrain had a long tradition of being a service centre for the Gulf 
region. Its airport is used as a stopover point between Europe and the 
Far East. Its local and international telephone system are extremely 
efficient. 
Secondly, Bahrainis favourable position on the door step of the richest 
countries in the region allowed the OBUS to build up their financial 
position, in a very short time. At the end of 1983 the total assets of 
the OBUs stood at about $63 billion. This compares favourably with 
figures of about $80 billion in Singapore and about $49 billion in the 
Cayman Islands.(20) 
Thirdly, the time factor is very important for the international banks. 
The geographical location of Bahrain, midway between Europe and the Far 
East made Bahrain the ideal place to complete the chain of money 
markets around the globle for the international banks. So many banks 
in Bahrain maintain a dealing room to take advantage of this situation. 
These banks, helped by the licensed brokers with their world wide 
network have been funding Singapore's deficit in the early morning and 
as Bahrainis markets closed passed their surplus to the financial 
centre in Europe as they opened. 
7.3 The impact of the offshore banks on the region 
The offshore banks in Egypt and Tunisia have had very little or no 
impact at the regional level because their operations are more closely 
scrutinized and mainly directed towards the local markets. But the 
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purpose of the OBUs in Bahrain was to create an international money 
trading centre in the Gulf to handle dealings in local currencies and 
to act as a channel for the surplus liquidity of the region. (21) 
Eventually the operations of the OBUs have affected the surrounding 
countries. Some of these effects are considered by some writers to be 
positive and by others to be negative. 
The advocates of the market claim that it achieved the following goals. 
1. The establishment of the OBUs brought branches of the major banks 
to the region which gave the public and private sectors the opportunity 
of placing their surplus funds with them locally and during the working 
hours of the individuals living in the region. And for this the OBUs 
have been the ideal vehicle for tapping the deposit market within the 
region.(22) 
2. The OBUs have created and developed money and inter-bank markets 
in the region. They have become a major free market for Gulf 
currencies, in particular the Saudi riyal and the Kuwaiti dinar. The 
wide margins which used to apply to large transactions in Gulf 
currencies have become minimal, and the extent of European currency 
deals has become similar to those existing in European and American 
centres. Meanwhile the inter-bank market in OBUs linked the commercial 
banks in the neighbouring countries into one large market. The banks 
from the other Gulf states could deposit funds in Bahrain if interest 
rates were higher there or borrow, if they were low. As a result, rate 
differentials have tended to decline in the region.(23) 
3. The development of the forward market for the region's currencies 
and foreign currencies reduced the profit on currency exchange.(24) 
4. The OBUs brought with them the most advanced systems used in 
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banking operations and they introduced a new level of service which 
is reflected in the improvement of other banks' services in the region. 
The arguments presented above in support of the OBUs seem to be 
exaggerated or of minor importance to economic development of the 
region and conceal the OBUs adverse effect on the surrounding 
countries. The exaggeration lies in the claim that the OBUs brought 
the top national banks to the region and that they were behind the 
improvement in the operation of the other markets. The truth is that 
the top international banks have been in the region for a long time 
through their branches in the U.A.E., Oman and Qatar. They are also 
present in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait through minority share holdings in 
commercial banks in Saudi Arabia and in finance and investment 
companies in both countries. Also the international banks had been 
present through the management services they offered to many local 
financial institutions. This is evident in the fact that the big 
players in the OBUs are those banks which have local branches. The 
adverse effect of the OBUs on the surrounding countries can be seen in 
the following areas. 
1. The OBUs dealing in the regional currencies created the forward 
market in them. The market began small but rapidly increased to a 
few billions in a very short time as seen in (Appendix 7.3). The OBUs 
bought local currencies for a reasonable period based on interest 
differentials against the dollar, then they hedged elsewhere against 
other currencies. Likewise they sold local currency to customers on 
demand or on the spot and lent it in the inter-bank markets until the 
customer was due to collect. Through that they collected the dollars 
by selling regional currencies and invested them for more than they 
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paid for borrowing local currencies. The speculation of the OBUs in 
the regions currencies created many liquidity crises. For instance 
their speculation in U.A.E. dirham in 1977 created a dirham crisis and 
led to the failure of two commercial banks there.(25) The failure of 
the two banks and the liquidity crisis undermined confidence in the 
whole banking system in the U.A.E. 
Dealing in the region's currencies has been on the rise despite the 
strong objections of the surrounding countries. The outstanding 
forward deals of about $8 billion in the region's currencies in 1982 
are very large for countries with small economies and could create 
great trouble for the management of their economies. 
2. The lending operation of the OBUs sometimes undermines economic 
stability in the Gulf States. Their excessive lending to shore market 
speculators accelerated the collapse of Al-Manakh Market in Kuwait. 
(26) The OBUs have opted for trade finance rather than lending long 
term, because this type of lending is profitable and does not require 
substantial funding. Financing construction through providing 
performance bonds, advance payment guarantees and letters of credit 
have constituted the other none-trade activities. The maturity 
structure of the OBUs as given in the Appendix 7.4 shows that the share 
of assets with a maturity of over one year had been low and in the 
range of 12-18 per cent of their total assets. This is an indication 
that the OBUs had concentrated their activities in short-term finance 
in competition with local banks. 
3. The operations of the OBUs, free from many restrictions, have 
drained the regions accumulated savings. An examination of the figures 
on geographical distribution of the OBUs as given in Appendix 7.5 shows 
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that the region has provided the OBUs with almost two thirds of their 
resources and only received about one half of their total finance in 
the period 1979-1982. So the region lost part of its accumulated 
savings instead of adding to them, as the OBUs through suit-case 
bankers and inter-bank dealing have collected more capital from the 
region than they extend to it. 
4. The introduction of the OBUs to the region has impeded (a) the 
use of local currency in large transactions and (b) the development 
of the local market. The increased dealing in regional currencies and 
the fear that these currencies would become internationalised compelled 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other countries to price their large contracts 
in dollars. (27) This reduced the transactions in local currencies, 
and perhaps discouraged these countries from integrating their 
currencies for fear of internationalization. Likewise the introduction 
of the OBUs with their liberal interest rates gave them the edge on the 
local financial institutions, since the latter's observance of a 
ceiling on interest rates prevented them from competing with the OBUs. 
Therefore, the development of the local institutions would have been 
faster had not the OBUs tapped a large part of their domestic savings. 
These savings would have gone to them in the absence of the OBUs, as 
the non-bank customers of the OBUs have been mainly private depositors 
who prefer to keep their savings at home. 
7.4 The ;mpact on the host countr;es 
From the discussion of the evolution of offshore banks in the region 
it has been seen that Bahrain, Egypt and Tunisia are the only Arab 
countries to have such enterprises on their territories. The 
preliminary objective of setting up such a business differs from one 
country to another. For instance Bahrain as a small island with a 
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population of less than 340,000 persons with a long history of being 
a regional service centre and with a free economic system has different 
objectives to those of Egypt and Tunisia which stood at the opposite 
end of the scale in terms of population territory and economic system. 
Bahrain's objective in setting up OBUs can be seen as an expansion 
of the service industry which it was undertaking in order to diversify 
its sources of income,(28) while the objectives of Tunisia and Egypt 
can be seen in terms of the offshore business's contribution to 
economic development mainly through finance and less through invisible 
foreign exchange earnings.(29) So the impact of the offshore business 
on these countries should be seen within this perspective. 
However, the economists found that the major benefits of hosting an 
offshore business were derived from their local operating expenditures, 
to the extent that these contribute to the domestic welfare of the 
country. (30) These enterprises pay salaries, rent, tax and other 
fees. These benefits appear to be loosely related to the volume of 
business routed through a centre but closely related to the number of 
banks and the types of operation carried out. Against that, a host 
country incurs direct and indirect costs. The direct cost is 
associated with expenditure on the regulation and control of such 
enterprises. The indirect cost is associated with building and 
maintaining efficient telecommunication and network services, education 
and the potential diminution of the autonomy of domestic monetary 
policy and perhaps increased tax evasion by businesses and 
individuals.(31) 
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7.4.1 The impact of the offshore banks on Egypt and Tunisia 
Given the nature of factors involved on the benefit and cost side of 
hosting an offshore bank, it is not possible to obtain satisfactory 
quantitative estimates. This difficulty is even greater in estimating 
the contribution and cost of offshore banks in Egypt and Tunisia 
because of the absence of data and the confusion in the framework 
guiding the operation of these banks. The banks operating in Egypt 
include, investment banks, joint-venture commercial banks, Egyptian-
owned banks and multinational offshore banks. Likewise, the offshore 
banks in Tunisia are joint-ventures with very little distinction from 
the domestic institutions. 
The influx of foreign banks with greater technological and managerial 
know-how has raised the standard of Egyptian banking and created a 
better atmosphere for foreign investments. This goes along with the 
objective of the new policy adopted in Egypt since 1975 which was 
intended to encourage foreign investment and rouse the Egyptian private 
sector. Likewise, the operation of foreign banks in Tunisia may help 
to improve the operation of Tunisian domestic banks through the new 
competitive environment created by the foreign banks. 
But the main objective of accepting these banks in both countries was 
to finance development. The hope had been that foreign banking 
operations would have become part of the policy of encouraging private 
enterprise, by managing and providing the finance to promote 
development but this has not materialised at the desired level. 
The bulk of foreign bank's finance has been raised for imports and some 
of the foreign banks were heavily involved in currency speculation. The 
speculative activities of some of the foreign banks have drained Egypt 
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of much of its foreign currencies (32), which it is badly in need of 
and which was one of the main purposes of accepting foreign banks in 
Egypt in the first place. In short these banks kept themselves away 
from the involvement of long term finance which is the only way to 
promote economic development. The experience of Egypt in this respect 
is described by Cooper in his study liThe Transformation of Egypt". 
Until the end of 1977 economic liberalization was an utter disaster. 
It produced none of the benefits that the government had projected on 
the side of production and investment, there was a deindustrialisation 
of Egypt literally, and a shrinking of industrial activity as a 
percentage of economic activity. Arabs rushed into financial 
activities, tourism and luxury construction. Egyptians shifted their 
activities into the free zones to escape the socialist laws and into 
commercial activities to serve the expanding international trade. Very 
little in the way of industrial activity, not to mention advanced 
technology industries was even contemplated.(33) 
The other important disadvantage of allowing foreign banks to operate 
in Egypt was the internal brain-drain. The well-trained Egyptian 
bankers, were lured by the high pay offered by the foreign banks. 
As a result many of them left their previous positions with local banks 
and jOined foreign banks. (34) Consequently the local banks were 
obliged to increase the salaries of their employees tremendously to 
keep them. The movement of such high calibre employees from the local 
banks undoubtedly affected their operations and perhaps some of their 
customers were lost. 
7.4.2 The impact of the OBUs on Bahrain 
The impact of the OBUs on Bahrain to some extent differs from that in 
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Egypt and Tunisia due to the greater number of institutions in Bahrain 
and its smaller national income. However, in the absence of any 
personal or corporate taxes in Bahrain, the main contribution of the 
OBUs to Bahrain has been the banking expenditures to the extent 
received by Bahrain. 
Banking expenditure is difficult to evaluate,but is closely related to 
the number of banks and people working on their payroll. However, 
in 1982, banking expenditure of all financial institutions including 
those with an offshore license was estimated at $160 million. (35) So 
this figure represented the total expenditure of all the financial 
institutions in Bahrain. To estimate the contribution of the OBUs to 
Bahrain, we can look into their annual registration fees, salaries paid 
to Bahraini, and other expenditure spent on goods and services produced 
in Bahrain. With regard to the first, Bahrain had received annual 
registration fees of $25,000 from each unit. This means that Bahrain 
had received an annual registration fee of less than $2 million. The 
salaries paid to Bahrain or spent on goods and services is larger than 
the registration fees. The number of Bahrainis working with OBU has 
risen to about 3,000 in 1984. See Appendix 7.2. But in a country 
where a high percent of the labour force is foreign, (36) where the 
indigenous population has no financial experience and few of them 
master the English language, we expect to find the Bahrainis in low 
level jobs such as clerical work so their total earnings would be in 
the magnitude of $30-40 million in 1984. 
The other direct benefit to Bahrain from the OBUs is their contribution 
of a 1 per cent levy on their monthly payroll to finance the Bahraini 
Bankers Training Centre which came into operation in 1981. (37) 
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To these benefits may be added another $10-15 million paid in rent. 
The other banking expenditures go to expatriates or are spent on 
imported goods, and had very little positive effect on the welfare 
of the Bahrain's. So in all the yearly contribution of the OBUs to 
Bahrain would be in the range of $40 - 50 million. 
It is not expected that the OBUs will have any effect on the efficiency 
of the banks operating in the domestic market despite the general 
assumption that they would have. The truth is that the domestic banks' 
are mainly composed of branches of top multinational banks such as; 
Chase Manhattan, Citibank, Grindlays, British Bank of The Middle East 
and others. These banks were established in Bahrain before the 
emergence of the OBUs. (see Appendix 7.2) 
Against the partial contribution of the OBUs to the economy of Bahrain, 
the influx of banks and companies put a severe strain on the tele-
communications system, housing and all other services networks. As a 
result the Bahrain government has incurred the initial cost of 
modernizing its communication systems and other network services and 
incurred the subsequent cost of running and maintaining these systems. 
In addition the government has incurred the cost of supervising and 
regulating the OBUs themselves. The cost of the adverse effect of the 
OBU's activities onshore is difficult to specify, but as eleven banks 
have onshore activities the distinction between domestic and offshore 
operations is a little blurred and could have adversely affected the 
domestic market. 
The social effect of the OBUs on the Bahrainis has been great. The 
arrival of the OBUs in the mid 1970s pushed up the cost of rents and 
services and boosted inflation.(38) This caused an increase in the 
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cost of living for the Bahraini citizens who rarely benefit from their 
arrival. The other effect on the people of Bahrain came through the 
high salaries paid by the OBUs. This discouraged the Bahraini from 
working in other economic activities because the pay was far less than 
in the banking industry. In addition the extravagant spending of the 
OBUs made people in Bahrain regard these enterprises as not being too 
serious and being more interested in show business. 
The most important adverse affect of the OBUs on Bahrain concerns its 
relations with neighbouring countries. The activities of the OBUs 
in the surrounding countries have not been welcomed by many and has 
caused certain problems which have been discussed in our examination 
of the OBUs impact on the region. The prosperity of Bahrain is 
dependent on its co-operation with its neighbours and because of this 
we consider that the adverse effect of the OBUs on neighbouring 
countries is costly to Bahrain. 
7.5 The prospects of the offshore banks 
The future of the offshore banks in the Arab region is dependant on 
their profitability and adaptability. The former is a necessary 
condition for the operation of the banks and the latter is essential 
for their acceptance by the region in general and the host countries 
in particular. 
To begin with Bahrain's offshore units, Bahrain's status as an 
international financial centre has been consolidated by different 
factors among which we find the following:-
1. The market has been developed in terms of the number and variety 
of financial institutions and it has developed the necessary 
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administrative machinery and tradition of financial expertise. So it 
has achieved economies of scale which militate against the 
establishment of competing centres nearby (39). Today the offshore 
business in Bahrain is composed of 149 units representing the interests 
of the world-wide financial communities. These interests will try to 
keep the business going. In addition, the strong relationship between 
the banking units in Bahrain and their parents abroad and the 
establishment of sufficient secondary services to provide accounting, 
investment, and legal advice assure the success of the market through 
its efficiency. The market, at present has an eternal vigilance and 
capacity to process and pass on information about development to 
various other financial centres and get its share as long as foreign 
exchange is kept free in the region. 
2. The growing presence of the Arab financial institutions in Bahrain 
has created more support for their operations in the surrounding 
countries. Bahrain has the largest Arab banks with government 
participation such as Gulf International Bank and Arab Banking 
Coporation. It is now the base of other regional institutions 
prominent among which is the reinsurance company (40) and with the new 
established cause-way between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia more companies 
are expected to establish their head office in Bahrain. 
3. The market has begun to develop new activities. Although foreign 
exchange is still the forte of the OBUs operations, the deposit side of 
the OBUs is building up and the banks have begun diversifying their 
activities. 
There is also uncertainty about the future of the OBUs in Bahrain and 
this emanates mainly from the conflict of interest and the development 
of the surrounding countries' financial systems. With regard to the 
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first the relationship between the OBUs and the surrounding states 
has never been an easy one because Kuwait and Saudi Arabia view OBUs 
as a threat. (41) Conflicts of interests exist. In the face of 
mounting pressure on their currencies, the nearby states resorted to 
certain financial measures to diminish the operation of the OBUs in 
their territory. The Kuwaitis revised the domestic banks liquidity 
requirements to stop the flow of Kuwait dinar to the OBUs.(42) 
Likewise the Saudi have taken several measures the main ones being: 
1. Restrictions on the participation of foreign banks in Saudi riyal 
syndication. 
2. An application to tax the foreign bank's earnings on direct 
lending to Saudi clients. 
3. The introduction of special 90 days deposit banks to soak up 
liquidity within the domestic market. (43) This instrument has also 
been introduced recently in other Gulf states for the same purpose. 
The other factors which would affect the future of the OBUs is the 
development of the financial systems in the neighbouring countries. 
The OBUs have taken full advantage of the inadequacy of the financial 
systems during the last few years in some of the neighbouring 
countries. Today the Arab capital surplus countries have developed 
their own institutions to export their capital and to serve the 
domestic market. This is clear from the experience of Kuwait and the 
U.A.E.s and to a lesser extent of Saudi Arabia. 
Kuwait experienced wealth many years before any other Arab countries. 
As a result it explored foreign investment and developed its own 
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institutions for this purpose many years before other countries in the 
peninsula did. It allowed its national banks to grow strong by banning 
the operation of foreign banks on its territory, and it has helped in 
the equity of many financial institutions. The government of Kuwait 
has provided part of the capital of two commercial banks, the Islamic 
bank and more important the two most powerful investment companies, 
namely the Kuwait Foreign Trading Contracting and Investment Company 
(KFTCIC) and the Kuwait Investment Company (KIC). And in a matter of 
policy it has given its national institutions a great role in 
channelling its surplus capital within the region as well as abroad. 
(44). This leaves very little for the OBUs to offer Kuwait. 
Likewise in the U.A.E. apart from the restricted license banks system, 
the country has developed its own institutions and has housed the top 
international banks. In the 1970s, the financial infrastructure of the 
U.A.E. has developed enormously, with its centre located in the city of 
Abu Dhabi, chiefly as a result of the financial strength of that 
Emirate as the principal oil and gas producer. To export its surplus 
capital, Abu Dhabi developed its own institutions such as the Abu Dhabi 
investment Authority and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Economic Development in 
addition to the National bank of Abu Dhabi. And to facilitate the 
1atter ' s activities in exporting capital the bank added to its 
commercial activities a merchant banking division in 1977.(a) Since 
then these institutions have been active in the deployment of Abu 
Dhabi's surplus capital and they are now considered to be the most 
aggressive institutions in this field.(45) In addition, Dubai has been 
housing a number of we11known foreign merchant banks such as wardley 
Middle East Limited, the merchant banking subsidiary of the British 
Bank of the Middle East and the Country Bank, and the merchant banking 
subsidiary of the National Westminster Bank.(46) 
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Thus the variety of financial institutions in the U.A.E. left nothing 
for the OBUs to offer their country of operation. 
Saudi Arabia has a less sophisticated financial system but the 
phenomenal growth and aggressiveness of its local banks after the 
Saudi-ization of the foreign banks (completed in 1980) substantially 
changed the scene. Today Saudi Arabia houses twelve large banks of 
which ten have a foreign minority interest and which all have access to 
levels of skill and professionalism matching those available to the 
OBUs. These developments considerably reduced the need for the OBUs 
service any more. (47) 
The development of the local financial system applies equally to other 
countries in the region. The financial systems of Qatar and Oman have 
grown very rapidly and in the light of their small local markets, both 
are overbanked consequently with very little room left for the OBUs. 
(48) 
The above signs of discontent and the fact that the financial markets 
in the region started to match Bahrainis financial markets raise some 
serious questions about the future of the OBUs in Bahrain. So we 
believe that for the OBUs to provide a service they should find a way 
of complementing rather than competing with other markets in the 
region. (49) 
The future of the other offshore banks in Egypt and Tunisia is not 
certain. The resentment towards foreign bank practices is common to 
both countries. A former Egyptian Minister of Finance described the 
scene in Egypt as a cow grazing the pastures of Egypt with its udders 
being sucked dry from outside. (50) In Tunisia the criticism levelled 
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at the new foreign banks is that too much faith is being put into such 
institutions with no results. 
As a result, Tunisia has restricted the operation of such banks and the 
authorities have shown no desire to become an offshore centre. In 
fact the Tunisian move in the first place was intended to help finance 
its own development needs, rather than to fulfil a regional role. And 
for this, Tunisia turned toward joint-ventures. (51) 
In Egypt the trend these days is to subject foreign banks to tighter 
controls through the central bank of Egypt and to transform them into 
joint-ventures. (52) And it is expected that those banks who feel 
committed to Egypt may decide to change their status to joint-venture 
banks, with a majority Egyptian shareholding. 
Indeed some foreign banks have already changed their status to jOint-
venture as such arrangements give them a wider scope of operation and 
make more investment opportunities possible. 
Conclusion 
The region has a slow capacity for introducing institutions conducive 
to economic development at the particular time they are needed. The 
state of affairs opened the way for the offshore banks to establish 
themselves in the region on the assumption that they would participate 
in the regions development. The OBUs have succeeded in developing 
exchange and interbank markets. This is to their credit but these 
developments are of minor importance for economic development. 
Granting permission to commercial banks to operate freely under 
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developed economies when their main objective is profit maximization is 
merely a way of emptying the region of accumulated savings or directing 
these savings into unproductive activities. Banks only participate in 
the financing of development in developing economies when national 
interests become the priority of such institutions. 
The introduction of the offshore banking units in the region where 
liberal foreign exchange controls are in force and where there is 
always a ceiling on the interest rate structure for social and 
religious reasons does no more than open a window for money to fly out. 
Private investors have engaged in foreign currency investment because 
the normally investment vehicles in the domestic markets were 
repressed, and the de facto link of the national currencies with 
dollars made foreign exchange risks negligible. As a result funds were 
moved into dollars and so deprived the local banks of the local 
currency deposit base needed to support local lending. 
After the development of the local financial markets in the Peninsula 
countries coupled with the existence of the major international banks 
there, the most important justification for the offshore banking has 
gone, and it is no longer necessary to circumvent the range of supply 
bottlenecks in the banking systems of other countries. 
In addition, the advantages which OBUs enjoy as a result of 
protectionism in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia will come to an end after 
the full implementation of certain measures which are at present 
underway to bring about economic integration in the Gulf region. (53) 
The benefit accruing to Bahrain from integration would be more than 
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offset by the fees lost if some OBUs were to be liquidated. Thus there 
is an obvious need to restrict further the OBUs operations through new 
and effective regulations. A coherent Arab common policy towards the 
outsiders is necessary, to build up on integrated Arab capital market 
capable of serving the region as a whole. It is hoped that such 
regulations will reduce the speculative activities of these banks and 
bring them into line with economic development needs and more 
importantly lessen their outside links and strengthen regional 
relations. 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
In drawing our conclusion on the development of the Arab financial 
markets we focus on their effectiveness in discharging the most 
important function expected of any financial system in the developing 
economies namely mobilizing savings from surplus sectors and making 
them available for borrowing by deficit sectors. In presenting our 
recommendations we acknowledge that the creation of unified financial 
markets is a gradual and long-term process, but significant moves to 
this end may be taken through standardization and unification of the 
financial services in the integrated area, and this depends on the co-
operation of all parties involved in this process. 
According to the first criterion, the examination of the Arab financial 
markets in the previous chapters reveals that they failed to discharge 
their most important function of mobilizing savings and making them 
available for the productive sectors at the national and regional 
level. 
In our examination of the constituents of the Arab financial markets 
we found that the commercial banks were the most developed sector 
although ill-equipped to mobilize domestic savings and to extend 
effective lending outside the trading sector. The number of commercial 
banks differs between Arab countries. Some of them are over banked and 
others have only one or several specialized commercial banks, but all 
banks are concentrated in urban areas. This leaves the rural areas 
outside the organized markets on the one hand a prey for moneylenders 
with their extravagant interest rate charges and on the other hand 
without the possibility of investing their savings. 
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In addition it was found that Arab commercial bank lending was mostly 
directed to finance trade with very little for the industrial and 
agricultural sectors. The adherence of the Arab commercial banks to 
orthodox banking practice (short-term self-liquidated loans) and their 
dominant role among other financial institutions in the vast majority 
of Arab countries has resulted in discrimination against the 
traditional and industrial sectors and has left a gap in medium and 
long term finance. This has led to differential costs of borrowing and 
lending in the different markets within such countries. 
The failure of the commercial banks to tap the rural area's and certain 
parts of the urban area's savings coupled with their reluctance to 
extend medium and long-term finance led to the emergence of other types 
of financial institutions. Some of them were deliberately created by 
governments, others emerged in response to the demand for the services 
they could offer. The development banks were of the first type of 
institution, sponsored by the government. Some of them were created by 
individual Arab countries while others were established collectively or 
by other rich Arab governments in order to extend medium and long-term 
finance for the region as a whole so as to reduce the wide disparities 
among Arab countries. The establishment of such institutions has 
contributed significantly to the development of the productive sectors 
and the housing sector through the extension of medium and long-term 
soft loans and the provision of the technical advice needed to 
formulate and carry out such activitiies. But the contribution of 
these institutions has been limited for various reasons. The 
development institutions of the deficit Arab countries were severely 
constrained by their inadequate resources, and the other development 
banks, particularly in the rich Arab countries, with great capital 
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resources at their disposal, were of recent origin. Consequently they 
had not had enough time to build up the technical capability needed to 
operate effectively and were merely regarded as administrative devices 
to administer government funds. Meanwhile the contribution of the 
regional development banks was limited due partly to the difficulties 
in identifying feasible projects in the region and partly because they 
limited their contribution to government projects or projects 
guaranteed by government. 
The emergence of the Islamic financial institutions added new financial 
instruments acceptable to those who objected to the operation of the 
commercial banks on the usury system and who refrained from using their 
facilities. This helped to tap the previously untapped savings of 
pious people and brought new customers to the financial markets both as 
savers and borrowers. But the Islamic banks have not spread widely 
enough to satisfy the growing demand for their services. As their 
operations have not yet been finalized it is really too early to judge 
their position within the Arab financial markets. 
The evolution of stock exchanges in a few Arab Countries did not add 
much to the financial markets of these countries as their operations 
were loosely regulated. The dominance of the family controlled 
business in the region and the enormous wealth of the government in 
the oil-exporting countries have constrained the expansion of such 
markets. The former severely limited the number of equity shares for 
sale and the latter prevented such governments from restoring any 
type of domestic borrowing. On account of this the securities markets 
in the region are small and consequently the stock exchanges in the 
region remain of little significance in financing development. 
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The collective Arab efforts in developing the region's integrated 
financial market have been limited to the activity of the Arab Monetary 
Fund whose principal aim, as stated in its article of agreement, is 
to achieve full monetary integration among the Arab member countries so 
as to facilitate the economic development of the region and strengthen 
its structure. The efforts of the AMF in this direction have achieved 
very little success. It has put most of its effort into finding a 
suitable method for the settlement of payments among member countries 
and in helping individual Arab countries to set up new financial 
institutions and markets. The Fund has done very little to increase 
the number of countries which have established free foreign exchange 
markets, to decrease the number of bilateral payment agreements among 
the Arab countries themselves, or to decrease the number of Arab 
countries which apply multiple exchange rates. Likewise the Fund has 
done very little to bring a unified Arab financial market into being. 
Although it brought some co-ordination to the activities of the 
professional associations and the national bodies responsible for 
supervising the proper functioning of the Arab financial markets, 
a general code of conduct for the region has not been issued. 
As a result, the financial legislation and regulations of the Arab 
countries have continued under the control of the national governments. 
Co-ordination in this respect has been minimal. The financial markets 
in the individual Arab countries grew independently in order to serve 
the national interest regardless of the interest of the region as a 
whole. 
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So the link between the local financial markets and the international 
markets remains stronger than the link between the local markets 
themselves. As a result we observed that the local financial markets 
developed their own peculiarities to serve the international markets 
rather than the regional markets. For instance, the financial markets 
in the oil-producing peninsula countries with enormous liquid wealth 
and limited investment opportunities at home sought outward growth 
beyond their national boundaries. To this end Kuwait developed its 
many investment banks and the Kuwait dinar bond markets to export 
capital mainly outside the region. Similarly the financial markets in 
the U.A.E. developed in order to export capital but as the wealth of 
the U.A.E. was less than that of Kuwait and its financial system was 
less sophisticated than that of Kuwait, its role in exporting capital 
was modest. 
The Saudi financial system was the weakest among them. It developed to 
serve local needs despite its great wealth, surplus capital, and 
greater investment opportunities. This motivated Bahrain, with no 
wealth of its own, to call on the international banks to set up 
business on Saudi Arabia's door step so as to benefit from their 
operational expenses. So the off-shore banking units in Bahrain 
established themselves as an inseparable part of the international 
banking industry. The financial markets in Qatar and Oman have 
improved remarkably but because of their countries' modest wealth and 
their late start they do not have the sophistication of the markets in 
neighbouring countries. 
In the remaining Arab countries, the growth of the financial system 
was also affected by their countries' wealth but more by economic 
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policy. In Algeria, Iraq and Libya, the oil revenues were almost 
sufficent for these countries' financial needs for development, so 
their financial systems grew merely to serve the local markets within 
the state's control. In other Arab countries such as Egypt, Jordan and 
Tunisia, the financial systems were faced with heavy demands for funds 
without being able to meet them from local resources. As a result, 
Egypt and Tunisia opened their doors to foreign banks to help finance 
their development, while Jordan greatly benefited from the considerable 
worker's remittances from its citizens working in the neighbouring 
countries, so its financial markets grew to accommodate these capital 
flows. 
Today the region has a few developed financial centres which together 
make up the Arab capital market. But their development on specialised 
lines and the limited links between each other have impeded their 
intermediary role in covering the region as a whole. This is evident 
from the great role which has been played by the international 
financial markets in accommodating the capital surplus of some oi1-
exporting countries and in lending the requirement of the Arab deficit 
countries for the last twelve years or so. So the financial dimension 
of Arab unity is at present undeveloped and fragmentary. The internal 
components have not been formed and the effective function of financial 
intermediation is not assured. 
The above summary leads us to conclude quite firmly that the Arab 
national financial markets are certainly undeveloped and that an 
integral Arab Capital Market has not yet materialized. 
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We now propose to return to the arguments presented in the first 
chapter which, it will be recalled, dealt with certain empirical and 
theoretical aspects of the financial problems facing developing 
countries. More precisely the initial chapter was concerned with the 
importance of capital accumulation in the process of the development of 
technologically-backward countries, the importance of financial markets 
and institutions in the saving/investment process and the importance of 
financial integration in transferring funds from the high savings 
countries to low saving countries, all of which have significant 
implications for current Arab efforts to unify the financial markets. 
It was shown that the development of the financial markets may assume 
an important role in the process of economic development. The 
development of the financial markets of an individual country may boost 
the saving/investment process in two ways: 
1. It may stimulate additional saving and investment through the 
introduction of a wide range of financial instruments with certain 
features of safety, liquidity and yield in which the complex needs 
of savers and investors are matched. Financial development with its 
twin pillars of monetization and financialization of the economy would 
lead eventually to a higher saving/investment process in countries 
where a large proportion of the household sector's savings are still 
put into land, livestock and to a certain extent durable goods. The 
financial development is expected to change the saver1s, wealth in 
favour of financial assets rather than existing assets of a non-
productive nature e.g. gold and jewelery which at present constitute a 
substantial part of the region's savers l portfolio. The transfer of 
such savings to financial assets makes additional funds available for 
lending to productive investment. 
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2. Financial development is essential to bridge the structural 
and functional gaps in the present financial markets. Their 
continuance may retard development because the financial structure 
in any country may either facilitate or hinder the flow of funds 
for economic development. 
The advantage of financial development at the regional level is almost 
the same as at the national level. A dynamic and integrated Arab 
capital market makes the savings from the high savings countries 
available to investors in low saving countries where investment 
opportunities in the latter are far in excess of the available funds 
for domestic savings. In this way the market would bring the cost 
of borrowing and lending in the different Arab markets into parity 
which in turn would lead to using Arab capital where it would make 
the largest contribution to the region's development. All of which 
would contribute towards building a firmer basis for Arab economic 
integration. 
In the light of the present situation where there are many elements, 
conducive to further efforts towards integrating the Arab capital 
markets and increasing the flow of funds within the region, intensi-
fied efforts are needed to overcome the shortcomings of the Arab 
financial markets and to move toward further economic integration. 
Our recommendations for the improvement of the operation of the 
existing Arab financial markets in order to enhance their role in 
economic development on the national and regional level, are presented 
under three main headings. The first is the effort necessary to 
encourage the mobilization of domestic savings and increase the volume 
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of medium and long-term finance. The second is the effort necessary 
to create a real economic base and a conducive environment for Arab 
capital to flow freely within the region and the third is the effort 
to integrate the Arab financial markets. 
1. Measures to encourage the mobilization of domestic resources 
and increase the volume of medium and long-term finance. 
a. Measures to increase the mobilization of additional resources. 
To institutionalize domestic savings in the Arab region several 
measures have to be taken. 
1. New savings banks or institutions similar to the building 
societies in Britain have to be created. No Arab country at present 
has such an institution, yet I feel that this is imperative for 
mobilizing the savings of small savers. 
2. The commercial banks can take several measures namely deposit 
insurance, increasing capital, branch expansion, better training, all 
of which supports the growth of deposits. The introduction of a 
deposit insurance scheme to insure against loss in the case of bank 
failure would encourage depositors to keep their savings with the 
banks. Likewise an increase in the number of bank offices would 
extend the geographical coverage of the banks and bring them closer 
for more people thus stimulating savings accounts. The consequent 
growth of the banks' capital would generate more good will and 
encourage people to save with them as a cushion against any loss 
increase. Then training employees would enable the banks to offer 
better services and attract more savers. 
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3. The development banks should be allowed to compete for deposits 
by offering rates close to those of the commercial banks and by 
giving priority to the depositors to receive loans when the need 
arises. For this the development banks' laws have to be amended. 
4. The development of unit trust companies is a further way to 
mobilize the savings of people with modest means. Therefore, such 
companies should be established in countries with sufficient equity 
shares. 
However, to help the banks carry out these measures-some of which are 
costly, the governments could support the deposit insurance scheme 
and impose mergers on small banks to increase their capital and spread 
their network of branches. In addition the adoption of a flexible 
and realistic interest rate policy is essential. Likewise to encourage 
savers to hold long term financial instruments with the development 
banks the goverments could give tax concessions to holders of such 
instruments. 
b. Measures to increase the volume of medium and long-term finance: 
1. The commercial banks should promote new financial instruments 
with long term maturity. The certificate of deposit is one such 
instrument which if used effectively could change the present short-
term nature of the Arab banks' liabilities. This change is a 
precondition of the banks' extending long-term finance. 
2. The development banks in the deficit Arab countries should pool 
their resources through the creation of a central office to co-
ordinate their activities. This would allow better use of the existing 
resources and improve the present situation where some have excess 
capital and others reject applications because of the lack of capital 
at their disposal. 
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3. The establishment of stock exchanges would help people to a 
acquire long-term instruments in the knowledge that they can liquidate 
such instruments on such markets if and when the need arises. The 
existence of stock exchanges helps banks to manage their liabilities in 
a way more beneficial to long-term finance. 
However, for the banks to direct more of their funds to medium and 
long-term finance, they should be given the appropriate discount 
facilities by the central monetary authorities and should be allowed to 
hold equity shares in industrial activities. 
2. Efforts necessary to create a real economic base and to 
encourage the flow of funds in the region 
The obstacles to capital movement are not confined to the restriction 
on its flow through exchange control in the backward economies. The 
obstacles are many and interwoven within the prevailing economic and 
financial environment. With regard to the Arab region there are three 
major obstacles to this movement. We noted in chapter two that the 
Arab countries have failed to create any real industrial base and have 
continued to depend on the outside world as a market for their raw 
material exports and as a source for all sort of imports. Their back-
ward economies integrated them with the rest of the world and lessened 
the inter regional exchange of goods. Likewise we noted that the Arab 
governments are the owners or holders of the large proportion of the 
region's domestic savings. This concentration of funds lessens the 
efficiency in deploying them for the development of the region. Finally 
obstacles may arise from differences in tax systems, poor communication 
facilities and inefficient administration. Therefore, we have the 
following suggestions to make. 
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a. Change the pattern of trade. 
The international orientation of the Arab commodity exchange has 
significantly lessened Arab capital market integration and increased 
individual Arab countries' financial market integration with the 
international banks. Total Arab external trade represented on average 
about 82 percent of total Arab GOP in the two years of 1981 and 1982. 
This shows that external trade occupies an important position in the 
region's economic life (Inter-Arab trade accounted for less than 10 
percent of this). The small size of inter-Arab trade is mainly due to 
the failure of the Arab countries to achieve real structural changes in 
their economies. The structure of the exported and imported 
commodities reveals these facts. Crude oil and other minerals 
constituted over 96 percent of the region's total value of exports. The 
imports were more diversified ranging from food-stuffs to all sorts of 
manufactured goods. 
In planning to increase regional trade, the Arab states have concluded 
several agreements between themselves aimed at removing the trade 
barriers. But the absence of any significant tax barriers on imports 
to the Peninsula oil countries (the largest market in the region at 
present) and the similarity of agricultural and manufacturing products 
among other Arab countries made such an agreement virtually 
meaningless. 
Abolishing trade barriers to increase the flow of goods within the 
region is not the practical answer within the context of the present 
Arab economic structure. Had greater attention been paid to the 
structural change in the real economy many of the problems of the 
present Arab financial markets would have been solved. Therefore, 
we advocate the creation of strong industrial base. This can be done 
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by directing more effort to co-ordinating investment in the region 
within the context of economic integration, and in particular through 
the development of forms of collective investment, taking the greatest 
advantage of the economies of scale and pooling the scarce technical 
resources and specialists in the region. Unless this desired 
structural change is achieved inter-Arab trade will continue to be 
small and consequently the financial superstructure resulting from such 
a volume of trade will also be small, and there can be no real progress 
towards greater economic integration. 
b. Improvements in the administrative, legislative, and political 
environment 
The present situation suggests that the great proportion of capital 
supply and demand in the region comes through the public sector. Thus, 
reforming the Arab governments' financial machinery is of paramount 
importance in eradicating the rigid centralisation of sources of funds 
and demand for them. The oil-exporting countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 
and U.A.E) have enormous wealth which is now managed by few people. For 
these funds to be managed efficiently, expertise of a high calibre 
capable of making feasability studies in the region as a whole should 
be recruited. Likewise the government machinery in the deficit Arab 
countries has to be reformed. Public enterprise should be allowed to 
operate more freely, smaller specialized units could be created to 
increase economic resilience and to compete for funds. In addition, 
the deficit Arab countries should set up a central autonomous 
development office vested with full authority to decide and follow up 
matters concerned with other Arab investors. At present the 
establishment of new projects involves inevitably dealing with many 
official bodies concerned with investment incentives, taxation, land, 
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immigration, labour, customs, foreign exchange control etc. These 
bureaucratic procedures may well discourage Arab investors. 
Improving the governments' mechanisms responsible for the investment 
of billions of dollars in the Arab surplus countries must be taken 
as a pre-requisite for the efficient deployment of the Arab funds. 
Efficient government machineries in all Arab countries would help to 
identify profitable projects within the region and to increase the flow 
of capital. In parallel with the improvement in administration, the 
political environment should be conducive to the operation of the 
market. In the first place, once financial markets are created their 
mechanism will depend more on confidence, attitudes and the legal and 
economic environment rather than the strictly institutional aspects of 
the market. In the second place, as the financial institutions are 
profit maximizers, they are expected to put their funds where the 
profit rate is high, the risk is small and the cost of administering 
the loans is low. In such a situation funds would not flow to the 
socially most effective project. 
The diversity in the Arab countries legislation with a full 
liberalization of capital movement within the region would drive 
capital not to where it is most needed, but to where it is least taxed. 
In general the present Arab administrative, legislative and political 
environments where decisions are frequently altered reserved or 
suspended is not helpful to the flow of funds in the region. 
c. Promoting the status of the AFSED 
The creation of the AFSED in 1972 was an important milestone on the 
road toward economic integration of the Arab region. Together with 
the other national development banks with a regional mission it is 
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helping to reduce the region's disparities. The fund at present is put 
in a straitjacket by the bureaucratic practice of the Arab governments 
and it is less capitalized than some national institutions. Therefore, 
we advocate substantial increases in its lending potential, political 
authority to enable it to initiate projects which have the highest 
priority in regional development, and to participate effectively with 
other Arab governments in drawing up their development plans. This 
would allow the co-ordination of all Arab general and sectoral policies 
and promote measures affecting the region as a whole. In addition, its 
long experience and access to information on the regional level can 
playa major part in confronting bottlenecks that relate to limits of 
the region's capacity for absorbing new investments. It would take 
over the task of preparing feasibility studies, a great number of which 
are presently provided by foreign concerns. 
3. Measures towards integrating the financial markets. 
Almost a decade has elapsed since the decision taken by the Governors 
of the Arab Central banks to work towards an economic and monetary 
union. The progress which has been made since then has been 
disappointing. The enthusiasm which existed when the decision was 
taken did not in general express itself sufficiently in the form of 
effective action. As a result, the Arab dinar, the central element of 
the Arab Monetary System remains only as a unit of account. Likewise 
the Arab currencies exchange rate arrangements continue to be linked to 
the dollar and to a smaller extent to other convertible foreign 
currencies. Consequently, the fluctuations in the rate of exchange 
between Arab currencies have been wider than those with the foreign 
currencies and the magnitude of the external influence has become ever 
greater. 
In essence an Arab Monetary System, as such, is non existent. 
Integration logically requires concentration of monetary powers. 
Within this context, this power has to be given to the AMF. Likewise 
in the Arab region, as far as concern us the weak or vulnerable 
currencies, it is unavoidable, that the Arab dinar is promoted as a 
parallel currency to create a zone of monetary stability to improve 
the prospects of economic development. 
1. Promote the status of the AMF to acquire the central monetary 
management function from Arab central banks. 
The Arab states have done quite a lot to provide a financial structure 
for the integrated Arab capital market. This is evident in the 
establishment of the AMF itself, the AFSED and the other multilateral 
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To allow it to playa more decisive role and greater political 
authority, partial pooling of the Arab central banks' reserves with 
those of the AMF should take place as a first step. 
Simultaneously it should be endowed with limited fidiuciary power. 
The former proposal would enable the AMF to contribute to the 
adjustment of imbalances in global and regional payments, facilitate 
stability in member countries, in exchange rates and develop bases 
for autonomous regional liquidity creation and management. It would 
also analyse Arab member countries' disequilibrium systems, evaluate 
economic performance in member countries and design through the 
collective judgement of members, regional and national policies in 
specific circumstances. 
The latter proposal would help the AMF to create regional liquidity 
which would enhance the use of the Arab dinar as means of payment and 
as a reserve instrument. The acceptance of the Arab dinar at the 
official and private level within the region may eventually lead to 
its acceptance as the regional currency. The unification of Arab 
currencies is one of the greatest steps towards the development of 
the integrated Arab financial market. 
2. Strong underwriting houses should be created mainly by the Arab 
financial institutions with shares distributed equally among the Arab 
states. These houses should be supported by a long line of credit 
and should be allowed to deal specifically in the equity shares and 
bonds of the Arab joint ventures. They would underwrite the primary 
issues of such projects and sell them to private and institutional 
investors in the regions. 
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The development of a secondary market in these instruments would follow 
naturally if there were many issues. But at first these houses should 
be prepared to buy such instruments from their holders if the latter 
wished to sell. 
3. The Arab Monetary Fund should try to instigate a gradual 
programme of dismantling barriers to capital movement within the 
region, unifying the financial markets' services through unification 
of the financial legislation and regulations governing banks, 
insurance companies and stock exchanges. Simultaneously, it should 
place more restrictions on the operation of the international banks 
in exporting capital in order to ensure an orderly opening to the 
international market and to stimulate the financial institutions' 
growth and development to act effectively as an engine of development. 
The integrated Arab capital market would help to make rapid economic 
growth possible. But the basic factors that would determine how far 
economic development can be achieved in the region in the foreseeable 
future are the stability of the region, the quality and range of Arab 
enterpreneurial ability and skill and the adaptability of the Arab 
workforce, and the growth of co-operation between the Arab countries 
themselves. 
Perhaps the questions raised and the conclusions drawn in this study, 
will serve as a critical and analytical guide to readers who are 
interested in the development of the financial markets which are 
subjected to similar conditions. After all, a detailed strategic 
programme for such institutions has a fundamental bearing on the 
advancement of Arab economies. 
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APPENDIX 2.1 
Illiteracy Rates in the Arab Countries 
Estimated Illiteracy Rate 
I 1978 1973 I 1968 Country 
I 
I 
24.90 34.60 I 45.60 Jordan 
I 31.03 48.75 I 66.50 U.A.E. 
36.06 48.16 65.00 Bahrain 
48.90 58.90 68.90 Tunisia 
68.30 73.30 78.30 Algeria 
57.92 69.77 81.17 Saudi Arabia 
48.20 62.00 75.50 Sudan 
44.30 50.05 55.80 Syria 
39.50 57.00 74.50 Somalia 
47.20 61.20 75.20 Iraq 
36.50 52.64 71.00 Kuwait 
38.00 52.00 66.00 Libya 
52.50 59.10 65.70 Egypt 
77.60 84.00 92.00 Yemen A.R. 
52.80 66.30 80.20 Yemen P.D.R. 
46.95 58.52 70.76 Average 
SOURCE: Joint Arab Economic Report, 1981 
(U.A.E.: Dar al-Khalig, 1982), p.242. 
APPENDIX 2.2 
Arab Countries Industrial labour Force in 1980 
I ndustri al S of labour in 
labour Industry 
000 
1980 1970 1980 
Algeria 1074 12 25 
Iraq 808 18 25 
Kuwait 133 34 35 
Saudi Arabia 350 10 13 
libya 184 17 27 
Jordan 295 26 19 
Tunisia 378 18 24 
Syria 480 19 22 
lebanon 23 27 
Egypt 3085 12 26 
Morocco 1076 14 20 
Sudan 598 6 9 
Somalia 98 4 7 
Mauritania 22 3 5 
Yemen A.R. 235 7 11 
Yemen P.D.R. 104 15 21 
TOTAL 8920 
• SOURCE: World Development Report, 1981 
Joint Arab Economic Report, 1981 OPe cit. p.205 
APPENDIX 2.3 
Country 
Algeria 
Iraq 
U.A.E. 
Qatar 
Kuwait 
Saudi Arabia 
Libya 
Jordan 
Bahrain 
Tunisia 
Syria 
Oman 
Lebanon 
Egypt 
Morocco 
Sudan 
Somalia 
Mauritania 
Yemen A.R. 
Yemen P.D.R. 
Djibouti 
TOTAL 
" 
Arab Countr1es: Land and its usage 
Total 
Area 
238,124 
43,397 
8,360 
1,100 
1,782 
214,969 
175,954 
9,718 
62 
15,536 
18,405 
21,246 
1,023 
99,545 
44,630 
237,600 
62,734 
103,040 
19,500 
33,297 
2,198 
1,352,270 
100" 
1n 000 hectors 
Arable Pasture Forest Irrigated 
6,875 36,321 4,384 ,341 
5,250 4,000 1,500 1,750 
13 200 2 5 
2 50 
1 134 2 1 
1,040 85,000 1,601 395 
1,753 13,000 600 225 
1,190 100 125 85 
1 4 1 
3,190 2,550 490 145 
5,230 8,378 466 539 
18 1,000 38 
240 10 73 85 
2,700 2 2,855 
7,269 12,500 5,195 510 
12,360 56,000 48,940 1,750 
1,050 28,850 8,860 165 
192 39,250 15,134 9 
2,740 7,000 1,600 245 
187 9,065 2,450 70 
1 244 6 
51,302 303,656 83,430 9,244 
3.8" 22.4" 6.1" 0.6" 
SOURCE: Food and Argriculture Organisation, 
Production Yearbook, 1982 and previous issues. 
APPENDIX 2.4 
Gross Domestic Product and Per Capita Income at market Prices of 
the Arab Countries 
I I Country 1971 1981 
GOP Per GOP Per 
$ mi 11 ion Capita $ mi 11 ion Capita 
$ $ 
Algeria 5073 340 41383 2040 
Iraq 4145 430 31810 2350 
Emirates 1130 4040 32013 37660 
Saudi Arabia 5108 800 154224 17830 Qatar 400 3330 8831 35330 
Kuwait 3880 4910 24262 16620 
Libya 4565 2210 30329 9780 
Oman 301 450 6769 7360 
Jordan 521 220 3678 1090 
Bahrain 261 1190 4516 11290 
Tunisia 1709 330 8224 1260 
Syria 2105 320 16158 1740 
Lebanon 1672 660 3774 1400 
Egypt 7219 210 29610 680 
Morocco 4234 280 14779 720 
Sudan 2186 150 7993 420 
Somalia 331 120 1580 420 
Mauritania 218 170 702 420 
Yemen AR 281 60 2838 480 
Yemen PDR 156 110 788 390 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, National Account Country Tables 
for the years 1971-81, 1983 (Abu Dhabi, 1983). 
APPEtlHX 2.5 
Cruntry 
Algeria 
Iraq 
Sub Total 
O.A.E. 
Saudi Arabia 
Qatar 
KtJNait 
Libya 
SUb Total 
Jordan 
Bahrain 
Tunisia 
Syria 
()nan 
Lebanon 
Egypt 
tIorocco 
Gross Darestic Product Sectoral Distribution (at Factor Cost in 1971) 
I. I .. I I . I I I I I 1 
Agnculture MlmnglManufact-IElectnc Construction Ccmrerce Transport Finance Services tiP 
532 
601 
1133 
uri ng I Water & 
499 705 
1451 335 
1950 1040 
Gas 
19 
33 
112 
537 
123 
985 
267 
660 1252 
20 718 31 15 71 86 
226 2815 436 66 224 238 
7 254 11 5 25 30 
9 2549 152 26 93 252 
93 2587 97 20 328 212 
355 8923 727 132 741 818 
2/6 
226 
502 
5.8 
83 
329 
29 
89 
244 
774 
1165 4778 
58 796 EO 
58 1961 8668 
.6 22.8 lOb 
50 66 1130 
235 463 5032 
17 22 400 
65 645 1 3880 
82 789 4452 
449 1975 14894 
2.4 60.0 4.9 1.0 5.0 5.5 5.2 3.0 13.0 100 
67 6 39 6 21 92 41 51 142 465 
2 188 6 4 5 14 3 - 39 261 
321 96 139 28 102 194 91 - 512 1483 
460 410 84 375 230 188 358
19 
210511 
40 178 1 49 7 5 2 »1 ~ 
144 232 37 74 534 136 61 454 167211 
1965 146 1379 110 294 676 340 2099 7rm~ 
942 146 679 148 197 893 165 1064 423411 II I.....,S.,....,ub.-=-To...,..ta-:-l-~ ..... 3 ..... 94r:r-1-~.....,99 ........... 2 ~~26~52~-:---:3O;""34-r--;..---:8~2~6 --+--~20"'tl'785on---;-,1-m011T1---i--->'!30i7'Il'2r.-....,468rm"'17r----TlM7~530m-11 
1~----~~ __ ~~~~~~~~-+--~--~1r~~~~~-r~~~~~1 % 22.5 5.7 15.1 2.0 4.7 15.9 5.8 1.7 26.6 100 I 
I I'S~ud~a--n ---+--844~--+--+---"2'17"1'01.--+----r:64.,.--i---cl8r-r1 --+--"-'2117\'"4-+-Tl:196~i---:---t-----,::J580m-n2rn:186thl 
Sanal ia 167 3 29 1 16 17 16 13 29 2911 
Mauri tani a 58 55 10 15 13 12 42 2051 
Yaren A.R. 145 3 12 1 14 43 9 6 38 2711 
Yaren P .D.R. 37 24 3 4 33 11 7 35 1541 
I 'S....,ub~To-:-ta-l-+-..,..1,...,.2500r1--+--,.6..-1 +-"""'I'2"76.,.--+----r:6l'r9 +--,If':136~~i-"7320:Jj'''\t-~244Iir"-r-~26~--,72~44...,3m10rr71· 
~~------~~~---~~~~_4~~+--rr__+_rn~T__n~---~~~IIIT1I % 40.2 2.0 9.0 2.2 4.4 W.3 7.8 .8 23.3 100 1 
1 ~'G~re~~~To~ta~l~--,.~~--~ImI9~276~T;46~9~5-4~M~7-T~236~3--r~5~17~5~~2~53n1-t~ro~5~c9~~~7ril~M~I~~1 
I 1 
15.1 27.0 10.6 1.5 5.3 11.7 5.8 1.8 21.2 I 100 I 
I I 
mCE: C011>iled fran Arab Monetary Fund Report 1983, Arab Cruntries National 
Accrunts 1971-81, Arab Monetary Fund 1983. 
APPE~IX 2.6 
Arab Countries: sectoral contribution to GJP in 1972 (at Factor Cost and in 
million U.S. $, at current prices) 
Coontry 
I. I .. I I I I I I I I 1 
IAgrl cu 1 turel Ml m rg I Manufact-I El ectri c Constructi on I C~rce IT ransportl Finance Services CIP I 
lFishirg & I & uring IWater & IRest. & ICann. & IIns. & sector I 
Forest Fuel Gas Hotel Storage Bar1< I 
hA~1~~riGa--~t-~63~1---T~lro~1T-(9~1~2~--COO~T-~77~2--~'1"16~3~--~~~~---+~1~4~~~~~~: 
Iraq 009 1223 421 41 136 300 258 60 915 41711 
1 ~4S~ubhT.fu~~~'--~'1~~m---~~~~~~ln~3~--ln3~9-T--~~W---~1~47~1-+--~~~+-~ro-+~2~Jro~~1~~I 
'%r-----~------~--~------_T----T_------~------~----~----~~--~--~: 
I ,U~.Ar.Er.-------7-~~~~-n9~~~j~rn-~~1~9-+--~9~3--~~11~2~--~100~~~6~5~--7~2~~14~ml 
Saudi Arabi a 255 4099 479 73 283 284 378 280 589 6720 I 
Qa~r 9 324 14 7 32 39 38 22 25 5101 
KlltIai t 11 2780 199 33 117 323 105 77 005 4450 I 
Libya 132 2785 140 29 556 291 305 113 978 53291 
Onan 44 199 1 2 59 10 8 2 42 3671 
I ·~S~w~fu~~-'--~-4~7~7--~1~11~2~2+-~8~73--~~1~6~3~~11~~~--~1~05~9-+--~M~2-+--5~~~~2~5-11~-1~~1 
.~------~------7---+-----~----~------~---7-----7----~--~--_1 % I 
I ·~J~o-~~n----~--7~5--~--9~---~--~--~7~--~2~6--~~1OO~+---~~~~55~~M~9~~51~21· 
Bahrain 3 200 14 5 7 17 6 51 303 
Tunisia 471 113 207 31 130 500 116 417 1985 
Syria 643 473 91 449 193 195 387 2431 
Lebanon 207 290 42 95 658 157 77 560 2006 
Egypt 2148 76 1279 106 278 644 354 1916 6001 
Morocco 1065 166 817 184 209 1001 192 1303 4937 
Sub Total 4612 
Sudan 862 
Somalia 228 
Mauritania 66 
Yemen A.R. 182 
Yemen P.D.R. 41 
SUb To~' 1379 
Grand To~l 7900 
~ 2833 
4 
61 
3 
68 
188 
31 
12 
19 
28 
278 
114298 5317 
I 
466 
60 
1 
1 
3 
65 
833 
1194 
92 
18 
10 
23 
9 
152 
3394 
3113 
375 
20 
20 
59 
32 
506 
6149 
SURCE: Canpiled fran Arab Monetary Fund Report 1983, Arab Cruntries National 
Accrunts 1971-81, Arab Mone~ry Fund 1983. 
1068 
182 
20 
16 
15 
12 
245 
2843 
132 4783 19055 
631 2m 
15 33 370 
52 237 
9 58 369 
7 39 171 
31 813 3537 
782 10447 151971 
APPENDIX 2.7 
----- -_ .... - ---. 
Arab Countries: Sectoral Contribution to GOP in 1979 (at factor cost and in 
million U,S, $, ~t current prices} 
--- --- -------- - - ----- r---
Country Agriculture Mining Menufact- Electric Construction Commerce Transport Finance Services GOP 
Fishing & & urlng Wl)ter & Rest. & Comm. & Ins. & sector 
Forest Fuel Ges Hotel Storage Bank 
'" ger II) ;LOJ4 tsts,,:z J705 400 4109 40()1 1')()() - ,~U ~OJtl/U Iraq 23~3 192~6 1707 168 1167 1134 1248 511 3164 30708 
SUD IOTal 4.)tll ~tllUtI '41~ '~H ",b '1 OJ,) lb14 '1 1 tl4UI OU"tI 
~ 
U.I\.t.. 1 I tI I.cOUI 004 ~,)H ~441 1 I OJ,) tI'90-~-,ro, I~O' .ll175 
Saudi Arabll) 1249 39341 3753 74 10344 4139 :5798 1216 9764 73678 
. Qatar 32 3621 227 22 360 440 110 319 623 57~4 
Kuwait 60 1~995 2096 96 760 1541 385 519 2948 24400 
LlbV a 505 15493 62B "5 2455 1294 984 657 3561 25712 
Ollan 93 20B7 41 27 263 240 106 50 4B7 3394 
:'UD lo'fal .c I 1 I tI'.:jI144 14U'.:jI 01i. 10029 '.:jI't 4'.:j1 ()"2~ ')b2b 1tH'4t1 1501113 
, 
-
JorOl)n 145 'J;L ,)1,) .)4 ;L,') 41 1 lUOJ Ji..) ,)U'J ;L;L 11 
Bahrain 35 637 4B9 27 23B 341 238 230 517 2752 
Tunisia 973 775 B17 
-
534 15B9 41B - 1103 6209 
Svrle 1747 - 2101 - 692 2414 710 660 1689 10013 Lebanon 294 449 - 187 11 7 973 264 129 1025 3438 
EgVpt 3614 27·26 2357 146 924 2953 1418 - 2878 17016 
Morocco 2851 705 2676 550 1267 31 01 677' - 40B5 15912 
SUD IOTa, '.:jI0,';I 'Jtl4 tl7".) 944 4007 11762 '9'4 1.)4i. T1805 - ,7'0"-
J 
:,uaan ;L()UI I .)tl9 1 1 U ,),)0 121~ 1()9 4U.) ';I')U -5757 
50110110 687 5 79 7 34 65 79 78 101 1135 
Mauritania 162 56 35 - 21 110 48 
-
104 536 
Yemen A.R. 668 29 110 8 229 369 Bl 63 367 1924 
Ye •• n P.D.R. 68 1 57 9 69 B9 BO 19 118 510 
SUD 'OTa~ 4'';I~ 96 ()10 1}4 ()8' 1t14') 1 '05 I ~'OJ TO"2U 10tl()2 
I ~ 
~ :r .. o >en' --20355 122734 22244 2258 26695 28271 13884 6042 40681 283164 j 
-
--.- . 
--
-- - --- - -- ------ ------- ------
National Accounts 1971-81, 
i 
APPENDIX 2.8 Arab Countries: Sectoral Contribution to GOP in 1980 (at factor cost and in 
-- . 
--------r----- ---- million U.S. s. at ~J!r.refl1.p-r:.ices) ...- .. ---
Country Agriculture Mining M~nuf~ct- Electric Construction Commerce Transport Fln~nce Services GOP 
Fishing & & urlng Water & Rest. & Comm. & Ins. & sector 
Forest Fuel G~s Hotel Stor~ge 8~nk 
""ger'a Z'bo I~~UJ 4411 44O -4tJ.lO . 4~HU l' .lJ - O~J::) JH41T 
Iraq 2925 22193 2121 208 1451 1409 1552 635 3935 36429 
~UD lote, ::)4'.11' ~'4/4 --05'9~ 0'4 Oill OJH'J JU /J '5 J ') 'Vi')V ~r 
) 
~.E. .li.~ J'JVUH J J JV J'U .lO,J 2453 1 OO~- Iii' 1 ts13 ~ '3'tfOOi 
S~udl Ar~bl~ 1397 73059 5032 82 12862 5272 4512 1375 11908 115499 Qatar 41 5263 294 29 476 485 132 367 839 7926 
K uw ~ I t 64 18728 1627 92 814 1731 460 679 3371 21566 
LIbya 539 22327 805 164 3064 1520 l1B4 160 4008 34371 
Oman 106 3547 65 B6 322 542 118 84 692 5562 
~UD 10T~' .lJ/U 14:lULl ts'J,J tsUJ :lUl~1 lZ00} 741i. 4540 77707 120991 I 
) 
. 
Jora~n .olIO lJJ 4Z6 
" 
,,)16 :)!'J7"J .l07 1tsi. Oli. ..)V~f) 
8~hraln 39 1152 726 32 259 433 294 355 623 3913 
Tunisia 1216 1127 1026 
-
578 1843 457 
-
1279 7526 
Syria 2702 
-
2700 
- 783 2735 797 801 2801 13325 
Leb~non 348 532 - 221 139 1153 313 152 1216 4074 
Egypt 4896 4436 3063 113 1087 3568 1813 
-
3661 22151 
Morocco 3229 811 3051 601 1230 3393 793 
-
4654 11822 
SUD ,oTe' 1i.646 HZ')1 10992 1 u'B'l- 44UZ lJbHZ 4194 1690 1491i. IZ~";)) 
,-- -
-,-m ---,n-
- lV4) 5uClan .l/U") U 4~i. 141 ~':Ii. tso2 11 '1U 
Som~lla 181 6 91 8 39 
llT 
91 90 113 1299 
Mauritania 161 60 39 - 47 52 - 118 598 
Yemen A.R. 158 33 144 14 220 95 16 455 2246 
Yemen P.O.R. 65 1 61 8 53 101 70 22 159 540 
Sub lote. 44/f) IVts 767 171 /)1 "vvl I I IV ")41 Itsts~ 11 ts ,,-
-- -~ 
-
-----l"1:ro.a I OTe I 24983 18584~ 27310 2712 31621 34075 16449 7406 49757 ':I 380158 ..,I 
, . 
______ 1 
-
-
-- _. - - - _. - ....... - -
-.- - . --------'---- - _ .. . -- .. - --_._----' 
SOURCE: Complied from Arab Monetary Fund Report 1983. Arab Countr;es Nat;ona1 Accounts 1971-81. 
APPENDIX 2.9 
Planned Investment by Economic Sector for 1970's 
Productive Sectors 
Agricultural 
Mining & Manufacturing 
Contruction & Building 
Electricity, Water & Gas 
Distribution Sectors 
Transportation & Storage 
Trade 
Service Sectors 
Health & Education 
Other Servi ces 
TOTAL 
% 
Major Oi1-
Exporting 
Countries 
64.5% 
120796 
(17496) 
(52405) 
(30517) 
(20378) 
62.8% 
42882 
(35863) 
(7019) 
84.81% 
69667 
(38925) 
(30742) 
(233345) 
69% 
SOURCE: Table 2/12, p.295 
Joint Arab Economic Report 1981. 
Non-Oil 
Countries 
30.5% 
57444 
(12268) 
(21136) 
(12018 ) 
(12022) 
30.0% 
20549 
(17095) 
(3454) 
12.3% 
10147 
(5276) 
(4871) 
(88140) 
26% 
(mill ion $ US) 
Least 
Developed 
Countries 
5.0% 
9438 
(3760) 
(2647) 
(2190) 
(841) 
7.2% 
4887 
(4165) 
(722) 
2.9% 
2320 
(1207 ) 
(1113) 
(16645) 
5% 
TOTAL 
100% 
187678 
(33524) 
(76188) 
(44725) 
(33241) 
100% 
68318 
(57123) 
(11195) 
100% 
82134 
(45408) 
(36726) 
(338130) 
100% 
APPENDIX 2.10 
Non Oil Arab Countries 
Official Unrequited Transfer 
/ / / / / 
I / Jordan / Egypt / Morocco Somalia Sudan Tunisia Syria Yemen Yemen Maurintania / TOTAL 
/ / / / North South 1 
1 / / / 1 
/ 1 1 1 1 
/ 1980 1 1308.7 1 36 114 142.6 17.8 101 1520 145.8 84.0 117.1 1 3587.0 
1 / 1 1 
1 1979 1 1055.6 / 49 43 58.1 1.3 59 1627 254.8 24.9 123.1 1 3295.8 
/ 1 1 1 
/ 1978 1 335.3 318 58 27.8 15.1 34 782 125.3 40.2 158.6 1 1894.3 
1 1 
1977 500.3 405 15 105.8 21.0 51 1142 114.1 55.0 127.5 I 2537.7 
1976 353.2 624 6 39.7 20.9 56 402 102.7 46.3 152.8 1803.6 
1975 409.5 986 34 100.3 46.7 42 654 116.3 10.1 81.8 2480.7 
1974 252.1 994 30 48.2 18.4 26 416 53.3 0.6 69.4 1908.0 
1973 186.5 633 33 25.9 -1.7 41 364 0.5 45.1 1327.3 
1972 184.5 290 30 15.2 6.3 33 45 604.0 
1971 100.3 268 35 17.2 -1.4 26 21 1.0 467.1 
1970 110.8 304 37 12.2 1.5 35 3 1 8.5 512.0 
1 
4796.8 4907 435 593.0 145.9 504 6977 1 912.3 / 262.6 1 883.9 1 20417.75 1 
======== ======= ========= ========= ======= ========= =======1=======/=======1=============1=============1 
1 1 / 1 / 
SOURCE: I.M.F. International Financial Statistics, 1982 
APPENDIX 2.11 
Non Oil Arab Countries 
Official Onrequited Transfer 
I I I I 
I I Jordan I Egypt Morocco Somalia Sudan Tunisia Syria Yemen Yemen Mau ri ntani a TOTAL I 
I I I North South I 
I I I 1 
I I I 1 
I 1980 1 664.8 I 2696 1004 57.3 209.0 286 137 1069.5 347.1 -33.7 6437.0 I 
I I I I 
I 1979 I 508.6 I 2213 8913 35.9 9.9 271 112 936.7 311.5 -26.5 5263.1 I 
1 1 I 1 
1 1978 1 466.2 1 1773 702 78.1 1.3 204 95 910.1 254.8 -25.6 4458.9 1 
1 
1977 420.8 896 546 2.2 -.3 152 92 987.1 187.3 -22.9 326u.2 1 
I 
1976 401.7 842 499 1.2 -.6 128 53 675.9 119.3 -28.4 2691.1 
1975 172.1 455 482 1.9 -1.2 131 52 270.2 58.8 -22.7 1599.1 
1974 82.4 310 299 3.5 4.9 106 44 135.5 42.8 -12.7 1015.4 
1973 55.6 123 211 2.7 6.3 91 37 32.9 -14.2 545.3 
1972 27.2 110 107 1.8 3.5 53 39 27.1 368.6 
1971 38 74 2.1 -.9 44 8 43.8 209.0 
1970 33 36 0.7 -1.2 23 7 52.1 1 -5.9 144.7 
1 
2799.4 9489 4851 187.4 230.7 148.9 676 4985.0 1477.7 1 -192.6 1 25992.4 1 
======== ======= ========= ========= ======= ========= ======= ======= =======1=============1=============1 
1 1 1 
SOURCE: I.M.F. International Financial Statistics, 1982 
APPENDIX 3.1 
Branches and Head Offices of Commercial Banks in the peninsula 
countries in 1966 
Saudi 
Arabia U.A.E. Qatar Bahrain Oman Kuwait 
British Bank of the 3 4 1 2 2 6 
Middle East 
Eastern Bank 3 1 2 
Ottoman Bank 1 1 
First National City 1 1 
Bank 
Banque de lilndochine 2 
A 1 gemene Bank Nederland 2 
National Bank of Pakistan 1 
Habib Bank 1 
Arab Bank 6 1 1 1 
Banque du Cairo 4 
Banque Misr 2 
Banque de Liban 1 
Intra Bank 1 
Riyad Bank 10 
National Commercial Bank 11 
Qatar National Bank 1 
National Bank of Dubai 2 
Bank of Bahrain 1 
National Bank of Kuwait 9 
Commerci al Bank of Kuwait 5 
Gulf Bank 3 
43 13 6 6 2 23 
SOURCE: The Bankers Almanac and Year Book 1966-1967. 
APPENDIX 3.2 
Branches and Head Offices of Commercial Banks in Jordan in 1966 
BANK 
Bank of Jordan 
Cairo Amman Bank 
Jordan National Bank 
Arab Bank 
Ottoman Bank 
British Bank of the Middle East 
Intra Bank 
Rafidain Bank 
OFFICE 
12 
13 
9 
10 
8 
2 
5 
1 
60 
SOURCE: The Bankers Almanac and Year Book 1966-1967. 
APPENDIX 3.3 
Ratio of Total Inter-Arab Trade to total external Trade 
Figures in percent 
Country 1971 1972 1974 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Jordan 26.45 22.67 21.65 23.02 22.91 26.28 23.64 Emirates 2.55 3.52 2.82 4.20 6.29 5.11 5.04 Bahrain 29.13 23.51 38.53 34.80 41.42 41.81 42.99 
Tunisia 4.91 4.79 8.13 6.30 7.14 8.03 4.67 
Algeria 2.04 2.08 3.67 0.12 0.15 0.35 0.04 Saudi Arabi a 8.48 8.08 6.10 4.03 4.26 4.02 4.93 
Sudan 8.74 9.56 6.78 8.52 29.23 23.66 
Syria 19.53 17.66 13.65 14.80 17.19 18.92 7.82 
Somalia 25.08 25.71 20.78 35.08 21.45 19.77 21.10 
Iraq 8.00 6.25 2.70 2.95 3.93 3.95 0.43 
Oman 2.80 4.03 6.48 7.59 6.57 7.67 0.32 Qatar 4.86 7.90 3.38 1.83 3.84 3.78 3.81 
Kuwait 3.19 3.32 3.44 6.38 6.19 7.48 3.43 
Lebanon 23.94 24.45 26.01 29.63 26.65 24.98 25.06 
Libya 1.77 2.17 1.64 0.95 0.52 0.56 0.30 
Egypt 7.53 7.83 6.72 4.71 4.76 5.95 2.60 
Morocco 3.69 3.89 6.59 6.73 10.67 13.87 16.21 
Muritania 0.87 1.07 0.75 0.34 
Yemen A.R. 33.23 25.56 16.20 29.10 23.49 25.31 16.78 
Yemen P.D.R. 25.81 19.46 24.82 20.47 24.26 37.56 3.88 
TOTAL 7.2 7.1 6.4 5.6 5.9 6.1 5.3 
SOURCE: External Arab Trade 1971-1981. 
APPENDIX 3.4 
Total inter-Arab Trade of member countries 
Figures in million of U.S. dollars 
Country 1971 1972 1974 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Jordan 65.2 71.0 139.3 413.3 541.7 780.0 935.7 Emirates 29.3 55.5 230.6 609.1 1296.2 1494.3 1506.5 Bahrain 166.3 166.4 924.0 1369.8 2055.7 2962.6 3641.9 Tunisia 27.6 37.5 167.6 207.2 331.0 459.0 300.4 
Algeria 42.3 57.8 323.3 17.8 27.3 86.1 9.6 
Saudi Arabia 364.7 460.5 2079.6 2349.2 3538.1 5316.7 7321.7 
Sudan 55.8 60.9 101.4 117.1 141.0 619.4 529.3 
Syria 123.7 146.0 274.8 520.6 854.8 1177.9 570.7 
Somalia 24.4 30.9 42.5 122.1 113.3 131.6 127.7 
Iraq 147.1 113.3 241.8 452.6 1236.3 1590.7 126.9 
Oman 6.9 11.3 99.2 187.9 228.6 389.5 21.3 Qatar 19.3 42.1 60.8 64.2 185.6 223.0 209.1 
Kuwait 100.8 125.5 430.0 957.1 1461.4 2015.1 825.4 
Lebanon 219.8 301.7 1004.1 931.6 1119.3 1322.1 949.4 
Libya 60.2 72.7 180.9 138.5 119.4 182.7 92.1 
Egypt 128.9 134.9 259.8 398.9 270.4 470.3 312.0 
Morocco 44.3 55.3 237.9 300.9 600.5 931.3 1079.8 
Muritania 4.2 6.5 5.5 3.0 
Yemen A.R. 12.6 21.6 32.9 375.6 353.3 474.6 299.0 
Yemen P.D.R. 67.2 30.8 128.9 127.1 241.0 680.0 58.8 
TOTAL 1706.4 1996.6 6959.4 9664.8 14721.4 21313.0 18920.3 
SOURCE: AMF External Arab Trade 1971-1982. 1983. 
APPENDIX 3.5 
Total external Trade Merchandise Exports & Imports 
Figures in million of U.S. dollars 
1 1 1 Country 1971 1 1972 1 1974 1978 1 1979 1980 1981 
1 1 1 
1 
Jordan 246.5 314.51 643.5 1795.2 2364.1 2968.1 3957.5 Emirates 1147.8 1578.31 8173.2 14509.9 20599.5 29262.5 29886.1 Bahrain 570.8 707.71 2398.3 3936.5 4963.1 7085.1 8471.4 Tunisia 563.2 780.41 2061.6 3287.1 4633.2 5724.7 6428.5 Algeria 2077.7 2777.51 8807.5 14996.8 18136.0 24488.4 21704.4 Saudi Arabia 4298.4 5695.9 34101.0 58263.7 83006.0 1322779.9 148597.9 Sudan 662.8 696.5 1061.1 1726.8 1656.1 2119.1 2237.2 Syria 633.5 826.7 2013.1 3518.4 4973.0 6226.3 7275.4 Somalia 97.3 120.3 204.7 347.9 528.0 665.7 605.2 
Iraq 1839. 1812.7 8970.8 15275.6 31491.9 40266.6 29595.5 
Oman 245.1 279.6 1530.2 2475.9 3480.2 5076.6 6703.8 Qatar 397.1 532.6 1800.7 3501.9 4831.4 5905.4 5495.8 
Kuwait 3162.3 3780.1 12514.7 15008.1 23611.9 26950.1 24059.8 
Lebanon 918.0 1234.0 3860.4 3144.0 4199.8 5291.8 3787.9 
Libya 3394.4 3345.8 11024.5 14509.6 23173.7 32489.7 31072.2 
Egypt 1711.2 1722.7 3867.3 8463.9 5677.1 7906.7 12014.8 
Morocco 1200.4 1421.0 3612.6 4469.3 5629.5 6715.7 6661.9 
Muritania 153.6 178.2 372.3 477.9 608.7 725.8 896.2 
Yemen A.R. 38.0 84.5 203.0 1290.7 1505.3 1875.6 1782.0 
Yemen P.D.R. 260.3 158.5 519.4 620.6 993.1 1810.6 1517.0 
TOTAL 23617. 28047. 10773.9 171619.8 246061.6 345832.4 352660.5 
SOURCE: AMF External Arab Trade 1971-1981. 
APPENDIX 3.6 
Arab Banks and financial institutions in London 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 
AFARCO Investment (Kuwait-London) 
Allied Arab Bank (two offices) 
Al-Rajhi Company for Islamic Investments 
Al Saudi Banque (two braches) 
Altajir Limited 
Arab African International Bank 
Arab Bank (three offices) 
Arab Banking Coporation 
Arab Bank Investment Company 
Arab international Finance Company 
Arab Latin American Bank 
Arinfi-Arab International Finance 
Artoc Bank & Trust Bank of Credit 
& Commerce International 
Bank of Oman 
Banque dlAffaires Franco-Arabes 
Banque de la Mediterranee 
Byblos Arab Finacial Bank (Belgium) 
Capital Guidance 
European Arab Bank 
Finarab Investment Company 
First Arabian Corportation 
Galadari Finance Company 
Gulf Bank, The 
Gulf International Bank 
International Resources & Finace Bank 
International Trade & Investment Bank 
Jammal Trust Bank 
Khalij Commerical Bank 
Kuwait Investment Office 
MEA Investment Company 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi (two branches) 
National Bank of Kuwait 
National Commerce Bank 
Oriental Credit 
Qatar Investment Office 
Qatar National Bank (two branches) 
Rafidain Bank 
Sarabex (money broker) 
Saudi International Bank 
Saudi Arabian Investment Company (Overseas) 
SCF Finance Company 
Sharjah Group Company 
UBAF Bank Limited 
UBAF Financial Services 
United Bank of Kuwait 
Yemen Bank for Reconstruction & Development 
Status 
Liaison Office 
Branch 
UK-registered 
UK-registered 
Branch 
UK-registered 
Representative 
Branch 
Representative 
UK-registered 
UK-registered 
Representative 
UK-registered 
Representative 
Branch 
Branch 
Representative 
Representative 
Representative 
UK-registered 
UK-registered 
Representative 
Branch 
UK-registered 
Representative 
Representative 
Branch 
Representative 
Branch 
Representative 
Representative 
UK-registered 
Branch 
Representative 
Representative 
UK-registered 
Representative 
Branch 
Branch 
UK-regi stered 
UK-registered 
Liaison Office 
UK-registered 
Representative 
UK-registered 
UK-registered 
UK-registered 
Representative 
Parents 
Company IS 
headquarters 
Abu Dhabi 
Kuwait 
London 
London 
Paris 
Grand Cayman 
Cairo 
Anunan 
Manama 
London 
London 
Lima 
London 
Kuwait 
Luxembourg 
Dubai 
Paris 
Paris 
Brussels 
Luxembourg 
Luxembourg 
Curacao 
Luxembourg 
Dubai 
Kuwait 
Manama 
Luxembourg 
Luxembourg 
Bei rut 
Adu Dhabi 
Kuwait 
Luxembourg 
Abu Dhabi 
Kuwait 
Jeddah 
Luxembourg 
Doha 
Doha 
Baghdad 
London 
London 
Jeddah 
Geneva 
Kuwait 
Paris 
London 
London 
Sanaa 
SOURCE: Arab British Commerce. Arab banking and Insurance Special Issue 
March, 1981 
APPENDIX 3.7 
Top 60 Arab Banks by Country 
country I I Assets IDepositsl Gross 
Less I I Revenue 
contra I I 
accounts I 
I 
Algeria Banque Nationale d'Algeria I 11357 8492 I 405 Banque Exterieure d'Algeria 7791 4842 
Credit populaire d'Algeria 3291 2146 
Bahrai n Arab Banking Corporation 4788 3770 621 
Gulf International Bank 4507 4146 588 
Bank of Bahrain & Kuwait 1560 1392 
Gulf Riyad Bank 1228 1151 148 
National Bank of Bahrain 1037 69 
Egypt National Bank of Egypt 5724 3377 511 
Bank Misr 4017 3384 346 
Banque du Cairo 3947 3234 173 
Arab African International Bank 2994 2575 368 
Bank of Alexandria 2824 1977 251 
Arab International Bank 1918 1609 204 
France Union de Banques Arabes et Franaises 5847 5520 710 
Banque Intercontinentale Arabe 1769 1679 242 
Al Saudi Banque 1152 n.a 137 
Union Mediterraneene de Banques 1055 n.a 158 
Iraq Rafi dan Bank 18064 15778 1250 
Jordan Arab Bank 8476 8118 999 
Kuwait National Bank of Kuwait 6940 6581 
Gulf Bank 5340 5055 
Commercial Bank of Kuwait 5132 4440 
Alahli Bank of Kuwait 4492 4232 
Bank of Kuwait & the Middle East 2647 2459 
Burgan Bank 1958 1849 
Kuwait Finance House 1247 n.a 121 
Luxemberg Bank of Credit & Commerce International 7345 6741 946 
Compagnie Arabe et International 2819 2576 
d'Investissement 2319 2148 
European Arab Bank Group 
APPENDIX 3.7 cont'd 
Top 60 Arab Banks by Country 
Country Institutions I Assets Deposits Gross 
Less Revenue 
contra 
accounts 
Libya Umma Bank 5774 1181 n.a National Commercial Bank 3951 3019 132 Wahda Bank 3004 2257 229 
J amahyri a Bank 2632 1396 124 
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank 2187 1717 n.a. 
Sahara Bank 1016 n.a. 74 
Morocco Banque Morocaine du Commerce Exterieur 1381 1243 109 
Credit Populaire du Maroc 1359 1172 107 
Peru Arab Latin America Bank 2089 1838 276 
Qatar Qatar National Bank 1509 1371 197 
Sauid Arabia National Commercial Bank 12171 9574 976 
Riyad Bank 7768 5568 813 
Saudi Cairo Bank 2388 1663 n.a. 
Saudi American Bank 2220 1883 341 
Al Bank Alsaudi Alfaransi 1815 1499 251 
Al Bank Alsaudi Alholandi 1604 1334 n.a. 
Saudi British Bank 1478 1278 196 
Saudi Investment Banking Corporation 1433 1348 n.a. 
Arab National Bank 1218 n.a. 117 
Spain Banco Arabe Espanol 1409 1279 212 
Syria Commercial Bank of Syria 4331 2493 n.a. 
Tunisia Societe Tunisienne de Banque 1862 n.a. 66 
U.A.E. National Bank of Abu Dhabi 6151 5163 766 
Bank of Oman 1690 1458 n.a. 
National Bank of Dubai 1122 n.a. n.a. 
United Saudi International Bank 3858 3570 497 
Kingdom U.B.A.F. Bank Ltd. 1311 1183 n.a. 
United Bank of Kuwait 1186 n.a. n.a. 
U.S.A. Financial General Bank Shares 2627 2201 307 
U.B.A.F. Arab American Bank 1088 n.a. 157 
SOURCE: The Banker (December, 1982), p.132 
APPENDIX 3.8 
Arab countries : commercial banks assets 
(in millions of USA dollars) 
COUNTRY 1971 1981 Average Annual 
Growth 
Algeria 2015 21905 22% 
Iraq 715 
U.A.E. * 909 17834 28% Qatar 135 2281 26% 
Kuwait 2067 27004 24% 
Saudi Arabia 819 31004 35% 
Libya 818 **13208 26% 
Jordan 231 3926 26% 
Bahrain 226 2553 24% 
Tunisia 741 4171 16% 
Syria 534 5760 22% 
Oman 100 1635 26% 
Lebanon 2005 10391 14% 
Egypt 3358 19684 16% 
Morocco 873 4587 15% 
Sudan 294 1990 17% 
Somalia 61 498 19% 
Mauritania 33 288 20% 
Yemen A.R. 59 910 25% 
Yemen P.D.R. 58 580 22% 
TOTAL 16051 170209 22% 
SOURCE: AMF Money and credit in Arab countries 1971-1982 
(Abu Dhabi, 1983) 
Note: * 1983 
** 1979 
APPENDIX 3.9 
Financial indicators: Arab countries 
Country M1 percentage M2/ 
Foreign I 
assets (net) Total I 
of GDP x 100 GDP x 100 / Domestic Deposit I 
Liquidity to GDP I 
I 
1981 1982 1981 1982 I I 1981 1982 1981 119811 
I I 
Jordan 58 58 99 104 I I 41 30 64 I 68 
Emi rates 8 9 25 31 I 65 58 22 I 26 
Bahrain 15 14 43 41 109 103 49 47 
Tunisia 29 32 43 47 13 12 33 28 
Algeria 54 61 60 68 15 10 29 36 
Saudi Arabia 14 16 9 24 470 454 13 16 
Sudan 34 35 40 42 1-60 -61 22 16 
Syria 39 35 44 40 - 9 29 
Somalia 37 36 46 44 1 -16 19 12 
Iraq 
Oman 9 11 19 25 109 92 14 17 
Qatar 10 12 23 28 68 61 20 23 
Kuwait 19 20 57 68 56 58 53 62 
Lebanon 55 90 248 397 53 46 220 339 
Libya 39 45 52 58 64 44 33 36 
Egypt 30 32 62 68 -10 -6 40 45 
Morocco 38 36 44 44 - 3 -9 26 26 
Mauritania 22 19 29 26 -14 -54 20 20 
Yemen A.R. 64 74 80 90 54 25 22 24 
Yemen P.D.R. 95 93 118 120 24 18 47 50 
SOURCE: AMF Money and credit in the Arab countries 1972-82. 1983. 
AMF National Accounts of the Arab countries 1972-82. 1983. 
APPENDIX 3.10 
Financial Indicators for some developed and undeveloped countries 
Country GOP Ml/GDP M2/GDP per captia 
$ 1979 1979 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
France 10,698 26 50 51 51 51 49 48 
Germany 12,482 16 53 55 56 55 54 54 
Japan 8,418 32 86 86 86 88 88 88 
United Kingdom 7,184 15 36 34 34 33 33 39 
Argentina 3,484 13 26 31 33 36 34 
Cyprus 21 83 74 71 69 66 
Greece 3,588 18 61 64 66 63 64 70 
India 170 17 32 34 38 41 40 
Indonisia 344 10 17 17 17 17 18 19 
Kenya 345 23 29 33 34 36 31 3U 
Tanzania 229 28 30 28 28 37 43 
Singapore 3,752 28 64 62 62 64 68 72 
Turkey 1,277 21 28 28 25 25 21 27 
Yugoslavia 2,783 30 79 79 83 78 80 
SOURCE: IMF. , IFS. , various issues. 
APPENJIX 3.11 
Ca'nrerci a 1 bati<s I sources of funds as end of 1982 in percentage 
I 
Coontry I Oanand Oeposi ts I Tirre I Credi t IF orei gn ICapita1ITota1 
I • . • • I and I fran 11 i abi 1 i t- Accoont I 
IOfflclal entltleslGOvern- I Total I Savings ICentra1 ies I land private Irrent I Deposits Bart I 
sector ldepositsl I 
I I 
I I Jordan 19.6 5.0 124.6 39.5 27.5 8.4 I 100 
Emirates 8.7 4.9 113.6 30.9 0.3 41.3 13.9 100 
Bahrain 18.2 5.4 123.6 47.9 17.1 11.4 100 
Tunisia 33.5 133.5 25.3 21.2 14.1 5.9 100 
Algeria 45.2 145.2 11.1 27.7 3.8 12.2 100 
Saudi Arabi a 41.5 6.9 148.4 33.6 11.7 6.3 100 
Sudan 35.5 135.5 17.7 3.6 39.5 3.7 100 
Syria 30.2 10.8 141.0 10.4 3.9 41.8 2.9 100 
Sana1ia 34.8 134.8 17.8 37.0 10.2 0.2 100 
Iraq 13.6 46.0 159.6 27.3 6.8 6.3 100 
Onan 12.3 12.9 125.2 36.2 rt..7 5.9 100 
Qatar 24.1 3.9 128.0 43.5 22.2 6.3 100 
KUtlait 9.8 4.2 114.0 32.0 2.7 45.1 6.2 100 
Lebanon 9.8 1.4 111.2 67.6 0.2 17.1 3.9 100 
Libya 50.9 7.1 158.0 19.1 17 .7 5.2 100 
Egypt 12.9 8.6 121.5 52.1 1.1 19.0 36.3 100 
r.t>rocco 59.4 159.4 22.3 10.1 4.5 3.7 100 
Mauritania 26.1 3.1 129.2 15.7 13.1 35.9 6.1 100 
Yaren A.R. 21.2 121.2 39.0 28.2 11.6 100 
Yanen P.D.R. 33.0 11.3 144.3 38.4 11.9 5.4 100 
I 
SOJRCE: Calculated fran r.t>ney and Credit in the Arab Coontries 1972-82 1983. 
Note 1 data for 1978 
Note 2 all data for 1978 
Note 3 data for 1980 
Note 4 data for 1981 
APPENDIX 3.12 
Jordan's commercial banks credit facilities by sectors percentage 
distribution 
Sector Average 
1971-79 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Agriculture 3.4 3.7 2.7 2.8 2.5 
Industry & Mining 12.1 15.9 12.4 12.7 13.5 
Construction 20.9 21.4 28.0 24.4 26.3 
Transportation 4.3 3.1 3.2 3.7 4.9 
General commerce & Trade 39.8 36.3 31.3 32.2 26.9 
Financial & institutions .5 1.9 1.3 2.2 2.5 
Municipalities and 4.9 2.3 6.2 7.3 6.3 
Public Corporation 
Tourist and Hotel 1.9 2.6 2.2 2.3 2.5 
Professional & Individuals 7.1 8.4 8.4 7.8 10.5 
Others 5.1 4.4 4.3 4.6 4.1 
100.0 100.0 \100.0 100.0 100.0 
\ 
SOURCE: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 
Vol.12, No.4, and Vol.15, No.4, and Annual Report 1983, p.165. 
APPENDIX 3.13 
Bank credit in U.A.E. by economic activity % at 31st December 
Sector I I 1975 1976 1977 1978 I 1979 
March 
Agriculture 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Mining & Quarrying 0.3 0.2 2.1 1.8 1.8 
Manufacturing 5.8 5.6 5.7 4.9 4.7 
Electricity, Gas & Water 2.1 1.9 2.1 3.8 3.6 
Construction 24.6 25.9 32.4 33.5 34.1 
Trade: Retai 1 & Wholesale 51.1 48.0 40.1 36.7 36.6 
Transport & Communication 1.4 2.6 1.9 2.0 1.9 
Government 5.7 6.3 8.3 8.7 8.9 
All Others 8.9 9.5 7.2 8.3 8.4 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
SOURCE: United Arab Emirates Currency Board Bulletin, Vol.4, 
No.2, (May 1978) Table A.11 and Bulletin Volume 5, 
No.2, (May 1979). 
APPENDIX 3.14 
Arab currencies: Exchange rates and exchange rate arrangements 
Algeria 
Bahrai n 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Exchange 
Rate 
Arrangements 
as of Apri 1 
30, 1985 
Basket 
Dollars 
0011 ars 
0011 ars 
SDR 
Basket 
Independt1y 
floating 
Libya 
Mauretania 
Morocco 
0011 ars 
Basket 
Managed 
Oman 
Qatar 
S.Arabia 
Somal i a 
Sudan 
Syria 
Tunisia 
U.A.E.s 
Yemen AR 
Yemen PDR 
floating 
Dollars 
of Dollars 
0011 ars 
Set of 
indicators 
0011 ars 
0011 ars 
Basket 
Dollars 
Dollars 
0011 ars 
Exchange rates expressed in 
U.S. dollars per national 
currency unit or vice versa 
(period average) 
Dinars per U.S. dollars 
U.S. dollars per Dinar 
U.S. dollars per pound 
U.S. dollars per Dinar 
U.S. dollars per Dinar 
U.S. dollars per Dinar 
Pounds per U.S. dollars 
U.S. dollars per Dinar 
Ougiyas per U.S. dollars 
Dirham per U.S. dollars 
Riyal Omani per U.S. dollars 
U.S. dollars per Riyal 
Riyals per U.S. dollars 
Shillings per U.S. dollars 
U.S. dollars per pound 
Pounds per U.S. dollars 
Dinars per U.S. dollars 
Dirhams per U.S. dollars 
Riyals per U.S. dollars 
U.S. dollars per Dinar 
1978 1984 Change 
% 
3.96 
2.58 
2.55 
3.38 
3.27 
3.63 
2.95 
4.98 
2.66 
1.42 
3.21 
2.60 
3.38 
6.51 
-25.7 
+3.2 
-79.6 
-5.4 
-25.9 
-7.2 
-120 
3.38 3.38 00 
46.16 63.80 -38.2 
4.16 8.81 -117.7 
0.34 0.34 00 
0.25 0.27 +7.5 
3.40 3.52 +3.5 
6.29 20.02 -218.2 
2.66 0.77 -246 
3.92 3.92 00 
0.42 0.77 -83 
3.87 3.67 +5.2 
4.56 5.35 -17.3 
2.89 2.89 00 
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics (June, 1985) 
APPENDIX 4.1 
Development Banks in the region 
--~--- -- --
No. Country & Name of the Institutions 
6 Jordan 
Housing Bank 
Housing Corporation 
Cities and Villages Development Bank 
Agricultural Credit Corporation 
Industrial Development Bank 
Jordan Co-operative Organisation 
3 United Arab Emirates 
Real Estate National Bank 
Emirates Industrial Bank 
Emirates Development Bank 
1 Bahrain 
Housing Bank 
9 Tunisia 
Banque de Developpement Economique de 
Tunisie 
Banque Nationale de Developpement 
Touristique 
Societe Tuniso Seoudienne D'Investissement 
Et Du Developpement 
Banque Tuniso-Koweitienne De Developpementl 
Banque Tuniso-Quatarie D'Investissement I 
Banque De Tunisie Et Des Emirates I 
D'Investissement I 
Banque De Co-operation Du Maghreb Arab I 
Banque Nationale De Developpement Agricolel 
Tunisian-Libyan Bank I 
3 Oman 
Housing Bank 
Oman Development Bank 
Oman Bank of Agriculture and Fisheries 
3 Kuwait 
Saving and Credit Bank 
Kuwait Real Estate Bank 
The Industrial Bank of Kuwait 
Note 
Founded 1973 
Founded 1959 
Founded 1965 
Founded 1979 
Established 1959 
Established 1981 
Established 1981 
Established 1982 
Established 1982 
Established 1981 
Established 1983 
Under Construction 
Established 1976 
Established 1982 
Established 1965 
Established 1973 
Established 1973 
Cont I d .... 
APPENDIX 4.1 Cont'd 
Development Banks in the region 
No. Country & Name of the Institutions 
4 Egypt 
The Principal Bank for Development & 
Agricultural Credit 
Land Bank 
Industrial Development Bank 
5 Morocco 
Caisse De Depot Et De Gestion 
Caisse Nationale De Credit Agricole 
Credit Immonilier Et Hotelier 
Banque Nationale pour le Developpement 
Economique 
1 Mauritania 
Fonds National De Developpement 
7 Lebanon 
Banque Nationale pour le Developpement 
Industrial 
Housing Bank 
Agricultural Credit Bank 
Finance Bank 
Finance and Investment Bank 
Bank of the Near East 
Credit Bank of Agriculture, Industry and 
Real Estate 
4 Libya 
Development Bank 
Real Estate 
The Agricultural Bank 
4 Yemen 
Industrial Bank of Yemen 
Agricultural Co-operative and Credit Bank 
Housing Credit Bank 
Credi t Bank 
1 P.D.R.S. of Yemen 
National Bank of Yemen 
Note 
Established 1976 
Two Banks 
Established 1975 
Founded 1965 
Founded 1959 
Founded 1920 
Founded 1959 
Established 1973 
Established 1776 
Established 1971 
Cont'd .... 
APPENDIX 4.1 Cont'd 
Development Banks 1n the reg10n 
I 
I No. Country & Name of the Institutions Note 
I----r-------------__________________ ~--------__ __ 
I 
I 4 Algeria 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Banque De L'Agriculture Et Du Developpement 
Rural 
Banque Algerenne De Developpement 
Caisse Centrale De Co-operative Economique 
Caisse Nationale D'Epargne Et De 
Prevogance 
4 Syri a 
Agricultural Bank 
Real Estate Bank 
Popular Credit Bank 
Industrial Development Bank 
5 Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Agricultural Bank 
Saudi Credi Bank 
Public Investment Fund 
Saudi Industrial Development Fund 
Real Estate Development Bank 
5 Sudan 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan 
Industrial Bank of Sudan 
Real Estate of Sudan 
Saving Bank of Sudan 
National Development Bank 
1 Somalia 
Somali Development Bank 
3 Iraq 
Real Estate Bank 
The Industrial Bank 
Agricultural Co-operative Bank 
Established 1982 
Established 1963 
Established 1968 
Founded 1924 
Founded 1966 
Founded 1967 
Founded 1957 
Founded 1961 
Founded 1982 
Founded 1968 
Established 1949 
Founded 1940 
APPOOIX 4.2 
I 
I DevelqJrent 
I I nsti tuti ons 
I 1--------
I Islamic DevelqJrent 
I Bark 
I 
I Abu Dhabi Fund for 
I Arab Econanic 
I DevelOfl'll2nt 
I 
I (PEC Fund for Inter-
I national Development 
Saudi Fund for Devel-
oprent 
Iraqi Deve 1 qJrent 
Fund 
DevelOJllEnt Financing Operations of Arab National and R~;onal Finaocing Institutions 1962-1983 
(ml I 11 on dOllars) 
1 I I I 1 I 1 1 I 
INo. of INo. of 11962-731 1974 1 1975 1 1976 1 1977 1 1978 \ 1979 1 1900 \ 1981 1 1982 1 1983 Total 1 % 
ICountriesl Operations , 1 1 1 1 1 I I I 
I I I I 1 1 I 1 I I 1 
.- - I 1 1 1 I I I I I 1 I I 
I 36 I 276 I - - I - I - I 119.34 188.70 498.73\ 475.39\ 649.05\ 519.831 571.21\3022.2521 16.4\ 
, \ , I' I 1 \ 1 I 1 I 1 
40 83 
1 1 1 1 \ I 1 1 1 I 64.291 44.18 163.731 138.82 215.95 145.14 100.611 69.88 65.681 25.7611034.04 1 5.bl 
I I \ 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
81 341 - I - 42.701 243.01 155.01 212.80 250.77 400.88 323.721 212.8511841.74 1 10.0\ 
1 1 1 1 1 I 
I 1 1 I 1 \ 
- 1282.75 432.581 770.01 561.68 447.01 331.89 348.61 611.331 372.26\4158.15 1 22.5\ 53 183 
1 1 \ 1 1 \ 
\ 1 \ 1 
31 69 30.001 - 15.00\ 26.301 101.201 405.30 743.26 373.30 37.66\ - 11733.02 1 9.4 
1 I 1 1 \ 1 
I 1 1 \ \ 1 
Arab Fund for Economic 1 16 129 I - 1114.891193.44 331.591 362.601 - I 70.23 111.72 148.40 232.751 309.7411875.52 1 10.2 
and Social Develqxrentl 1 1 I 1 1 1 I I 
1 I I I I I 1 1 1 _ 
Kuwait Fund for Arab I 62 259 I 342.90\138.861327.111 318.701 410.991 200.171 353.681 268.681 741.381 763.111 389.9514255.52 1 23.0 
Econanic Development I I I 1 I I I 1 I I I 1 1 
1 1 I I I I I 1 I I I I I 
Arab Bark for Economicl 37 92 I - I - I - I 79.041 77 .041 66.921 20.201 81.021 69.701 80.001 67.15\ 541.431 ~.9 
Deve 1 ~nt in Afri ca 1 I I I I 1 I I I I 1 I I 
I I I I I I 1 I I I I 1 I 
Grand Total 
% 
-, -r -- r- T-- 1 --- T--- I --- I r I I I I I 
99 1432 I 342.901348.041847 .4811383.7012148.1411489.6312154.0912363.3412801.2012634.0011948.92118461.521100.01 
1 1.8 1 1.9 1 4.6 I 1 11.6 I 8.1 I 11.7 I 12.8 I 15.2 I 14.3 I 10.5 I 100.0 I 1 
I 1 J 1 __ -'_I 1 I I I I I I' 
SOJRCE: Coordination Secretariat, Arab Fund for Econanic and Social Developrent; Developnent Financing of Arab National and Regional Financing 
Institutions as at End 1983, Kuwait, 1984. 
APPENDIX 4.3 
Development Financ;ng Operation to the end of 1982 Sector;al and 
--- ---I 
I Country 
I 
I 
I 
-.- -----
I 
I Jordan 
I Emirates 
I Bahrain 
I Tunisia 
Algeria 
Djubouti 
Sudan 
Syri a 
Somalia 
Iraq 
Oman 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Egypt 
Morocco 
Mauritania 
Yemen A.R. 
Yemen P.D.R. 
Total 
% 
-- - Countries d;stribution 
(in million U.S. Dollars) 
---- ---- ----
I 
1 Transportation 
1 and 
1 Telecommunication 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
210.47 
1.40 
165.10 
128.61 
50.65 
329.01 
214.96 
53.82 
77.74 
59.20 
11.02 
373.72 
53.60 
183.32 
130.36 
130.92 
2173.70 
25.6% 
Power 
(Electricity 
& Gas) 
240.85 
145.22 
43.99 
17.98 
100.36 
116.55 
125.22 
7.34 
218.06 
32.54 
135.59 
162.77 
28.49 
149.69 
266.65 
1791.30 
21.2% 
Water & 
Sewage 
107.02 
198.90 
67.76 
23.98 
62.07 
4.52 
27.55 
113.21 
605.01 
7.1% 
Agriculture & 
Livestock 
55.64 
202.69 
120.03 
6.79 
169.88 
25.38 
396.97 
80.78 
52.24 
85.07 
1195.43 
14.1% 
SOURCE: Arab Monetary Fund, Joint Arab Economic Report 1983 
-- ---
Industry & 
Mining 
224.02 
10.00 
14.35 
208.15 
264.66 
30.55 
144.00 
46.35 
10.80 
10.56 
28.62 
147.02 
183.37 
230.21 
1.66 
37.30 
1600.62 
19.0% 
--T- 1 I 
Others 1 Total 1 Percentage 1 
1 1 
1 I 
1 1 
1 1 
185.00 11023.001 
5.13 1 15.131 
26.69 192.661 
46.07 864.861 
24.20 417.671 
4.00 102.981 
43.52 736.921 
50.95 503.361 
40.90 423.601 
17.90 
24.39 348.811 
9.75 101.691 
11.02 
18.99 762.771 
177.12 982.351 
104.86 627.661 
45.31 406.811 
291.11 924.221 
1097.95 18464.01 
13.0% 1 100.0% 
1 
1 
1 
1 
12.25 1 
1 
2.4 1 
10.3 1 
5.0 1 
1.3 
8.8 
6.0 
5.0 
4.1 
1.2 
9.0 
11.6 
7.4 
4.8 
10.9 
100.u 
APPENDIX 5.1 
Islamic Banks in Arab Countries 
I I I 
I I Name Est Paid-up Major shareholders I 
I I capital (and notes) I 
I I (Us$m) I 
I I I 
I I I 
I Bahrai n I Bahrian Islamic Bank 1979 15 Bahraini public and Government I 
I I agencies. Kuwaint Finance House I 
I I and Kuwaiti Government agencies. I 
I I Dubai Islamic Bank (full banking I 
licence) I 
I 
Masraf Faisal al-Islami 1983 20 Dar al-Maal al-Islami (OBU licence)1 
(Bahrain) I 
I 
Egypt Banque Misr 1980 Egyptian Government (Banque Misr I 
has an Islamic department with I 
separate accounts, but no separate I 
corporate identity) I 
I 
Faisal Islamic Bank I 1977 I 21 Egyptian nationals 51%, Saudi and I 
other Muslims 49% (10 branches, I 
offshore status) I 
I 
Islamic International Bank 1981 12 Egyptian nationals, mainly non- I 
for Investment and resident (Offshore status, invest- I 
Development ment banking) I 
I 
Nasser Social Bank 1972 5 Egyptian Government (21 branches, I 
social Welfare objectives) I 
I 
Cont'd ...• 
APPENDIX 5.1 Cont'd 
_.- ----- --- I 
Name Est Paid-up Major shareholders I 
capital (and notes) I ( Us$m) I 
I 
I 
Jordan Jordan Islamic Bank for 1978 9 Jordanian public ( 8 branches, I 
Finance and Investment full commercial licence) I 
I 
Kuwait Kuwait Finance House 1977 30 Kuwaiti public 51%, Kuwaiti minis- I 
tries 49% (10 branches, banking I 
investment and trading) I 
I 
Saudi Arabia I Islamic Development Bank I 1975 I Governmens of 41 Muslim countries 
(provides interest-free loans for 
social and economic development in 
Muslim countries and communities) 
eX-Al Rajhi Company for 1983 172 Al-Rajhi family (174 branches, 
Currency Exchange and foreign exchange dealings and 
Commerce remittances, recently granted 
licence for Islamic banking) 
Sudan Faisal Islamic Bank 1978 9 Sudanese nationals 40%, non-Sudan-
ese 60% (7 branches, commercial and 
investment banking) 
United Arab Dubai Islamic Bank 1975 14 Lootah family, other UAE national 
Emirates (4 branches, including one in 
Cairo) 
SOURCE: Finacial Times, October 3, 1983. 
APPENDIX 5.2 
Islam's Banking Institutions in Non-Arab Countries 
I------~------------~-------------------
1 Name Notes 
1---------+---------------1 ---------------------
1 Bahamas 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 Cyprus 
1 (Kibris) 
1 
1 Denmark 
1 
I 
I 
Guinea 
Iran 
Luxembourg 
Mal aysi a 
Niger 
Pakistan 
Senegal 
Switzerland 
Our al-Maal al-Islami 
Trust 
Kibris Islamic 
Bank 
Islamic Bank 
I nternat i ona 1 
Masraf Faisal 
Isami (Guinea) 
Iranian banking 
I sl ami Bank i ng 
System International 
Holding SA 
Bank Islam Malaysia 
Masraf Faisal 
I sl ami (Ni ger) 
Pakistani Banking 
System 
Masraf Faisal 
I slam i ( Sen ega 1 ) 
Dar al-Maal al-
I sl ami OM!) SA 
Shari'a Investment 
Services, SA 
H~lding company for DMI Group, 
wlth operating headquarters in 
Geneva, founded in 1981. 
Authorised capital $1bn ($308m 
paid-in) 
Established 1982, paid-in 
capital $1m 
Established in summer 1983, Kr 
25m paid-in capital, mainly 
owned by Islamic Banking 
System Internatinal Holding SA 
of Luxembourg. First full 
licence for an Islamic bank in 
Europe 
Established mid-1983, subsid-
iary of DMI, authorised 
capital $20m 
All Iranian banks are now oper-
ating Islamically 
Shareholders from 27 Islamic 
countries including several 
Islamic banks 
Established July 1983. Owned 
by federal Government (30%), 
religious councils (25%) and 
other state agencies. Capital 
M$100m 
Established mid-1983, subsid-
iary of DMI, authorised 
capital $20m 
Plans for complete 
Islamicisation 
Established mid-1983, subsid-
iary of of DMI, authorised 
capital $20m 
Operating subsidiaries of Dar 
al-Maal al'Islami Trust 
Cont'd 
APPENDIX 5.2 Cont'd 
Turkey 
United 
Kingdom 
Name 
Masraf Faisal Islami 
(Turkey) 
Kuwait Finance House 
(Turkey) 
Masraf Faisal 
Islami (UK) 
Al Rajhi Company for 
Islamic Investments 
Notes 
Subsidiary of DMI, authorised 
capital $20m, under formation 
Subsidiary of Kuwait Finance 
House, under formation 
Incorporated, with authorised 
capital$O.6m, application as 
licensed deposit taker 
submitted 
Established in 1981 as a sub-
sidiary of the Al Rajhi Company 
for Currency Exchange and Com-
merce. Trade finance for 
internatinal companies 
SOURCE: The Financial Times, October 3, 1983, p.4 
APPENDIX 6.1 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Securities Transacted on AFM 1978 to 1983 
Shares (in millions) Bonds (in thousands) 
Number of Volume of 
Traded Trading 
2.43 
6.53 
17.90 
29.23 
34.6 
36.32 
5.61 
15.84 
41.43 
75.42 
112.25 
119.61 
Number of Volume of 
Traded Trading 
Bonds 
117 
98 
217 
184 
43 
780 
1660 
2300 
1940 
610 
SOURCE: Amman Financial Markets, Various Reports, 
Central Bank of Jordan Annual Report Various Issues 
APPENDIX 6.2 
Government Securities and Corporations bonds, outstanding at the end of each year 
according the holders 
(in thousands of JDs) 
Treasu ry Bill s Government bonds 
Bearer and Registered 
Public corporation bonds 
I 
I 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
SOURCE: 
Centra 1 Commerci al Other 
Banks Banks 
4000 3770 630 
8285 3350 965 
12755 7320 925 
5040 12525 2685 
8305 13010 1685 
15800 10570 1630 
9450 17990 1560 
18360 11200 5440 
15005 20925 2070 
1025 47395 580 
10895 40850 6255 
31495 31400 3105 
41440 32520 540 
52630 35015 855 
32845 63470 185 
Centra 1 Bank of Jordan 
Monthly Statistical Bulletin 
Vol.12, No.4 
Vol.13, No.7 
Vol.18, No.10 
Vol.20, No.4 
Central Commerci al Other Central Commerci al Other 
Banks Banks Banks Banks 
1256 1744 
1180 3250 3570 
2526 4014 5460 
5284 4344 10372 
1507 6679 14226 
80 10871 21049 2000 
5551 9527 25922 1400 600 
7901 11754 29345 360 9255 1385 
9780 16670 29550 650 8937 1413 
17405 14421 29174 10713 9238 49 
22634 17679 29691 46 21360 744 
33448 17036 28516 4644 19893 1613 
34319 19644 31037 5855 18250 2045 
APPENDIX 6.3 
Kuwaiti Share Holding Companies 
Period Volume of Traded Overall Stock 
Shares 1000 Price Index 
January 1, 1976=100 
1976 176.297 235.2 
1977 60.001 191.8 
1978 164.771 258.9 
1979 169.220 311.4 
1980 143.716 313.3 
1981 246.694 489.6 
1982 162.427 509.4 
SOURCE: Central Bank of Kuwait 
Quarterly Statistical Bulletin 
Various Issues 
APPENDIX 6.4 
Volume of Traded Kuwaiti Dinar Bonds in Primary and Secondary Markets 
( i n mi 11 ion KD) 
I 
Period I Primary Secondary 
I 
I I 
I Number of I value 
I Issue I 
I I 
I I 
1974 I 1 I 5.0 
I I 
1975 I 8 I 47.5 
I 
1976 13 76.0 
1977 7 31.0 
1978 16 125.0 140.4 
I I 
I 1979 13 106.0 I 90.1 
I I I 
I 1980 1 7.0 I 43.3 I 
I I I 
I 1981 5 34.0 I 106.4 I 
I I I 
I 1982 8 53.0 I 125.0 I 
I I I 
I 1983 4 4.0 I 142.6 I 
I I I 
SOURCE: Arab Company for Securities Trading 
APPENDIX 6.5 
Lebanese Treasury Bills 
Peri od Issues 
1977 527.40 
1978 3024.60 
1979 2432.35 
1980 4045.05 
1981 11067.23 
1982 24936.34 
1983 19309.00 
(in Millions Pounds) 
Amortiz- Debt Outstanding 
ation 
527.40 
2498.35 1053.65 
2320.15 1165.85 
2734.85 2476.05 
8633.64 4909.64 
17567.26 12278.72 
17815.25 17364.74 
SOURCE: Bank of Lebanon 
Quarterly Bulletin 
APPENDIX 6.6 
Basic Development Indicators 
Al geri a 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Morocco 
Saudi Arabi a 
Sudan 
Syria 
Tunisia 
U.A.E. 
Yemen AR 
Yemen PDR 
Average annual rate of inflation % 
1960 - 70 1970 - 81 
2.7 
2.6 
1.7 
1.4 
5.2 
2.0 
3.7 
2.6 
3.6 
13.4 
11.1 
18.2 
14.6 
17.3 
8.2 
24.3 
15.9 
12.0 
8.2 
15.6 
Source: World Development Report, World Bank, Washington, 
1983, pp.10-11 in summary edition. 
APPENDIX 7.1 
Offshore Banking Units 
1. Offshore banking Units (OBUs) established in Bahrain must be 
full branches of the parent bank or must satisfy the Bahrain Monetary 
Agency (BMA) of the commitment of the parent bank to its office. 
2. OBUs must be fully staffed, operational branches whose staff 
are actively engaged in the business which is written in the books 
of the branch. Permission will not be given for brass plate operations 
in which the business is written elsewhere and booked into Bahrain 
solely as an accounting device. 
3. OBUs will not be allowed to deal in any way with residents of 
Bahrain except for the Government, its Agencies, the fully licensed 
banks and, as an exception, to participate in the financing of 
development projects approved by the BMA. 
4. OBUs will not be allowed to offer chequing account services but 
will otherwise be free to offer all banking services to non-residents 
of Bahrain of all classes, Governments, banks and non-banks. 
5. OBUs will not be required to maintain any reserves with the BMA 
or observe any formal liquidity ratios. 
6. OBUs will be required to supply regular monthly statistical 
information including a balance sheet to the BMA and to satisfy the 
BMA if called upon to do so of their ability to meet their obligations 
as they fall due. 
7. OBUs will be required to submit to the BMA a balance sheet and 
profit and loss account of their OBU operation audited.by auditors 
approed by the BMA within 90 days of the year end and 1n due course 
file a copy of their Group's published accounts. 
8. An annual licence fee of $25,000 is payable to the BMA for an 
OBU licence; no taxation on OBU profits is at present planned or 
proposed by the Government of Bahrain. 
9. Existing fully licensed banks may apply for an OBU ~ic:nce for 
their non-resident business. The BMA will wish to be satlsfled that 
adequate arrangements are made for separate accounting records. 
APPENDIX 7.2 
Bahrain Banking 
I 
I Bank 
I 
Opening Number of 
I __________________________________ +-____ ~-------
I 
Date Staff 
I*British Bank of the Middle East. Hong Kong 
I*National Bank of Bahrain. Bahrain 
I*Arab Bank. Jordan 
I United Bank, Pakistan 
I*Habib Bank, Pakistan 
I*Citibank, U.S.A. 
*Chase Manhattan Bank, U.S.A. 
Bank Melli Iran, Iran 
*Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait 
Banque du Cairo, Egypt 
*Bank Saderat Iran, Iran 
Rafidan Bank, Iraq 
*Banque Paris, France 
*Algemene Bank Nederland, Netherland 
*National Bank of Abu Dhabi, U.A.E. 
Ali-Ali Commercial Bank, Bahrain 
Bahrain Islamic Bank, Bahrain 
Bahrain Saudi Bank, Bahrain 
Grindlays Bahrain Bank, Bahrain 
Chartered Bank, U.K. 
Note: * has offshore banking licence 
1944 
1957 
1960 
1969 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1971 
1971 
1972 
1974 
1975 
1974 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1984 
1984 
1920 
292 
439 
120 
64 
70 
200 
15 
49 
405 
25 
16 
40 
75 
50 
180 
60 
50 
Offshore Banking Units 
Bank Status 
of 
1 i cence 
Number of 
Staff 
Bahrain 
Al Bahrain Arab African Bank. Egypt OBU 82 
Algemene Bank Nederland. Netherlands OBU 75 
Allied Banking Corp. Philippines OBU 5 
A 1 Saudi Banque. France OBU 30 
ALUBAF Arab International Bank. France OBU 44 
American Express International Banking Corp. US OBU 60 
Arab Asian Bank. Bahrain OBU 51 
Arab Bank. Jordan OBU 120 
Arab Banking Corp. Bahrain OBU 180 
Arab International Bank. Egypt OBU , 
Arab Investment Company. Saudi Arabia OBU 25, 
Arab Solidarity Bank. Bahrain OBU 9, 
Arlabank International. Bahrain OBU 42, 
Bahrain International Bank. Bahrain OBU 28, 
Bahrain Middle East Bank. Bahrain OBU 58, 
Ball. Luxembourg OBU, 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. Italy Rep 4, 
Banco de Vizcaya. Spain OBU 2, 
Banco di Roma. Italy Rep 1, 
Banco do Brazi 1. Brazi 1 OBU/Rep 8, 
Banco do Commercio&Industria de Sao Paulo.Brazil OBU 7, 
Banco do Estado de Sao Paulo. Brazil OBU 6, 
Banco Esterior de Espana. Spain Rep 3, 
Banco Itau. Brazil ep' 
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia OBU 18, 
Bankers Trust. US OBU 28, 
Bank Negera Indonesia. Indonesia Rep 5, 
Bank of Ameri ca. US OBU 50, 
Bank of Bahrain & Kuwait. Bahrain OBU 405, 
Bank of Baroda. I ndi a OBU 11, 
Bank of Credit & Commerce International. , 
Luxembourg OBU 31, 
Bank of Nova Scotia. Canada OBU 14, 
Bank of Oman. Oman OBU 19, 
Bank of Tokyo. Japan OBU/Rep 28 , 
Bank of Saderat. I ran OBU , 31 , 
Banque I ndosuez. France OBU , 43 , 
Banque Nationale de Paris. France OBU , 28 , 
Banque Pari bas. France OBU , 23 , 
Barclays Bank International. UK OBU , 38 , 
Baring Brothers. UK Rep , 2 , 
Bayeri sche Verei nsbank. Gennany Rep , 2 , 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce. Canada OBU/Rep, 12~ , 
Chase Manhattan Bank. US OBU" 
Chemical Bank. US OBU , 36 , 
Citibank. US OBU,' 
Commerzbank. Germany Rep , 2 , 
Continental Illinois. US OBU , 22 , 
Credit Commercial de France. France OBU/Rep, 19 , 
--------------------~------~,---------, 
Cont I d .... 
Cont'd 
Offshore Banking Units 
Bank 
Credit Suisse. Switzerland 
Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank. Japan 
Daiwa Bank. Japan 
Deutsche Bank. Germany 
Dresdner Bank. Germany 
European Arab Bank (Middle East). Luxembourg 
First City National Bank of Houston. US 
First National Bank of Boston. US 
Arab Bank (Middle East). Luxembourg 
Fuji Bank. Japan 
Grindlay's Bank. UK 
Grindlay's International Bank. UK 
Gulf International Bank. Bahrain 
Gulf Riyad Bank. Bahrain 
Habib Bank. Pakistan 
Havil Bank. Korea 
Hokkaido Takyshoku Bank. Japan 
Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. Hong Kong 
Industrial Bank of Japan. Japan 
Interfirst Bank Dallas. US 
International Commercial Bank of China. Taiwan 
Irving Trust. US 
Korea Development Bank. Korea 
Korea Exchange Bank. Korea 
Kredletbank. Belgium 
Kuwait Asia Bank. Bahrain 
Kyowa Bank. Japan 
Lloyds Bank International. UK 
Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan. Japan 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust. US 
Marina Midland Bank. US 
Massaraf Faysal Al-Islami of Bahrain. 
Switzerland 
Midland Bank. UK 
Mitoshibishi Bank. Japan 
Mitsui Bank. Japan 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi. Abu Dhabi 
Natinal Bank of Bahrain. Bahrain 
National Bank of Greece. Greece 
National Bank of Pakistan. Pakistan 
National Westminster Bank. UK 
Netherlandshe Middenstronds Bank. Netherlands. 
Nippon Credit Bank. Japan 
Overseas Trust Bank. Hong Kong 
Royal Bank of Canada. Canada 
Sanwa Bank. Japan 
Saudi European Bank. France 
Saudi National Commercial Bank. Saudi Arabia 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Status Number of 
of Staff 
licence Bahrain 
OBU/Rep 31 
Rep 5 
Rep 4 
Rep 5 
Rep 5 
OBU 17 
Rep 2 
Rep 2 
OBU 14 
Rep 4 
OBU 13 
OBU 8 
OBU 311 
OBU 39 
OBU 69 
OBU 11 
Rep 4 
OBU 18 
Rep 5 
Rep 2 
Rep 1 
Rep 1 
Rep 5 
OBU 25 
OBU 14 
OBU 52 
Rep 4 
OBU 47 
Rep 4 
OBU/Rep 48 
Rep 2 
OBU 22 
OBU 15 
Rep 4 
Rep 5 
OBU 50 
OBU 20 
Rep 2 
OBU 12 
OBU 25 
Rep 3 
Rep 4 
OBU 13 
Rep 3 
Rep 5 
OBU 16 
OBU 46 
Cont'd .... 
Cont'd 
Offshore Banking Units 
Bank 
Scandinavian Bank. UK 
Security Pacific National Bank. US 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken. Sweden 
Societe Generale. France 
Standard Chartered Bank. UK 
State Bank of India. India 
Summitomo Bank. Japan 
Summitomo Trust & Banking. Japan 
Swiss Bank Corp. Switzerland 
T.C. Zirsat Bankasi. Turkey 
Texas Commercial Bank. US 
Toyo Trust & Banking. Japan 
Union Bank of Switzerland. Switzerland 
Union de Banques Arabes et Francaises (UBAF). 
France 
United Bank of Kuwait. Kuwait 
United Gulf Bank. Bahrain 
Wardley Middle East. Hong Kong 
West Pack Banking Corp. Australia 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi. Turkey 
Yasuda Trust & Banking. Japan 
Status 
of 
licence 
OBU/Rep 
OBU 
Rep 
OBU 
OBU 
OBU 
Rep 
Rep 
OBU/Rep 
Rep 
Rep 
Rep 
Rep 
OBU 
OBU 
OBU 
Rep 
Rep 
OBU 
Rep 
Number of 
Staff 
Bahrain 
28 
8 
2 
30 
37 
49 
7 
4 
40 
2 
3 
4 
6 
30 
9 
2 
5 
4 
4 
3111 
Cont'd 
Investment Companies 
Bank 
Al BARAKA Islamic Investment Bank. Bahrain 
Arab Investment Banking Corp (INVESTCORP). 
Bahrain 
Bahrain Kuwait Investment Group. Kuwait 
Bahrain Investment Company. Bahrain 
Bahrain Islamic Investment Company. Bahrain 
Ball. Luxembourg 
Citibank. US 
E.F. Hutton International. US 
Marril Lynch International 
Nomura Investment Banking (Middle East). Japan 
Sumitomo Finance (Middle East). Japan 
Trans Arabian Investment Bank. Bahrain 
United Gulf Bank. Bahrain 
Yamaichi International (Middle Eat). Japan 
Securities Houses 
Bank 
Daiwa Securities. Japan 
New Japan Securities. Japan 
Nikko Securities. Japan 
Nippon Kangyp Kakumaru. 
Wako Securities. Japan 
Foreign Exchange 
Bank 
Charles Fulton (Gulf). UK 
Kirkland - Whittaker. Bahrain 
Marshalls (Bahrain). UK 
R.P. Martain (Bahrain). UK 
Tullet and Tokyo (Bahrain). UK 
United Arab Broking Co. UK 
NOTE: OBU Offshoe Banking Licence 
Rep Representative Office 
SOURCE: The Banker, July 1984, pp.93-102 
Status Opening 
of Date 
licence 
1984 
1982 
1982 
1977 
1981 
1976 
OBU 1975 
1980 
1977 
1982 
1983 
1977 
OBU 1981 
1983 
Status Opening 
of Date 
licence 
Rep 1982 
Rep 1984 
Rep 1981 
Rep 1984 
Rep 1982 
Status Opening 
of Date 
licence 
1977 
1979 
1976 
1976 
1979 
1982 
Number of 
Staff 
Bahrain 
20 
40 
1 
16 
4 
58 
195 
18 
30 
46 
7 
29 
79 
19 
542 
Number of 
Staff 
Bahrain 
8 
H 
4 
6 
6 
32 
Number of 
Staff 
Bahrai n 
14 
11 
23 
18 
16 
15 
97 
APPENDIX 7.3 
Forward purchases and sales of OBU's (U.S.$m) in Bahrain as on 
December 31st 1976-82 
Currency 
Forward Purchases 
U.S. $ 
Regional Currencies 
Others 
Purchases = Sales 
Forward Sales 
U.S. $ 
Regional Currencies 
Others 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
291 990 1490 1937 3557 3953 
153 988 1654 1415 1839 2822 
97 327 609 1020 3402 2692 
541 2305 3753 4372 8798 9467 
250 1285 2103 2430 4978 4958 
109 726 1002 834 827 1682 
182 294 648 1108 2993 2827 
SOURCE: Bahrain Monetary Agency. 
1982 
6,339 
4,511 
2,745 
13,595 
6,785 
3,292 
3,518 
APPENDIX 7.4 
Maturity Analysis of Assets and Liabilities of OBU's 
as on December 31 of each year {percentage} 
I I I I 
I Maturities I 1976 I 1977 1978 1979 I 1980 1981 1982 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I Assets I I I 
I I I I 
I Up to 1 month I 31.6 I 41.1 36.8 37.2 I 38.3 41.9 41.0 
I Over 1 month to I I I 
I 1 year I 50.4 I 45.9 51.2 48.5 I 49.5 42.9 51.7 
I Over 1 year I 18.0 I 13.0 12.0 14.3 I 12.2 15.2 17.3 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I Assets & Liabilitiesl 100 I 100 100 100 I 100 100 100 
I I I I 
I -- I I I 
I Up to 1 month I 61.8 I 60.9 53.3 51.6 I 46.7 48.7 48.8 
I Over 1 month to I I I I 
I 1 year I 37.4 I 38.1 45.1 I 46.2 I 50.6 48.5 47.1 
I Over 1 year I 0.8 I 1.0 1.6 I 2.2 I 2.7 2.8 4.1 
I I I I I 
I I I I I 
SOURCE: Compiled from Bahrain Monetary Agency Data. 
APPENDIX 7.5 
OBU's Assets and Liabilities, 1970-82 Geographical Classification 
End of Period 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Assets 
Arab Countri es 40.0 45.0 49.8 53.1 52.7 48.9 49.1 
North America 3.0 1.1 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.4 
Western Europe 18.1 24.8 22.6 24.9 26.0 26.1 24.2 
Offshore Centres 20.0 12.0 12.6 8.0 6.7 7.6 7.8 
Others 21.9 15.2 13.9 12.3 12.9 15.5 16.5 
Assets & Liabilities 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Arab Countries 41.4 52.5 49.7 58.1 64.6 67.1 66.8 
North America 3.4 2.6 8.0 3.0 1.0 1.3 2.1 
Western Europe 36.6 31.8 29.9 28.3 24.8 21.9 20.8 
Offshore Centre 15.0 9.8 7.9 6.9 6.2 5.7 7.4 
Others 3.6 3.3 4.5 3.7 3.4 4.0 2.9 
SOURCE: Compiled from Bahrain Monetary Agency Data. 
